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Abstract 
Abstract 
This research examines how political connectedness influences the corporate 
governance disclosure practices of listed companies. The research also explores 
the process of preparation of annual reports and seeks explanations on decision 
making, regarding the level and nature of corporate governance disclosure. 
This research uses annual report data from companies listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange from 2009-2013. The research utilises qualitative content 
analysis for the study of the disclosure practices of politically connected and 
non-connected firms. An in-depth analysis of silence has been conducted 
focusing on the incidence of the lack of information on corporate governance. 
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews have been conducted in order to seek 
deeper insights into the research phenomena and the triangulation of findings. 
The findings of the qualitative content analysis indicate that non-connected 
firms disclose a higher level of voluntary, as well as mandatory corporate 
governance information, in comparison with politically connected firms. 
However, the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure is found to be higher 
when compared with mandatory disclosure. The results of the analysis of 
silence indicate that politically connected firms stay silent on a diverse range of 
voluntary disclosure items and provide notably limited disclosure. The findings 
of interview data analysis are consistent with the findings of qualitative content 
analysis and the analysis of silence in annual reports. 
To make sense of the findings the research has called upon the dual 
perspectives offered by agency theory and rational choice institutionalism. In 
assessing the implications of disclosure/non-disclosure practices it is found that 
the decision to disclose fnformation is driven by the self-interest and 
12 
Abstract 
opportunism of politically connected members of the board who avoid 
voluntary disclosure of information. However, it is also found that rationality 
plays an important role and while the firms are operating in a tight regulatory 
environment, politically connected firms provide better mandatory disclosure. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Corporate governance refers to the way in which organisations are directed and 
controlled (Cadbury, 1992). Wu (2005, p. 17) argues that corporate governance 
is concerned with the allocation of organisational resources such as power, 
privileges and economic benefits amongst stakeholders in corporate 
organisations. In any political system, this allocation is often influenced by the 
political power held by these stakeholders. Shliefer and Vishney (1997, p. 738) 
state that "corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal 
institutions that can be altered through political process". As corporate 
governance regulations aim at influencing the allocation of organisational 
resources, the implementation and enforcement of corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as corporate disclosure, might be resisted by various 
influential groups in organisations (Wu, 2005). 
However, there is a scarcity of empirical literature on the impact of political 
influence on corporate governance disclosure. This research has attempted to 
fill this gap in existing literature through an in-depth empirical investigation 
into the context of a developing country, namely Pakistan. This research 
undertakes an analysis of the impact of political connectedness on the 
disclosure of corporate governance information in the annual reports of 
Pakistani listed companies. Figure 1.1 represents the structure and framing of 
this thesis. 
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Figure 1.1: Chapter 1 - Positioning in the Thesis 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This chapter will provide an overview of the structure and content of this 
thesis. Section 1.1 explains the rationale for this research. Section 1.2 explains 
the personal motivations for carrying out this research. The objectives of this 
research, along with the research questions, are elaborated in Section 1.3. 
Section 1.4 explains how this research has contributed towards the 
development of knowledge in the field of corporate governance disclosure. 
1.1 Research Rationale 
This study of corporate governance disclosures has been undertaken for several 
reasons. First, numerous reports pertaining to corporate governance, such as 
Treadway (1987) in the USA and Cadbury (1992) in the UK, have placed 
special emphasis on the quality of reporting and the internal control 
mechanisms of corporate governance (Green and Graham, 2005; Lin et aI., 
2014). In Pakistan, international financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation and the Asian 
Development Bank have played an important role in the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards and the implementation of an 
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance in the country (Ashraf and Ghani, 
2005; Mumtaz, 2005). It might therefore be inferred that regulators of business 
corporations around the world, as well as in Pakistan, place great emphasis on 
the corporate governance and disclosure practices of listed companies. 
Second, academics emphasise the usefulness of the disclosure of information in 
corporate communication. The consequences of ineffective corporate 
governance and unreliable financial reporting include a lack of investor 
confidence (Rezaee, 2004; Kumar and Zattoni, 2014), poor accounting 
practices and weak internal control mechanisms (Uwuigbe et aI., 2014). 
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Financial scandals such as Enron highlighted the need for greater 
accountability and transparency, and raised concerns about the practices of 
corporate boards and managerial misconduct. Bujaki and McConomy (2002) 
argue that firms disclosing poor quality of corporate governance information 
run into corporate governance failures. Thus, prior literature on corporate 
governance disclosure recognises that good corporate governance and 
disclosure are important mechanisms for ensuring transparency in corporate 
affairs, preventing frauds and safeguarding against corporate failures. This 
significant concern of academic researchers in the area of corporate governance 
disclosure has also constituted as an important reason for carrying out this 
research. 
The third reason for carrying out research on corporate governance disclosure 
practices stems from the argument that the board of directors is the holder of 
managerial powers in Anglo-Saxon countries (Heracleous and Lan, 2012), 
holding a central position in the corporate governance system (Daily et aI., 
2003). However, researchers have recognised that accessing board members is 
a difficult task. Hence, existing research lacks understanding of what actually 
happens in board meetings (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Payne et aI., 2009). 
Green and Graham (2005) assert that corporate disclosures provide a source of 
information in regard to decisions making and strategy formulation during 
board meetings. Therefore, an in-depth investigation into disclosure practices 
enables a closer analysis of the role of the board of directors in influencing 
corporate governance disclosures. 
17 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Another reason for carrying out this research stems from the argument that 
there is a lack of empirical research on the influence of political connectedness 1 
on corporate governance disclosure. The influence of politics on corporate 
reporting and disclosure has been recognised by prior literature. Tinker and 
Neimark (1987) recognise the role of political influences on corporate 
reporting and argue that accounting information and disclosure are not merely 
ways of transmitting objective accounting facts, but instead comprise a socially 
constructed reality. They further assert that corporate disclosure is used as a 
tool for the dissemination of wealth and power among leaders. Shleifer and 
Vishny argue that political processes have the potential to alter corporate 
governance mechanisms (1997, p. 738). 
Roe (2003) has also argued that a firm's political environment may profoundly 
impact the development of national as well as firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms. For instance, Roe (2003) argues that the political context may 
determine which type of ownership structure and corporate governance 
arrangements persist and develop within the context of an economy. Different 
laws and regulation found in different countries attribute to differences in their 
political environment (La Porta et aI., 2000). Since regulatory bodies introduce 
and enforce corporate governance codes and guidelines, the development and 
enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms (such as corporate 
disclosure) is influenced by political power held by various stakeholders. 
However, empirical research on the impact of political influence on corporate 
disclosures is limited, largely quantitative and provides contradicting evidence 
(Bushman et aI., 2004; Chaney et aI., 2011; Sari and Anugerah, 2011). Owing 
1 Consistent with the definition provided by Khwaja and Mian (2005), this research has considered a firm 
to be politicalJy connected if it has a politician serving as a director on its board. Please refer to section 
3.1 for a detailed account of reI evant literature on the definition of political connectedness. 
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to these reasons, an in-depth investigation has here been carried out to explore 
the process of the preparation of annual reports in listed companies, seeking 
explanations of how political influence affects corporate governance 
di scI osures. 
The legal and political context of Pakistan has rendered it an appropriate case 
for the study of political influence on corporate governance disclosures. 
Pakistan is a developing country with weak law enforcement and high levels of 
political corruption (Easterly, 200 I; Anwar, 2006). The capital market in 
Pakistan is highly concentrated and firms use political connections for 
extracting rents, such as preferential access to credit and subsidised interest 
rates (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Saeed, 2013). Bushman et al. (2004) assert that 
in countries with weak law enforcement, relationship-based arrangements and 
private mechanisms for enforcement of contracts emerge. Firms avoid the 
dispersal of equity to outsiders and the resulting equity markets are thus highly 
concentrated with greater emphasis placed on personal relationships. Bushman 
et at. (2004) further argue that, in order to meet their political interests, the 
politically powerful elite favour their acquaintances in return for bribes, 
political support and nepotism. 
Considering the institutional context of Pakistan (explained in detail in Chapter 
2), it was considered an appropriate case for the study of political influence on 
corporate governance disclosures. Like many other developing economies, 
Pakistan's capital market is less liquid and manifests the characteristics of poor 
investor protection, family control of listed companies and strong corporate-
political connections, while the legal system in the country is also weak 
(Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002; Tsamenyi et aI., 2007). 
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Furthermore, Pakistan like many other developing countries has implemented 
an Anglo Saxon model of corporate governance, with its focus on separation of 
ownership and control. This model of corporate governance places a special 
focus on reducing information asymmetry and protecting investor interests 
through the introduction of corporate governance and reporting regulations. 
The findings of this research will therefore provide insights that could be 
applied in the investigation of other countries sharing a similar capital market 
structure and institutional context. This research hence advances the agenda for 
carrying out in-depth research in the context of these countries, thus examining 
the compatibility of externally developed corporate governance regulations in 
the institutional context of these countries. 
The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is based on an agency theory 
perspective. An agency theory perspective views corporate governance as a 
mechanism devised for resolving agency problems arising from the separation 
of ownership and control in corporate organisations (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency 
theory assumes that the principals (owners) hire the agent (manager) to derive 
some benefit from the agent's expertise, skills and knowledge to maximise 
returns on his/her investment. The agent thus serves the principal and is 
entitled to remuneration for these services. However, agency theory recognises 
that human beings are opportunistic in nature and managers (agents) will not 
always work in the best interest of the principal (owner), maximising their 
personal gains over the principal's interests. 
Agency theory thus points out the information asymmetry problem between the 
principal and agent. The agent, being an insider, possesses superior knowledge 
20 
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and might misstate the prices of various financial instruments and manipulate 
information on various business transactions (Arnold and Lange, 2004). This 
will then give rise to the problems of the lack of transparency and disclosure in 
corporate communication. Corporate governance and disclosure regulations 
such as Sarbanes Oxley Act in the USA were introduced with an aim of 
reducing information asymmetry through accurate and reliable corporate 
disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Abdioglu et al., 2015). 
Fan and Wong (2002) argue that in developing countries, capital markets 
display concentrated ownership structures and agency conflict might then be 
observed between controlling owners and minority shareholders. Fan and 
Wong (2002) assert that closely held firms are more likely to be politically 
connected as politicians use concentrated ownership structures to control the 
flow of information regarding their secret transactions with the government. 
The controlling owners are thus politically connected and they control the 
disclosure of information to public. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that 
politicians' involvement in company affairs (such as being members of the 
board) results in their bargaining with managers, whereby they offer bribes to 
the managers in pursuit of their political interests. Thus despite being the 
agents of the shareholders, politically connected members of the board work to 
meet their personal political interests. Thus, the presence of politically 
connected members on boards ultimately leads to lower level of disclosures 
and transparency. 
This research also draws upon the theoretical underpinnings of rational choice 
institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism recognises that social actors 
have utility maximising preferences and they behave in a strategic manner to 
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achieve those preferences. The attainment of self-serving preferences might 
then lead towards collectively unfavourable outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Hall and Taylor (1996) further argue that, through an analysis of institutional 
environment, social actors make calculations about the behaviour of other 
social actors and devise their strategic action plan accordingly. 
It can therefore be argued from the perspective of rational choice 
institutionalism that politically connected members of the board try to 
maximise their personal political interests. They also take into consideration 
the high level of political corruption and weak regulatory institutions prevailing 
in the country. Thus, they might be involved in such behaviours as shirking and 
the expropriation of the rights of minority shareholders. Thus disclosure of 
information in the annual reports of politically connected firms is likely to be 
restricted for the purpose of hiding such activities as shirking and 
expropriation. 
Consistent with the views of Hendry (2005, p. 55) this research has adopted 
'the position of theoretical pluralism' in the investigation of complex 
phenomena. The limited ability of agency theory to explain real life situations 
has been dealt with by the use of the additional perspective of institutionalism 
that helped to capture the complexity inherent in real life. Peters (2005) has 
emphasised the use of several approaches for understanding complex 
phenomena. In tum, Dacin (1997) argues that it is not only institutional forces 
that affect organisations over time, but organisational ecological2 and economic 
factors also play an equally important role and should be well thought out in 
organisational studies. 
2 B~um, J. A. (1996) explains that organisational ecology aims to study the influence of the political, 
SOCIal and economic environment on the emergence of diverse organisations. 
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Owing to these arguments, this research combines the agency and institutional 
approaches for the development of careful and logical propositions. The 
differences in the theoretical lenses have been used to provide complementary 
explanations, rather than highlighting contradictions. The empirical research 
was carried out in the institutional settings of Pakistan, whereby the initially 
established propositions were treated as socially constructed realities that were 
subject to variations specific to a unique context. 
Existing research on corporate governance disclosure and political influence 
has been limited and mainly quantitative; this relationship has therefore not 
earlier been examined through an in-depth study. In addition, to the best of 
researcher's knowledge, no such in-depth investigation has so far been 
conducted in Pakistan, as an under-researched developing economy. This 
research fills these gaps through an examination of how and the extent to 
which these influences operate in real life situations. This study focuses on 
investigating how listed companies disclose corporate governance information 
in annual reports and how political connectedness influences corporate 
governance disclosures 
1.2 Personal Motivations for the Study 
My personal motivation for this study has developed from my observation of 
the close ties between business and politics in the institutional environment of 
Pakistan. My curiosity in this area increased as I could observe that 
international organisations such as the Asian Development Bank and World 
Bank have played a major role in improving enforcement and awareness 
regarding corporate governance in Pakistan (Javid and Iqbal, 2010). On the one 
hand I could thus observe the Code of Corporate Governance (2002) being 
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introduced and the efforts made for its effective implementation with an 
expectation that better corporate governance would result in increased 
corporate transparency and better disclosure. On the other hand, various news 
and media reports indicated the existence of a close nexus of business and 
politics with a high level of political corruption prevailing in the institutional 
set-up of the country. I felt increasingly interested in studying whether the 
introduction and awareness regarding better corporate governance and good 
disclosure had a similar influence on the practices of the companies having 
political connectedness, as they had on non-connected companies. 
My initial motivation to carry out this research was supported and further 
increased by the academic research that recognises the negative impact of 
political connectedness on corporate transparency and disclosure (Bushman et 
aI., 2004; Chaney et aI., 2011). I was puzzled how politically connected 
companies could avoid the disclosure of information in an environment where 
a lot of attention and emphasis had been placed by international organisations 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan on improving 
corporate transparency. It was also interesting to note that there was a lack of 
relevant research carried out in the corporate context of Pakistan. 
The predominant use of agency theory in the existing corporate governance 
and disclosure literature served as another motivation for this research. As most 
of the existing research in the field of corporate governance is quantitative, 
various researchers have criticised the predominant use of agency theory in the 
field (Lubatkin et aI., 2007; Van Ees et aI., 2009). Lubatkin et al. (2007, p. 43) 
argue that the principal-agent model is flawed as it is based on "a number of 
simplifying assumptions intended to reduce the complexity of the governance 
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phenomenon." Lubatkin et al. (2007, p. 43) further argue that "while this 
reductionist approach may enhance the model's precision and, in tum, its 
scholarly appeal, it endangers an under socialised view of principals and 
agents, thereby reducing the model's relevance." It implies that the agency 
theory assumption of human self-interest is too simplistic and has been used by 
economists to develop economically efficient models. However, these rigid 
assumptions about opportunistic human nature ignore the role played by the 
context and the institutional environment in shaping human behaviour and 
board decision making. 
In response to this criticism, Wiseman et al. (2012) argue that an agency theory 
perspective provides a useful lens for the analysis of corporate governance 
issues. Wiseman et al. (2012) further argue that the objection that agency 
theory ignores the institutional and social context of principals and agents can 
be removed by introducing institutional factors as variables in the existing 
agency framework. Thus, institutional factors are introduced as intervening 
variables that influence agent's behaviour in the agency framework proposed 
by Wiseman et al. (2012). 
In tum, Heracleous and Lan (2012) proposed a legal perspective on agency 
theory. Heracleous and Lan's (2012) legal perspective holds that the traditional 
assumption of shareholders being principals is not accurate. The corporation in 
itself, by being an independent legal entity, is the actual principal. Therefore, as 
per law, directors should protect the interest of the whole corporation contrary 
to the traditional shareholder perspective. Heracleous and Lan (2012) further 
argue that directors are not the agents, but autonomous fiduciaries of the 
Corporation and that they will always work in best interests of the organisation. 
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The directors also act as mediators between various parties in corporate 
organisations and thus reduce uncertainty and mistrust. Heracleous and Lan 
(2012) thus assert that this model is more sensitive to institutional factors and 
open to an inductive investigation. 
These theoretical debates caught my attention and I felt greatly motivated to 
study how well the agency theory perspective could explain the disclosure 
practices of listed companies in the real life context of Pakistan. In order to 
address the calls for using multiple theoretical perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hendry, 2005; Peters, 2005) for the study of corporate governance research, I 
used the agency theory perspective along with rational choice institutionalism 
for the purpose of developing initial research propositions. 
The use of these theoretical perspectives not only helped in the determination 
of the scope of my research but also enabled me to focus on the phenomenon 
under research. It also helped me to be aware about the importance of 
institutional factors and the richness of the context in which the research was to 
be carried out. I was determined to observe the phenomena and accept all 
possible explanations. Thus this research is differentiated from prior research, 
in that it combines both the institutional and agency perspectives. The research 
has also gone one step further in investigating empirically whether the 
traditional model of agency is sufficient to explain the investigated phenomena. 
To sum up, my motivation for this research started from a practical observation 
of the context in which this research was later carried out. However, the 
existing academic literature and the gaps identified therein have provided a 
strong motivation for an empirical investigation. 
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1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
The review of the existing literature (Chapter 3) has exposed gaps in the 
relevant research on political connectedness and corporate governance 
disclosure. The political affiliations of corporate organisations are not recently 
studied phenomena. Existing research recognises that politicians develop 
connections in the business sector so as to extract rents3• The importance of 
political connections is distinct in developing countries as political connections 
help corporate organisations to access utilities, obtain subsidies, win contracts, 
access preferential treatment, access capital and gain other undue benefits 
(Domadenik et aI., 2014). This research was conducted in the context of 
Pakistan being that there is a strong connection between business and politics 
in the institutional environment of Pakistan. Thus the review of literature, 
along with an analysis of the context in which the research was to be carried 
out, has informed the development ofthe following objectives for research: 
1. to analyse the process of preparation of annual reports so as to understand 
the role of the board in decisions regarding corporate governance 
disclosure; 
2. to examine the preferences of listed companies regarding mandatory and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure; 
3. to explore the perceptions of senior management in listed companies, 
statutory audit firms and regulatory bodies regarding political influence on 
disclosure practices of listed companies in Pakistan; 
4. to explore the differences between voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure practices of politically connected companies and non-connected 
companies; 
3 A detailed review of this literature is provided in Chapter 3 
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5. to explore the differences between mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure practices of politically connected companies and non-connected 
companies; 
6. to explore the underlying motivations of politically connected members of 
the board in influencing listed companies in relation to their voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure practices; and 
7. to explore the underlying motivations of politically connected members of 
the board in influencing listed companies in regard to their mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure practices. 
In order to achieve these objectives, answer to the following key question was 
sought. 
'How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of corporate 
governance information in annual reports oflisted companies in Pakistan?' 
In order to obtain the answer to this central question, following sub questions 
were developed 
1. How do listed companies in Pakistan disclose corporate governance related 
information in annual reports? 
2. How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of mandatory 
corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed companies 
in Pakistan? 
3. How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of voluntary 
corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed companies 
in Pakistan? 
There are seven chapters to this thesis. The following sections provide an 
overview of Chapters Two to Seven. 
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1.4 Overview of the Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge 
Chapter Two of this thesis contains information about the institutional 
background of this research. This background information is particularly 
important as this is a qualitative piece of research and recognises that providing 
an understanding of the institutional environment in which corporate 
governance disclosure is practiced is the key for seeking explanations to 
research phenomena. This chapter explains the existence of the close nexus 
between politics and business in Pakistan. It sets the contextual foundation for 
examining how agency relationships are affected by the institutional 
environment of a country. 
This chapter is particularly significant as it explains that the institutional 
environment of Pakistan is similar to the institutional environment prevailing in 
many developing countries across the world. It highlights that Pakistan shares 
the characteristics with many other developing countries, such as concentrated 
and less liquid capital market, weak legal system, poor investor protection and 
family control and strong connection of politicians and business enterprises 
(Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002; Tsamenyi et aI., 2007). It is argued that 
although this research is a qualitative study, the findings of this research might 
be generalisable in other countries sharing a similar capital market structure 
and institutional context. 
The literature review is provided in Chapter Three. This chapter starts with an 
explanation of the various ways by which political connectedness is defined in 
literature. An explanation is provided about the definition of political 
connectedness as it has been used in this research. It is followed by an 
explanation of the distinctive nature and importance of political connectedness 
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in developing countries as the research was carried out in a developing country; 
that is, Pakistan. The review of literature provided in this chapter shows that, so 
far, there has not been any prior research investigating the impact of political 
connectedness on reporting and disclosure practices of listed companies in 
Pakistan. 
This chapter also provides relevant literature on the impact of political 
connectedness on corporate reporting and disclosure. Here, it is argued that 
although several studies have investigated the impact of political 
connectedness on the quality of financial reporting, there are currently no 
studies investigating the impact of political connectedness on the corporate 
governance disclosure practices of listed companies. In addition, the existing 
research has predominantly utilised the agency theory perspective for 
conducting quantitative investigation. Therefore, for the purpose of gaining 
deep insights, this research has used the agency theory perspective in 
conjunction with rational choice institutionalism. Various recent debates and 
suggestions regarding a socialised version of agency theory were taken into 
account. Initial research propositions were developed for the purpose of 
directing the scope of the future research. It is proposed to analyse the so-called 
positivist and rigid assumption of self-interest in the institutional context in 
which social actors make disclosure decisions. 
Research methodology and methods are discussed in Chapter Four. This 
chapter provides an explanation of various choices made during the process of 
research. Research data includes 200 audited annual reports of 40 listed 
companies from various industrial sectors from 2009 to 2013 along with 20 
semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives from listed 
companies, audit firms and regulatory authorities. 
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Three methods are used for data analysis. Firstly, the annual report data of 
politically connected and non-connected companies was analysed to gauge 
differences in corporate governance disclosure. Secondly, an in-depth analysis 
of the narrative sections of annual reports was carried out to observe the 
incidence of 'silence' (as defined in detail in section 4.3.2) on corporate 
governance affairs. Thirdly, a template analysis was carried out to develop an 
understanding of the interview data obtained from the representatives from 
listed companies, regulatory bodies and statutory audit firms. This research 
project is different from prior research because it is an in-depth study using 
qualitative methods for analysis. The use of qualitative methodology facilitated 
the acquisition of a deep and context based understanding of the phenomena 
under study. In addition, the use of multiple methods of analysis has helped in 
triangulation. 
The findings and discussion of content analysis and analysis of silence are 
provided in Chapters Five and Six. Chapter five explores the level of corporate 
governance information in annual reports. A comparison of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure with mandatory corporate governance disclosure is then 
provided. The results of the analysis revealed that companies in all sectors have 
provided high mandatory disclosure while the level of voluntary disclosure is 
poor. The chapter also explains the variations in the level of disclosure among 
politically connected and non-connected firms. The level of disclosure in the 
annual reports of politically connected firms has been found lower in 
comparison to non-connected firms. This chapter also highlights that politically 
connected firms become silent on various voluntary corporate governance 
matters. It therefore makes a contribution to knowledge, whereby evidence has 
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been found and explanations are provided regarding the nature and existence of 
agency conflict in the capital market of Pakistan. 
Chapter Six provides findings from the template analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews. The analysis of interview data provided information about the 
process of preparation of annual reports along with an explanation of the role 
of board members in influencing information regarding corporate governance. 
The analysis of the interview data supports findings from the content analysis 
and the analysis of silence because the participants generally asserted that 
politically connected companies do not disclose corporate governance 
information voluntarily. This chapter also makes a valuable contribution to 
knowledge by linking the findings of empirical research to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research. 
Chapter Seven concludes this thesis. This chapter summarises the findings of 
this research. Contributions to the knowledge are outlined along with an 
overview of the quality of this research. This chapter also explains the various 
limitations of this research and outlines an agenda for future research. 
32 
Chapter 2 - The Institutional Background 
Chapter 2 - The Institutional Background 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter will provide background infonnation on the existing governance and 
regulatory environment of Pakistan. This background information will highlight 
the need for and the significance of a context-based study of an under-researched 
developing economy. 
Section 2.1 of this chapter explains why the study of political influence is 
interesting in the context of Pakistan. Section 2.2 provides an account of the 
socio-cultural, political, judicial and administrative environment in Pakistan. This 
sections serves to explain how these institutional factors have contributed towards 
the development of business organisations and the equity market in the country. It 
also maps out the close ties between business and politics in the highly corrupt 
political set-up prevailing in the country (Transparency International, 2014). 
Section 2.3 provides information about the capital market structure prevailing in 
the country. Here, it is explained that the capital market of the country is highly 
concentrated and family businesses are a dominant feature of the market. Section 
2.4 provides infonnation about the development and implementation of the code 
of corporate governance in Pakistan. This section briefly outlines the existing 
regulatory set-up of the country regarding corporate reporting and disclosure. 
Section 2.5 explains that the findings of this study might be quite useful as they 
are generalisable to other developing countries sharing similar institutional 
characteristics as Pakistan. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
The information about the background for the research is especially important as 
this research will utilise qualitative techniques for analysis of data (explained in 
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detail in Chapter 4). Qualitative research assumes that knowledge and awareness 
of research context help in identifying and explaining the behaviours of 
individuals in their institutional settings (Hennink et aI., 2010). Thus qualitative 
research methodology has enabled the researcher to shed light on the entire 
process of the preparation of annual reports in Pakistani listed companies and 
included the assessment of the actual corporate governance disclosure provided in 
annual reports of politically connected and non-connected companies. Figure 2.1 
illustrates how this chapter intends to provide the backdrop for this research. 
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Figure 2.1: Chapter 2 - Positioning in the Thesis 
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2.1 Background to the Study 
Pakistan manifests poor levels of performance in various dimensions such as 
governance effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, democracy and 
accountability (Easterly, 2001; Anwar, 2006). The constitution of Pakistan has 
allocated distinct and separate roles to the executive, legislature and judiciary. 
As per the constitution, the judiciary has been made responsible for ensuring 
that the executive and legislature adhere to the provisions of the constitution. 
However, since the establishment of Pakistan, military forces in the country 
have actively intervened in politics and toppled several democratic 
governments. The judiciary has also supported these military interventions 
through the provision of legitimation and approval to each military dictator 
(Hassan, 2007). Easterly (2001) elaborates that, owing to constant political 
instability coupled with military interventions and take-overs of national 
government, Pakistan could not initially develop appropriate structures for 
public sector governance. The governance institutions inherited from the 
undivided India were not adapted to the requirements of the changed 
expectation level and demands of the general public. 
This failure of the governments to cater to public expectations and demands 
has resulted in major political setbacks for the country. One of the most 
noticeable political setbacks led to the break-up of the country in the form of 
the separation of East Pakistan in 1971. The following discussion will provide 
an account of the institutional context of Pakistan, whereby a comprehensive 
analysis of socio-cultural, political, legal and judicial environment will be 
provided. 
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2.2 The Institutional Framework in Pakistan 
An institutional framework plays a substantial role in the development of any 
economy. A strong institutional framework supports the system of governance 
in an economy and results in the development of strong capital markets, 
increasing shareholder value and reducing business risk (Javid and Iqbal, 
2010). Hodgson (2006, p. 2) defines institutions as "systems of established and 
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions." North (1990) argues 
that the institutions in a society outline informal rules regarding acceptable and 
unacceptable human behaviour. North (1990) further argues that institutions 
can be formal as well as informal. However, he neither defines clearly nor 
differentiates between formal and informal institutions. 
Williamson (1998) has focused on this differentiation, explaining that informal 
institutions consist of social and cultural norms, traditions, customs and 
religious values. Formal institutions, as explained by Williamson (1998), 
constitute polity, judiciary and bureaucracy in an economy. The following 
sections will provide an overview of the informal as well as formal institutional 
framework prevailing in Pakistan. 
2.2.1 Informal Institutions 
Informal institutions include historical norms and belief systems prevailing in a 
society. South Asian history has a deep impact on the socio-cultural 
environment in Pakistan. The impact of British rule on the structuring and 
operations of institutions is also evident. On the one hand, Pakistan is an 
Islamic country, but on the other hand the societal traditions are deeply 
influenced by the mixed social system of Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam that 
prevailed in the undivided India. 
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a) Socio-cultural Environment 
Afghan and Wiqar (2007) argue that Pakistani society is a collectivist4 society. 
Here it is argued that people in Pakistan prefer to be recognised on the grounds 
of relationship-based clusters such as family, caste and tribes. People derive 
their norms and values from this clan and tribe system. Marriages between 
cousins are used as a tool to retain family togetherness, and to ensure that land 
and assets stay within the same family (Afghan and Wiqar, 2007). 
Kinship networks and family ties are central to all social networking. This 
strong kinship and familial system exerts a deep influence on the political and 
corporate system in the country. These strong ties promote a culture of 
nepotism within the national political environment. People extend undue 
favours to their relatives, which results in high levels of political corruption in 
the country. The corporate sector also operates under a strong family system, 
whereby most of the businesses are family owned and controlled (Islam, 2004). 
Afghan and Wiqar (2007) argue that Pakistani society is highly 'power 
distant's. Being that the family system is highly centralised, the head of the 
family is considered to be the centre of the power. Society believes in a highly 
unequal distribution of authority. A strong family system inhibits younger 
members from challenging the authority of elders in the family. Experience and 
seniority are also linked to power and authority. Siblings are encouraged to 
have close ties among themselves in order to ensure family solidarity. 
4Hofstede (1984) defined collectivism as the extent to which people prefer to stay in closely knit social 
framework, whereby the members of family, clan or tribe are expected to provide favours in return for an 
expectation for unconditional loyalty. 
~Hofste?e (1984) defined power distance as the degree to which a society accepts power hierarchy and 
mequahty. 
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Masculinity is another important dimension for cultural analysis of a society. 
Afghan and Wiqar (2007) explain that masculinity refers to the emphasis 
placed on heroism, assertiveness and achievement. Pakistani society is highly 
masculine as gender roles are strongly prescribed. Women are not expected to 
assume leadership roles6, and men are expected to take charge of the family. 
Men are the bread-winners and are inheritors of family businesses. These 
socio-cultural factors have a deep influence on the development of the business 
environment of Pakistan. Consequently, family businesses with strong control 
by family members are a norm in Pakistan's cultural set-up. 
The following section will describe the development, structure and role of the 
judiciary, bureaucracy and polity in Pakistan. This description of the 
institutional environment will be accompanied by an explanation of how this 
environment has influenced the development of business organisations and 
capital market in Pakistan. 
2.2.2 Formal Institutions 
According to Williamson (1998), formal institutions consist of the polity, 
judiciary and bureaucracy in an economy. This section will provide an account 
of the formal institutional environment prevailing in Pakistan. 
a. Judicial and Legal Environment 
The judicial system in Pakistan has evolved under the influence of various 
social norms, religious doctrines and political establishments, both pre- and 
post-colonisation of India before its division. Subsequent to the partition of the 
6 Haeri (2002) provides the example of Benazir Bhutto, who was elected as a Prime Minister in Pakistan 
for two non-consecutive terms. Haeri (2002) explained that Benazir Bhutto dealt with the problem of 
social resistance by covering her head, accepting an arranged marriage, avoiding shaking hands with men 
at international meetings and thus met the social code of purity and honour for Pakistani women. 
39 
Chapter 2 - The Institutional Background 
Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Government of Pakistan decided to retain the 
Government of India Act 1935. Therefore, the existing judicial system has its 
roots in the system that prevailed before partition of India (Hussain, 20 II). 
The existing judicial system is comprised of the Supreme Court, provincial 
high courts and lower courts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is the final Court 
of Appeal in matters that remain unsettled at provincial level. The Supreme 
Court is also the custodian of the constitution in the country. Provincial high 
courts deal with the cases that fall within each provincial court's territorial 
jurisdiction. Lower courts include district courts. District courts are further sub-
divided into civil and criminal courts and deal with the cases falling under their 
jurisdiction respectively. The President of Pakistan appoints the Chief Justice 
of Pakistan. The President also appoints other judges of provincial high courts 
in consultation with the Chief Justice and the Governor of the province in 
which the appointment is to be made (Yasmeen and Ali, 20 II). 
The judicial system of Pakistan has been criticised for long delays in the 
provision of justice and variance in the level of justice provided to different 
sections of civil society (Chemin, 2009; Siddique, 2011). Siddique (2011) 
asserts that the judicial system in Pakistan serves justice to the people either on 
the basis of their class or their ability to access various resources such as 
relationships and wealth. In addition, access to justice is extremely expensive 
and subject to long delays. The existing literature asserts that the governments 
of Pakistan have failed to develop a strong judicial system since its inception in 
1947, while the existing judicial machinery is both inefficient and ineffective 
(Chemin, 2009). 
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The legal system, and especially its origin, are acknowledged to have a deep 
impact on accounting practices in an economy (Hope, 2003). Pakistan's legal 
system is characterised by weak law enforcement mechanisms (Ashraf and 
Ghani, 2005). Pakistan is a common law country. La Porta et al. (1997) argue 
that common law countries provide better protection to investors and are 
characterised by strong capital markets when compared with civil law 
countries. However, despite the fact that Pakistan is a common law country, it 
is characterised by weak law enforcement, has a small and concentrated capital 
market, and corporations in Pakistan heavily rely on bank financing instead of 
equity financing (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005). The explanation of this paradox 
might be found in La Porta et al.'s (1997) argument that, in countries with a 
poor quality of law enforcement, businesses have fewer opportunities to access 
external (equity) finance. Therefore, these companies rely on bank financing, 
which ultimately results in the prevalence of small equity markets (Ashraf and 
Ghani, 2005). In addition, owing to weak law enforcement and investor 
protection, small investors are powerless to obtain a return on their investment. 
Consequently, in the absence of strong legal protection, investors tend to make 
large investments so that they have a greater control on the firm's affairs, 
ultimately leading to the prevalence of concentrated ownership structures (La 
Porta et aI., 1997). 
Shareholder rights are not protected in Pakistan's legal system (Hamid and 
Kozhich, 2007). In addition, the legal system also lacks the expertise required 
for handling corporate complaints. Several steps have been taken to improve 
the situation, and judges having an expertise in corporate law are appointed in 
provincial courts for the resolution of corporate disputes. However, Hamid and 
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Kozhich (2007) assert that the overall situation of the system of provision of 
justice in the country is fragile. 
h. Bureaucracy in Pakistan 
The bureaucratic system in Pakistan was adopted from that prevailing in India 
before division. This former bureaucratic system was highly centralised and 
was administered by the Indian Civil Service (Wilder, 2009). Thus, the 
bureaucratic system adopted by Pakistan was also administered by its Civil 
Service. 
Civil Service reforms were introduced in Pakistan in 1973 when the Civil 
Servants' Act (1973) was introduced. Under these reforms, all civil service 
cadres were categorised as occupational groups. The hierarchical structure in 
these occupational groups was linked to Basic Pay Scales (BPS). As ordered by 
the Constitution of Pakistan (1973), appointments in civil service of Pakistan 
were to be made by parliament, which is the supreme legislative body in 
Pakistan. The appointments for provincial civil servants were then to be made 
by respective provincial assemblies (Imtiaz, 2013). 
Academics and international organisations have criticised the bureaucracy in 
Pakistan on account of its inefficient practices and high levels of corruption 
(Shafqat, 1999). The bureaucracy has been criticised for not being able to 
implement policies effectively, or to facilitate development. The existing 
literature outlines the reasons for this incapability. It has been argued that the 
bureaucracy works subject to the deep influence of political forces in Pakistan, 
whereby the appointments in government and administrative machinery are 
made on the basis of nepotism and political networking (Kalia, 2013). The high 
level of political influence has badly affected the capabilities and skill set of 
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government machinery in Pakistan. The link between performance and rewards 
does not exist because appointments, promotions and placements are made 
under political influence. 
Kalia (2013) argues further that the politicians in the country are highly corrupt 
and are not interested in effective policy making. The regulations and policies 
are introduced on a preference basis instead of merit. In addition, the power 
and influence of politically corrupt elite makes it difficult for bureaucrats to 
implement policies effectively. 
c. Political Environment 
Subsequent to its establishment in 1947, Pakistan adopted the Government of 
India Act (1935) after introducing slight amendments to it. The amended 
constitution served as an interim constitution for the country. The constitution 
currently applicable in Pakistan was developed in 1973. The 1973 constitution 
provides for a federal parliamentary system. The President is the head of the 
state. The Prime Minister is elected through a popular public majority and is 
the head of the government. 
The Federal Legislature (Parliament) consists of an upper house (Senate) and 
lower house (National Assembly). The Senate serves as a permanent body for 
legislation and its term lasts for 6 years. The Senate is composed of an equal 
number of representatives from all provinces, Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas, and Islamabad Capital Territory. Seats in the National Assembly are 
allocated to representatives from all the provinces, Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, and Islamabad Capital Territory on the basis of population. 
The members of National Assembly are elected through general elections in 
the country and their term lasts for five years. In addition to the system of 
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federal legislature, the provinces in Pakistan are administered by a Governor 
and a publically elected Chief Minister. Each province has its own provincial 
assembly while the members of the provincial assembly are also elected in 
general elections. The term of provincial assemblies also lasts for five years. 
Pakistan's political system is dominated by patronage. As discussed in Section 
2.2.1, family relationships, networking and ties are very important in Pakistan's 
cultural set-up. The political environment of Pakistan also operates under the 
influence of these relationships and political power also moves from one 
generation to another within clans and tribes. Since its establishment in 1947, 
Pakistani politics has been characterised by the existence of powerful families, 
for example the Bhutto family, Shareef family, Choudhary family etc. The 
members of these political families have held the offices of Prime Minister, 
Chief Minister and other important positions in the national and provincial 
governments. These political elites hold enormous resources and these 
resources are transferred from one generation to the next in these political 
dynasties (Niaz, 2010; Mushtaq et aI., 2013). 
Another important characteristic of the political environment in Pakistan is the 
high level of political corruption. The following section will explain this 
feature in detail, along with an explanation of how these high levels of political 
corruption ultimately affect business and economy in Pakistan. 
Political Corruption 
Political corruption is considered to be one of the most pervasive problems in 
Pakistan's economy. In 2014, Pakistan was ranked as the 126th most corrupt 
country in the world, according to the Transparency International Corruption 
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Perception Index 7 (Transparency International, 2014). The Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index provides the ranking based on the 
perception about the extent of corruption prevailing in the public sector of a 
particular country. Saeed (2013) explains that three democratically elected 
prime ministers, along with the respective national and provincial assemblies, 
were toppled before they could finish their term, on account of charges of 
corruption. It is also argued that corruption in Pakistan is not only limited to 
the political arena, for the society of Pakistan suffers all possible types of 
private, public, judicial, political and religious corruption (Javaid, 2010). In 
public sector organisations, most of the appointments at higher level are made 
on the basis of personal ties and nepotism (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
Ties between Politics and Business 
Another important characteristic of the political environment in Pakistan is the 
close linkage between business and politicians. The political families in 
Pakistan do not limit themselves to political activism: they also actively 
participate in business. All the leading participants in Pakistan's political arena 
also have strong business stakes. The close ties between business and politics 
result in a limited separation between business interests and the political 
interests of the parties involved (Saeed, 2013). Since politicians are involved in 
policy making, they might exert an influence on the formation of policies 
favourable to the corporate sector. In addition, since bureaucracy in Pakistan is 
not free from political influence, politicians might also exert an influence on 
the implementation and enforcement of these policies. 
~ Andersson and Heywood (2009, p. 774) argue that although the Transparency International Perception 
mdex ~an be criticised on account of problems associated with the definition and measurement of 
corruptIOn, the Index has nevertheless played an important role in academic research on corruption and is 
the "best available corruption indicator worldwide." 
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Amongst the number of researchers who have studied the impact of political 
connectedness on corporate sector, Correia (2009) argues that firms with 
political connections exhibit poor compliance with reporting regulations, being 
that such firms are less likely to be penalised for misreporting when compared 
with unconnected firms. As Pakistan's institutional environment displays weak 
law enforcement and high levels of political corruption, this research will 
investigate how political connectedness influences the level of corporate 
governance disclosures in politically connected firms. 
2.3 Capital Market 
A well developed and robust capital market plays an important role in 
mobilisation of resources in the financial system. A well-established capital 
market might bring considerable improvement to the corporate governance 
standards of firms through the imposition and enforcement of rules and 
regulations (John and Senbet, 1998). An efficient capital market also acts as the 
provider of information between various stakeholders in listed companies, such 
as shareholders, regulators and investors. 
The history of the capital market in Pakistan began soon after its foundation in 
1947. The first stock exchange of Pakistan was established in September 1947 
in Karachi. In 1970, the second stock exchange of Pakistan was established in 
Lahore, followed by the establishment of the Islamabad Stock Exchange in 
October 1989. Hussain and Qasim (1997) have discussed the historical 
developments of equity markets in Pakistan, stating that the number of listed 
companies in 1960 was 81. The stock markets flourished remarkably well 
during the early 1960s and by the beginning of 1970s the number of listed 
companies had reached 219. 
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However, later on, owing to socio-political instability, growth slowed down. In 
the early 1970s, the government nationalised all the large companies operating 
in the manufacturing, banking and insurance sectors of the economy. This was 
a major set-back for the development of equity market in Pakistan. As a result 
of national is at ion, seventy per cent of the country's economy went under direct 
government control while the remaining 30 per cent consisted of government-
dominated, fully nationalised financial institutions. 
In the 1980s, the government revisited its nationalisation policy and introduced 
a disinvestment programme of government-held shares. Private businesses 
were again encouraged to make investments in the financial system through 
investment banks. This encouragement resulted in the development of the 
capital market in the country and the number of listed companies rose to 314 in 
the 1990. 
In the 1990s, the government initiated move towards privatisation, coupled 
with increased encouragement for private sector investors. The resulting 
progress of the equity market can be summarised by the fact that while the 
number of listed companies on the Karachi Stock MarketS in 1949 was five, it 
reached to 762 in 2000. Information in Table 2.1 shows the development of 
KSE over the years. 
8 Data from the Karachi Stock Exchange has been taken as being representative of the overall situation of 
the equity mru:ket in Pakistan, on the basis of the assumption that Karachi Stock Market is the largest and 
the most volatile stock exchange in Pakistan. See Hussain and Qasim (1997). 
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Table: 2.1 Growth ofthe Karachi Stock Exchange 
Year Number of Listed Listed Capital (PKR in Million) 
Companies 
1949 5 117 
1950 15 1,007 
1960 81 3,864 
1970 291 7,630 
1980 314 28,056 
1990 487 236,458 
2000 762 229,000 
2010 650 289,000 
2015 560 116,518 
·Adapted from Hussain and Qasim (1997, p. 866) and the Karachi Stock Exchange 
It may be observed that there was a constant rise in the number of listed 
companies until 2000. However, this number started declining afterwards. This 
observation supports the arguments presented by Hamid and Kozhich (2007) 
who asserted that listed companies might have chosen to delist from KSE 
owing to the cost of financial reporting and restructuring required for ensuring 
compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance, which was introduced in 
Pakistan in 2002. However, Israr (2012) argues that the decline in the number 
of companies might be attributed to the removal of tax benefits offered by the 
Government to listed companies in 2002. Therefore, the listed companies now 
have to pay tax at similar rates as non-listed companies but also have to comply 
with additional regulation. Therefore, many companies decided to delist. 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the level of investor protection and law 
enforcement affect the structure of capital market in an economy. They also 
argue that countries with a common law tradition display a better level of legal 
protection when compared with civil law countries. La Porta et al. (1998) 
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further argue that in economies with poor legal protection, capital markets tend 
to be concentrated. 
The case of Pakistan IS, however, complex. Pakistan is a common law 
economy, as historically it was a British colony (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005) and 
follows an Anglo-Saxon based set of regulations (Ibrahim, 2005). However, in 
contrast to La Porta et al. 's (1998) argument for strong investor protection in 
common law countries, law enforcement in Pakistan is quite poor and investor 
rights are unprotected. Consequently, the stock market in Pakistan is highly 
concentrated and volatile (Iqbal, 2008; Nawazish and Sara, 2012). For instance, 
Javid and Iqbal (2010) evaluated the ownership concentration in 60 randomly 
selected non-financial firms, listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), over 
the period 2003-2007. They found that in those 60 companies, more than 50 
per cent ofthe shareholdings were held by only three shareholders. 
Dominance of Family Business 
As discussed in 2.2.1, family relationships have played an important role in 
shaping business and corporate environment in Pakistan. Family-owned 
businesses, affiliates of multinational corporations and state ownership are the 
most common forms of ownership in Pakistan. Hamid and Kozhich (2007) 
state that the majority of listed companies in Pakistan are family owned. 
Family ownership is most prevalent in the textile, automotive, tobacco and 
agriculture sectors. The family-owned business groups prefer to raise capital 
through internal financing and bank credit, as raising capital through equity 
finance from market results in weakening their control over firm management 
(Mumtaz, 2005; Mirza and Azfa, 2010). In a family business, the majority 
owners attempt to retain control over business activities and closely monitor 
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management (Mirza and Azfa, 2010). Khan (2014) argued that family members 
also serve as independent and non-executive directors in most of the family 
firms. 
Mirza and Azfa (20 I 0) further explain that minority shareholder rights remain 
unprotected in Pakistan under existing legislation For instance, shareholders 
with less than a 20 per cent shareholding cannot sue company management in 
court for negligence. Ashraf and Ghani (2005) have found that the high 
concentration of ownership in Pakistani firms has made it easier for majority 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholder rights. 
2.4 Corporate Governance and Reporting Regulations 
Corporate Governance 
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) is the principal 
regulatory body for corporate sector regulation in Pakistan. The SECP governs 
the corporate sector through various laws and regulations. The SECP 
introduced the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance through the 
introduction of a Code of Corporate Governance for the companies listed on 
the stock exchanges in Pakistan in 2002, while a Code of Corporate 
Governance for public sector enterprises was later introduced in the year 2012. 
The Anglo-Saxon model, largely found in the USA and UK, is a market-based 
model and is labelled as an 'outsider' model of governance (Rwegasira, 2000). 
This model is based on shareholder theory, whereby corporations are primarily 
accountable to the shareholders. Following an agency theory perspective 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.1), this model is suitable for a 
market characterised by widely dispersed owners, efficient and liquid capital 
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and equity markets (where firms are expected to be less dependent on long 
term bank finance), and well established legal systems where company 
management is relatively free from close monitoring and control. This type of 
corporate governance model is also characterised by a one-tier (unitary) board 
structure. 
Siddiqui (20 I 0) argues that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance 
adopted by developing economies (such as India, Bangladesh, South Korea and 
South Africa) does not represent a suitable model, given the economic, legal 
and corporate environment of these countries. Siddiqui (2010) explains that 
stock markets in developing countries are less developed and are characterised 
by high ownership concentration, whereas the Anglo-Saxon model is more 
appropriate for implementation in the markets characterised by a low level of 
ownership concentration and less dependence on bank finance. 
However, despite this misalignment, various developing countries, including 
Pakistan, have adopted this model under the influence of international financial 
agencies. Javid and Iqbal (2010) point out that Pakistan took technical 
assistance from the Asian Development Bank for effective enforcement of 
corporate governance, while the World Bank has provided support in the area 
of training and development. 
The Code has been made a part of the listing regulations of stock exchanges in 
Pakistan and compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Code is thus 
binding on listed companies. A checklist outlining the enforcement status of 
the clauses of the Code is provided as an appendix to the Code. Therefore, all 
the provisions of the Code are marked as either mandatory or voluntary in that 
checklist. Hamid and Kozhich (2007) comment that, considering the lack of 
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awareness regarding corporate governance in the country, the Code was 
introduced as a 'comply or explain,9 document. The regulatory authorities have 
aims to increase awareness about corporate governance through a relaxed 
regulatory system. The authorities then intend to introduce a strict/mandatory 
regulation once the level of awareness with corporate governance has risen. 
The business community in Pakistan has resisted the introduction and 
implementation of the Code of Corporate Governance (The World Bank, 
2005). The main barriers identified by businessmen in implementing corporate 
governance are: (1) the availability of a sufficiently qualified workforce to 
assist in implementation of the Code; (2) issues related to disclosure of 
proprietary information to competitors; and (3) a lack of sufficient benefits for 
compliance (International Finance Corporation, 2007). Hamid and Kozhich 
(2007) explain that some companies delisted from the Karachi Stock Exchange 
after the introduction of the Code and suggested that the introduction of the 
Code of Corporate Governance was the sole reason for their delisting. The 
main factor contributing towards their deli sting was the increased cost of 
compliance. The companies' perceive that the printing and publishing of 
quarterly financial statements and appointment of additional qualified 
personnel is an extra financial burden. Since the majority of companies in 
Pakistan are family owned and controlled, companies prefer not to comply with 
strict regulation aimed at protecting minority shareholder rights (Khan, 2014). 
In order to ensure compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Code, the 
statutory auditors of the company are required to verify the statement of 
9Listed companies have to either comply with the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance or 
they have to explain the reasons for non-compliance (Ibrahim, 2005) Albu et al. (2015) explained that the 
pUrpose of the 'comply or explain' principle is to provide flexibility to corporate organisations. 
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'compliance with corporate governance' issued by the board. However, this 
statement does not confirm the accuracy of the information provided therein. 
Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance Disclosures 
In order to meet international reporting standards, Pakistan adopted 
International Accounting Standards (lAS) voluntarily in 1980. Currently, using 
a step by step approach, Pakistan is adopting International Financial Reporting 
Standards (lFRS). As required by Section 234 of the Pakistan Companies 
Ordinance 1984, the SECP is empowered to recommend IFRS. The SECP 
notifies of the applicability of these standards after consultation with the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (lCAP) whereby ICAP is also 
responsible for their implementation. In addition to these reporting standards, 
the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan incorporates provisions 
regarding the reporting requirements for companies (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005). 
Iqbal (2008) argues that the Code of Corporate Governance was introduced in 
Pakistan for the purpose of ensuring fair trade and transparency in corporate 
disclosures. 
2.5 Pakistan's Institutional Context: Relevance to Other Developing 
Countries 
Developing countries have not only significantly different institutional 
environment compared to developed countries, but there are also considerable 
variations in the institutional conditions of various developing countries across 
the world (Singh and Newberry, 2008). However, existing researchers have 
highlighted that some of the developing countries share similarities in terms of 
the size of capital markets, ownership structures, legal origin, investor 
protection and political corruption. 
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Research carried out in Africa indicates that several African countries were 
British colonies, inherited a common law tradition, characterise 
ethnic/community affiliation, and display high levels of corruption and poor 
law enforcement. Rwegasira (2000) argues that capital markets in African 
countries are small, illiquid and display high levels of ownership concentration, 
while businesses are mainly dependent on bank financing. These countries 
have weak legal infrastructure and investor rights are not well protected. For 
example, see Angaye and Gwilliam (2009) for Nigeria and Soobaroyen and 
Mahadeo (2008) for Mauritius. It can therefore be argued that the institutional 
environment prevailing in these countries is comparable with the institutional 
context of Pakistan. 
Similarly, existing literature on regions such as Southeast Asia also recognises 
the presence of a high level of political corruption, the dominance of family 
ownership and control, and a high concentration of ownership in the capital 
markets of these countries (Wu, 2005). The capital market and institutional 
context in South Asian countries shares remarkable similarities with the 
institutional context of Pakistan; for example, see Siddiqui (2010) for 
Bangladesh and Afsharipour, (2009) for India. It may therefore be argued that 
although this research was conducted in the context of Pakistan, the findings of 
this research might have limited generalisability to the context of other 
developing countries which share similar institutional characteristics. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion indicates that Pakistan is characterised by the 
presence of highly concentrated family ownership structures, weak minority 
shareholder rights and high levels of political corruption. There is a close 
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linkage between politics and business as most of the well-known politicians are 
running business empires in the country. The chapter has also provided an 
account of the introduction of corporate governance regulations in the country. 
It was also observed that the Code of Corporate Governance encountered 
resistance from the business community immediately after its introduction. In 
addition, family controlled companies in the country have also considered 
reporting and disclosure regulations to be a burden. 
In a country with high political interference in business, weak law enforcement 
and strong family controlled businesses, the study of the reporting practices of 
listed companies might reveal interesting theoretical and practical 
considerations. All these factors indicate that Pakistan is an appropriate case 
for the study of political influence on corporate governance disclosures. In 
addition, Pakistan's institutional environment shares institutional 
characteristics prevailing in many other developing countries and the findings 
of this research might thus be generalisable to other similar contexts. Chapter 3 
will provide a comprehensive review of literature on the study of political 
influence on corporate governance disclosures. The chapter will also highlight 
the lack of research investigating this academically interesting phenomenon in 
the context of Pakistan. 
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Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations of the Research 
3.0 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to lay the foundation for this study by 
presenting the relevant literature on corporate governance disclosure and 
political connectedness. Section 3.1 begins with a critical review of the existing 
literature, explaining how various researchers have defined the term 'political 
connectedness' in different contexts. This discussion is followed by an 
explanation of how the 'political connectedness' of the listed companies was 
measured for this research. Section 3.2 elaborates the distinct nature of political 
connectedness in developing countries, whereby both the firms and politicians 
extract benefits from each other through the establishment of political 
relationships. Section 3.3 provides a critical review of prior literature on 
corporate governance disclosures. This section also provides an account of 
existing corporate governance and disclosure research in Pakistan. 
Section 3.4 provides a critical analysis of the existing literature on the impact 
of political connectedness on corporate disclosure. Section 3.5 elaborates the 
theoretical underpinnings of agency theory and rational choice institutionalism. 
The theoretical propositions drawn from these perspectives are also stated in 
this section. The decisions regarding data collection and analysis were then 
taken on the basis of these theoretical propositions. Section 3.6 summarises the 
gaps identified in literature review and explains how these gaps will be 
addressed through this research. Section 3.7 explains how this research makes 
a significant addition to the existing body of literature through its theoretical as 
well as methodological contributions. Section 3.8 will conclude this chapter. 
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Figure 3.1: Chapter 3 - Positioning in the Thesis 
... 
Q 
C 
Q 
.;;; 
<II 
= OJ <II 
.~ ~ 
Q .: 
'C'C 
c .S 
<':'-
<II 
.;;; 
b 
<': 
C 
~ 
'C 
C C 
<': .5; 
<II '" ~= c-._ OJ 
'C c: 
c: Q 
fi:U 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Introduction 
Research Rationale 
Personal Motivations for the Study 
Research Objectives and Questions 
Overview of the Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge 
Chapter 2 - The Institutional Background 
Introduction 
Background to the Study 
The Institutional Framework in Pakistan 
Capital Market 
Corporate Governance and Reporting Regulations 
Pakistan's Institutional Context: Relevance to other Developing Countries 
C.ondll~ion 
Chapter 4 - Research Methodology, Design and Methods 
Introduction 
Research Philosophy, Research Approach and Research Design 
Data Collection Methods 
Data Analysis 
Ethical considerations 
Conclusion 
Chapter 5 - Interpreting the Annual Report Data 
Introduction 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
Analysis of Silence in Annual Reports 
Conclusion 
Chapter 6 - Interpreting Interview Data 
Introduction 
How do Companies in Pakistan Disclose Information in Annual Reports? 
The Influence of Pol itical Connectedness on Corporate Governance 
Disclosures 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
Introduction 
Findings of the Research 
Contribut ions to Knowledge 
Quality of Research 
Limitations of the Studv and Directions for Future Research 
57 
Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations of the Research 
The following section will provide an account of existing literature on the 
definition of political connectedness. A critical analysis of the existing 
literature will be provided, following an explanation of how this term is 
defined for this research project. 
3.1 Political Connectedness 
Prior research has identified that political influence can be exerted on corporate 
organisations through political connectedness (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Faccio, 2006). Several studies on the impact of political influence on business 
organisations have found that political connectedness brings several benefits 
for the firms. Boubakri at ei. (2012) have found that political connectedness 
brings the benefit of lower cost of capital for connected firms. Several other 
studies have found that politically connected firms enjoy the benefit of easy 
access to financial services (Charumilind et aI., 2006; Faccio, 2006; Claessens 
et aI., 2008). 
Existing research also provides evidence that firm value and market 
share/performance are positively related to political connectedness (Fisman, 
2001; Goldman et aI., 2009; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). 
Faccio (2006) argues that political connectedness provides the finns with many 
benefits such as lighter taxation, lenient regulatory compliance and preferential 
treatment by government departments. 
Researchers in the field of corporate political connectedness have developed 
various measures for studying this important phenomenon. The following 
section reviews research on political connectedness in various countries and 
contexts to understand how it has been defined and measured in by different 
researchers. 
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Definition of Political Connectedness 
Various researchers have used different measures for gauging political 
connectedness across varying contexts. Figure 3.1 provides a summary of 
various ways in which existing researchers have defined political 
connectedness. It is noteworthy that the context in which the research is carried 
out is a key determinant of the method by which political connectedness may 
be measured. 
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Table 3.1: Definition of Political Connectedness in Prior Literature 
Authors Country Data Source Proxy 
Xu et al. (2015) China China Stock Market & Accounting Research A firm's founder is defined as politically connected if he or she 
(CSMAR) and the Wind Financial Database was a former government official, a former military officer, a 
(WindDB) member of the Committee of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, or a member of the National Congress 
of Communist Party of China. 
Fan et a1. (2014) China Governnment publications and internet Relationship between managers from listed companies and 
allegedly corrupt bureaucrats 
(Peng et aI., China Shenzhen GTA Information Technology The firm's CEO or Chairman is a former or current government 
2011) Corporation, the Beijing Sinofin Information bureaucrat 
Service, and the Shenzhen Bloomberg 
Database Corporation. 
Fan et a1. (2007) China IPO prospectuses of newly listed A-share The CEO's (director's) political connections are established by 
companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange examining whether he or she was currently or formerly an officer 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1993 of either the central government, a local government, or the 
to 2001 military. 
Saeed (2013) Pakistan OSIRIS and Election Commission of Pakistan The firm having a politician on its board, whereby a politician is 
(ECP) defined as an individual who has participated in elections 
---~ ~-~-
--
'-----
-- --
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Table 3.1: Definition of Political Connectedness in Prior Literature 
Authors Country Data Source Proxy 
Khwaja and Pakistan Credit Information Bureau (CIB) database at The firm having a politician on its board, whereby a politician is 
Mian (2005) the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and election defined as an individual who has participated in elections 
data, Election Commission of Pakistan (ECB) 
I 
Braam et al. Cross Dataset used by Faccio (2006) and If at least one of the firm's large shareholders (anyone 
(2015) country Worldscope Database controlling at least 10% of voting shares) or one of the top 
study officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) 
is a member of parliament, a minister, or closely related to a top 
politician or party 
Chen et al. Cross The Global Vantage and International IIB/E/S A company is identified as being connected with a politician if at 
(2010) country databases least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 
study 10% of voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, 
vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is a member of 
parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or 
party 
Faccio and Cross DataStream Firms are regarded as connected if their headquarters are located 
Parsley (2009) country Worlds cope in the home town of the deceased politician (city where politician 
study www.J;!oliticalgravellard.com resided). 
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Table 3.1: Definition of Political Connectedness in Prior Literature 
Authors Country Data Source Proxy 
Faccio (2006) Cross Official web site of each country's A company is identified as being connected with a politician if at 
country government and parliament, W orldscope least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 
study 10% of voting shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, 
vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is a member of 
parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or 
, 
, party , 
Civilize et al. Thailand Stock Exchange of Thailand and Business A 'politically connected firm' is defined as any firm that: (1) has 
(2015) Online website which has a license from The a politician or a family member of a politician sitting on the 
Ministry of Commerce of Thailand to deal board of directors, either as an executive, or non-executive 
with information on Thai listed companies director; or (2) has a politician, a family member of a politician, 
or any private entity ultimately owned by himiher, as a major 
shareholder during the study period 
Bandeira-de- Brazil The Economatica database Political donations 
Mello et al. 
(2012) 
---
,. 
-
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Table 3.1: Definition of Political Connectedness in Prior Literature 
Authors Country Data Source Proxy 
Menozzi et al. Italy Electronic databases such as FACTIVA, Firms having directors on the boards who had a record for I 
(2012) LEXIS-NEXIS, ABI Inform (press release), present or past activity in the political arena I i 
i 
and the Who's Who in Italy. Most of the 
information was found on the Internet. 
layachandran United Centre for Research on Security Prices Political donations 
(2006) States (CRSP) 
Federal Election Commission 
Khemakhem Canada OSISRIS data base, Sedar.com. and SEDAR At least one of the firm's directors is or has been a member of 
and Dicko database parliament, works for the government, belongs to a political 
(2013) party or has made a financial contribution to a political party 
Fisman (2001) Indonesia Suharto Dependency Index Suharto Dependency Index rated the level of political 
Financial Times Extel Financial Database connectedness on the basis of strength of relationship with 
Suharto and his children. 
----
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Table 3.1 shows that, in the context of China, Fan et al. (2014) identified 45 
cases of corruption from 1996-2007. They identified all those companies that 
were located within the province or city administered by the allegedly corrupt 
bureaucrats involved in these corruption cases. In order to determine political 
connectedness, Fan et aI. (2014) searched government publications and the 
Internet for news about relationships between managers in those listed 
companies and the allegedly corrupt bureaucrats. A company was considered 
as politically connected if Fan et al. (2014) found a news item confirming that 
the senior managers, directors or major shareholders of that company had 
allegedly bribed one ofthese bureaucrats. 
The determination of political connectedness using this criterion can be 
criticised on various accounts. Firstly, it might be argued that the assumption 
that political connections are jurisdiction (location) based is flawed. Thus, 
some of the bureaucrats may be connected to the companies located in other 
provinces and cities. Secondly, the credibility of online news and media reports 
might be questioned being that no explanation was provided as to which 
particular online news portals were used for research. Concerns may thus be 
raised regarding the trustworthiness of the data obtained from the Internet. 
In another research project carried out by Fan et al. (2007) in China, a CEO 
was defined to be politically connected if he/she was currently or had formerly 
been an officer of either the central government, local government or the 
military. This measure has also been used by (Xu et aI., 2015). Peng et aI. 
(2011) have also used a similar measure, considering a firm connected if the 
CEO or chairman was a current or former government employee. 
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These measures are suitable for measuring political connectedness in China, 
considering the strong government control and influence over the corporate 
sector. However, it might be argued that these measures are not ideal for 
measuring political connectedness in Pakistan because the level of state 
intervention and control over corporate sector in Pakistan is significantly less 
compared to China. 
Table 3.1 also shows that political donations have been used as a measure for 
identification of political connectedness in the United States and Brazil 
(Jayachandran, 2006; Bandeira-de-Mello et aI., 2012). However, being that 
firms do not publically disclose data on their political contributions in Pakistan, 
this measure of political donations is not suitable for determining political 
connectedness in Pakistan's context. 
Fisman (2001) used the Suharto Dependency Index developed by the Castle 
Group for the identification of political connectedness in Indonesia. The 
Suharto Dependency Index provides subjective ratings of the extent to which 
the top 25 business groups in Indonesia depend on political connectedness for 
increased profitability. The firms are rated on a scale ranging from one to five, 
depending on the strength of their political connectedness. For example, a 
score of five is assigned to a firm that is affiliated to Suharto's children. This 
measure of political connectedness has been quite useful for the purpose of the 
study in the context of Indonesia. However, such a measure cannot be used for 
determining political connectedness in Pakistan being that no such index has 
been prepared for Pakistan (Saeed, 2013). 
Several researchers have used the political affiliation of the members of 
corporate boards as a measure for political connectedness in cross-country 
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studies. Faccio (2006, p. 369) describes a firm as politically connected if one of 
its largest shareholders (controlling at least 10 per cent of voting shares) or one 
of its executive officers (its CEO, president, vice-president, chairman or 
secretary) was a member of parliament, a minister, or was closely related to a 
senior politician or party. This measure has also been used by various other 
researchers (Chen et aI., 2010; Braam et aI., 2015). However, it limits the 
analysis of political connectedness to CEO, president, chairman and secretary 
of the firms as political influence transmitted through politically connected 
members of the board is not taken into account. 
Khemakhem and Dicko (2013) have overcome this limitation of excluding 
board members and included politically connected members of the board of 
directors while measuring firms' political connectedness. Thus a firm is 
considered to be politically connected if at least one of the firm's directors has 
served as a member of parliament, has worked for the government, is or was a 
member of a political party or has made contributions to a political party. 
Faccio and Parsley (2009) argue that location is an important determinant of 
political connectedness. They consider companies to be politically connected if 
they have headquarters located in the town of birth or residence of a politician. 
Such a measure might also be criticised on numerous grounds. Several firms 
might be operating in a single town/jurisdiction/city, however all of them 
cannot be considered to be politically connected. The definition of the term 
'location' is also quite problematic as it may refer to a varying range of 
possibilities, such as a village, city, constituency or province. Moreover, under 
this definition, the status of the political connectedness of a firm will remain 
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unchanged even in the case of change of ownership, directors or management, 
merely because the firm's headquarters is situated in a particular location. 
Menozzi et a1. (2012~ p. 7) define politically connected firms as firms having 
directors on the boards who have a record for present or past activity in the 
political arena. They consider a firm to be politically connected if the directors 
on its board hold a political position or membership to a political party, or have 
participated in an election. 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) investigated the influence of political environment on 
bank lending practices in Pakistan. They define a firm as politically connected 
if it has politicians on its board; here, a politician is defined as an individual 
who has participated in elections. This measure of political connectedness has 
been used for this research project because it allows for the measurement of 
connectedness at individual firm level. This definition of political 
connectedness takes into account the presence of current and former 
politicians, based on the argument put forward by Boubakri et a1. (2008) that 
politicians remain capable of extracting benefits even when they are not in 
power. That is, ex-politicians have often been found to obtain easy access to 
loans, preferential treatment and resources. 
Saeed (2013) argues that there are several difficulties associated with the 
determination of political connectedness in developing countries such as 
Pakistan. Saeed (2013) asserts that determining the political connectedness of a 
firm requires the researcher to establish linkages between the firm and 
governmental bodies. Prior literature argues that companies are often reluctant 
to disclose their political connectedness as this information is considered to be 
of a sensitive and proprietary nature (Baines and Viney, 2010). Meanwhile, 
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discussion of the existence of political relationships is considered a taboo 
subject in the business environment of developing countries, such as Pakistan 
(Saeed, 2013). In addition, the nature of these relationships is volatile and can 
be subject to a noticeable shift over time. 
Saeed (2013) also studied the influence of political connectedness on non-
financial listed firms in Pakistan. This study explored the impact of political 
connectedness on firm's performance and the ability to access finance. The 
results of the study indicate that political connectedness is positively related to 
a firm's ability to access finance, although it negatively influences the firm's 
performance. Saeed (2013) also used the same measure to determine the 
political connectedness of listed companies in Pakistan; that is, the one used by 
Khwaja and Mian (2005). Here it is argued that this measure is most 
appropriate in consideration of Pakistan's political and institutional context. 
A detailed explanation regarding the selection of the research sample and the 
process of data collection is provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1. The 
following section explains the importance of corporate political connectedness 
with reference to developing countries. 
3.2 Political Connectedness in Developing Countries 
Politics can influence the owners, size, structure, profitability, financing 
avenues, culture and operations of a firm (Roe, 2003). Wu (2005) argues that 
politicians take an interest in corporate organisations as they extract benefits 
and bribes from the corporate sector. On the other hand, the existing literature 
also recognises that corporate organisations develop political connections 
strategically for the purpose of seeking rents, obtaining preferential treatment 
and subsidies, reduced taxation, obtaining access to land and utilities and 
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extracting other undue benefits. Therefore, the connection between politicians 
and finns yields mutual benefits for both parties (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Macey, 2014; Domadenik et aI., 2014; Fan et aI., 2014). 
The nature and prevalence of political connectedness is distinct in developing 
economies (Desai, 2011; Saeed, 2013). In developing countries, the capital 
markets lack sufficient institutional resources to support entrepreneurs 
(Domadenik et aI., 2014). Business owners often face difficulties in obtaining 
access to various facilities, such as bank finance, land, services from public 
organisations, while they also have to follow excessive regulation (Desai, 
20 I I). As key state resources are held by government, business organisations 
tend to develop relationships with politicians. Thus, political connections 
facilitate access to the resources required on the part of these business 
organisations (Li et aI., 2008; Xu et aI., 2013). 
Xin and Pearce (1996) argue that, in the absence of a strong judicial system, 
people hesitate to trust one another. In such circumstances, legal contracts are 
not deemed enforceable. Thus, in order to protect their interests, people tend to 
establish relationships and political connections to serve as a substitute for a 
strong legal infrastructure. Bushman et at. (2004) claim that, in countries with 
weak law enforcement, relationship-based arrangements and private 
mechanisms for enforcement of contracts will emerge. As contract enforcement 
mechanisms are weak, parties to a contract develop infonnal ties with each 
other. These infonnal ties serve as a substitute for the strong enforcement of 
contracts. 
Owing to poor law enforcement, firms avoid dispersal of equity to outsiders 
and outside investors also lack the necessary confidence for investing money in 
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the equity market. The resulting equity markets are thus highly concentrated 
with greater emphasis placed on personal relationships. Bushman et al. (2004) 
further argue that in order to meet their political agenda, politically powerful 
elites favour their acquaintances in return for bribes, political support and 
nepotism. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) also argue that, in countries 
characterised by weak law enforcement, economic transactions are made on the 
basis of close personal ties and political relationships, while political influence 
plays a significant role in shaping corporate governance systems. 
The extent of political connectedness is also relevant to the level of corruption 
in an economy (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al.. 
2009). Fisman (2001) argues that a high level of corruption in developing 
countries such as Pakistan, China, India and Bangladesh might indicate the 
existence of a higher level of political corruption and rent-seeking through 
political connectedness. Faccio (2006) and Boubakri at el. (2008) argued that 
the political connectedness of firms is predominant in countries which exhibit 
lower judicial independence. Faccio and Parsley (2009) also found that 
politically connected firms are more prevalent in countries with high levels of 
corruption and weak legal systems. 
Berglof and Thadden (1999) argue that, in most developing countries, business 
organisations are characterised by the dominance of family ownership 
structures. Berglof and Thadden (1999) further argue that the owners of these 
family-held businesses are normally politically influential people. Bertrand and 
Schoar (2006) argue that family firms are in a better position to develop and 
maintain political relationships through kinship and networking. These 
politically influential people often succeed in influencing the development and 
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implementation of laws and regulations in such countries (Berglof and 
Thadden, 1999). 
Being that political relationships are an important feature of business in 
developing countries such as Pakistan, the study of the influence of political 
connectedness on corporate activities is particularly important. The existing 
literature recognises that political influence is the reason why certain laws 
remain in place in developing countries, irrespective of their enforceability or 
usefulness. Agrawal and Knoeber (200 I) and Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang (2009) found that politically connected firms use political 
influence for the implementation and adaptation of favourable economic 
policies and regulations in developing countries having weak legal 
infrastructure. Hellman et al. (2000) supply evidence to suggest that firms 
influence the legal systems and policy-making process through the exercise of 
political influence. 
In addition, the value of political connections in developing countries increases 
because these economies are mainly dependent on bank finance. Several 
factors are considered to have an influence on financing decisions by banks; for 
example, trust (Moro and Kodwani, 20 I 0), political relationships (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005), social responsibility practices (Cheng et aI., 2014), etc. In the 
absence of formal mechanisms of governance (such as a strong legal system), 
social systems (such as political connectedness) are developed to carry out 
economic and financial transactions such as bank loans (Charumilind et aI., 
2006). Consequently, in such countries politically connected firms commonly 
obtain better access to finance (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Therefore, it can 
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be argued that the nature and value of political connectedness is manifold in 
developing economies. 
Political influence is recognised to be the most significant factor in bank 
financing decisions in Pakistan. Khan and Bhatti (2008) have documented the 
impact of direct political influence on the presidents of banks in regard to the 
sanction of loans to politically influential people. Such borrowers have later 
defaulted and the loans have never been recovered. 
Khan and Bhatti (2008) argue that the State Bank of Pakistan has a poor 
corporate governance system and the financial sector of Pakistan has been 
severely abused by politically influential elites. Saeed et at. (2014) indeed find 
a positive relationship between a firm's leverage and its political 
connectedness. Saeed (2013) also studied how political connectedness affects a 
firm's ability to raise finance, and found that politically connected firms enjoy 
the benefits of preferential lending. Saeed (2013) also investigated the impact 
of political connectedness on firm performance and found negative 
relationships to be prevalent. 
Meanwhile, Khwaja and Mian (2005) investigated the influence of political 
connections in the financial sector of Pakistan. They found that public sector 
banks are subject to heavy political influences, being that politically connected 
firms borrowed 40 per cent more from public sector banks, while the default 
rate of the loans extended to politically connected firms was 50 per cent higher 
when compared to the default rate for non-connected firms. The authors further 
assert that in contrast to public sector banks, private banks are not subject to 
high political pressures. 
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As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Pakistan is a developing country with weak 
law enforcement and high levels of corruption (Easterly, 2001; Anwar, 2006). 
The World Bank (2005) has reported that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP), which is responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of all corporate policies and regulations for corporations 
operating in Pakistan, itself operates under political influence. Furthermore, the 
substantial involvement of political dynasties in the corporate sector (discussed 
in detail in chapter 2) renders Pakistan to be an ideal case for the study of the 
impact of political connectedness on corporate disclosure. 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of research on the influence of political 
connectedness on the disclosure practices of listed companies. To the best of 
the researcher's knowledge, no research has so far focused on investigating the 
impact of political connectedness on the corporate governance disclosure 
practices of listed companies in Pakistan. This research will thus fill this gap in 
the literature, while the research findings may also be generalisable in the 
developing countries which have a similar institutional context to Pakistan. 
3.3 Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices 
Corporate governance and disclosure are considered to be highly interlinked 
concepts. Transparency of corporate information is an important aspect of 
corporate governance. Corporate governance ensures transparency in corporate 
disclosures through the introduction of such mechanisms as reporting and 
disclosure regulations (Qu and Leung, 2006; Melis and Carta, 2010; 
Stelanescu, 20l2a). On the other hand, disclosure requirements are considered 
to be an important mechanism used by regulators to enhance corporate 
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governance, being that they ensure managers are managing the affairs of the 
firm in an effective and transparent manner. 
Several researchers have argued that level of corporate disclosure increases 
with the introduction of mandatory disclosure regulations (Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005). Therefore better transparency in a firm is related to superior 
corporate governance mechanisms (Green and Graham, 2005). According to 
the corporate and financial reporting framework provided in the Code of 
Corporate Governance (2002), the purpose of corporate disclosure 
requirements is to ensure that the financial statements present a fair picture of 
the actual affairs, where proper books of accounts are maintained, appropriate 
and consistent accounting policies are applied and any concerns are explicitly 
stated about a company's ability to continue business as a going concern. 
Financial scandals, such as that of Enron, have highlighted the need for greater 
accountability and transparency and raised concerns about the practices of 
corporate boards and managerial misconduct. Subsequent to these scandals, 
disclosure and reporting requirements received extensive attention throughout 
the world. The reports of the various commissions, such as Treadway (1987) in 
the USA and Cadbury (1992) in the UK highlighted the importance of better 
corporate governance for improving corporate transparency (Green and 
Graham, 2005; Lin et aI., 2014). Ineffective corporate governance practices 
accompanied by unreliable financial reports have been considered a major 
reason for a lack of investor confidence (Rezaee, 2004), poor accounting 
practices and weak internal control mechanisms (Uwuigbe et aI., 2014). 
Bujaki and Mcconomy (2002) argue that firms running into corporate 
governance failures disclose a poor quality of corporate governance 
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information prior to such failure. Thus, the literature on corporate governance 
disclosure recognises that good corporate governance and disclosure are 
important mechanisms for ensuring transparency in corporate affairs, 
preventing frauds, and safeguarding against corporate failures. This is a 
significant concern for international regulatory bodies, as well as academic 
researchers in the area of corporate governance disclosure, and has therefore 
served as an important motivation for this research. 
As existing research has affirmed, the board of directors is the holder of 
managerial powers in Anglo-Saxon countries (Heracleous and Lan, 2012). The 
board holds a central position in corporate governance system (Daily et aI., 
2003). However, accessing the members of the board has been recognised as a 
difficult task by researchers. Hence accounting for what actually happens in 
board meetings remains under-researched (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Payne 
et aI., 2009). Green and Graham (2005) assert that corporate disclosures 
provide a source of information in regard to the decisions taken during the 
meetings and the strategies of the board as they are prepared under the advice 
of the board (Matoussi and Chakroun, 2008). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) claim that annual reports are prepared by chief 
accounting officer of the companies. In order to understand the actual process 
behind the preparation of annual reports in the context of Pakistan, this 
research aims to investigate who makes decisions regarding the preparation and 
disclosure of corporate governance information in annual reports. 
The following section will provide a critical overview of the existing literature 
on corporate governance disclosure. 
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3.3.1 Review of Literature on Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Bhasin (2012) defined corporate governance disclosure as the provision of 
governance related information to the stakeholders of corporate organisations. 
It is important to clarify here that 'corporate disclosure' is a broad term that 
collectively covers disclosure in the various aspects of corporate 
communication (Akhtaruddin et aI., 2009; Ta Quang, 2012; Chakroun, 2013). 
However, a diverse body of literature exists on each of the aspects of corporate 
disclosure; for example, environmental disclosure (da Silva Monteiro and 
Aibar-Guzman, 2010; Salama et aI., 2012), corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (Khan et aI., 2013; Jizi et aI., 2014; Chan et aI., 2014), disclosure on 
a company's intellectual capital (Jing et aI., 2008; Hidalgo et aI., 2011; Dumay 
et aI., 2015). information on human resources (Vuontisjarvi, 2006; Ullah et aI., 
2015), corporate governance disclosures (please refer to the following section 
for a detailed review), disclosure on forward looking information (Kent and 
Ung, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008), and disclosure on corporate risk 
practices (Uddin and Hassan, 2011; Rodriguez Dominguez and Noguera 
Gamez, 2014; AI-Najjar and Abed, 2014) etc. However, this research focuses 
on the analysis of corporate governance disclosures. 
Various researchers have studied corporate governance disclosure from 
different perspectives. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the literature review 
carried out in this research. The table provides information about the various 
determinants of corporate governance disclosure as identified by prior 
literature. 
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Table 3.2: Review of Relevant Literature-Determinants of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Authors Country Theory Type of Analysis Variable with a Significant Effect Variable without a Sienificant Effect 
AI-Najjar and United Regression Industry competition + Agency theory Board independence + Ding (2014) Kingdom models Audit committee independence + 
Sharma (2014) Agency Multiple Size + Profitability Nepal Leverage + Listing age Theory regressIon Foreign Association + 
Bhasin (2012) India Information Content analysis Size + Industry type 
assymetry 
Desokyand Univariate Foreign listing + 
Mousa (2012) Egypt Agency theory Analysis Firm size + Multivariate Audit Firm + 
Analysis 
CEO duality -
Samaha et al. Egypt Agency theory Multiple Ownership concentration -(2012) regression Firm size + 
Number of independent directors + 
Steranescu United Agency Multiple CEO Duality 
-
(2012a) Kingdom Theory Regression Number of independent directors + 
Steranescu United Multiple Existance of Board committees + Agency theory Independence of board committees (2012b) Kingdom regressIOn 
+ 
Agency theory Size + Board composition Muhamad et Malaysia Stweardship Multivariate test Leverage + Profitability 
al. (2009) 
theory Industry + Auditor 
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Table 3.2: Review of Relevant Literature-Determinants of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Authors Country Theory Type of Analysis Variable with a Significant Effect Variable without a Si2nificant Effect 
Intention to raise equity capital + Board size 
Level of analyst following + CEO-Chairman 
Gandfa (2008) Spain Agency theory Multiple Duration of company In Stock - duality Regression exchange Free float 
Firm size + Size of Audit fIrm 
Sector + 
Size + Age 
Public Ownership - Complexity of 
Hossain India Agency theory Multiple Board composition + Business (2008) regressIOn Financial Performance + Dividends 
Multiple listing 
Number of Auditors 
Hussainey and Saudi Sector + AI-Nodel Arabia - Content anal ysis Government invlovement in business -(2008) 
Maingot and Canada Isomorphism Content analysis Webpage as a medium of disclosure -Zeghal (2008) Size + 
Ben-Amar and Inside ownership - Management 
Boujenoui Uni veriate CEO duality - ownership 
(Ben-Amar Canada Agency theory analysis Board independence + 
and Multivariate Firm size + 
Boujenoui , analysis Cross-listing + 
2006) 
- -----
~---
-- --- "---
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Table 3.2: Review of Relevant Literatu re-Determina nts of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Authors Country Theory Type of Analysis Variable with a Significant Effect Variable without a Si2oificaot Effect 
Role duality + Management 
Existence of an audit committee + ownership 
Number of shareholders + Proportion of non-
Board compensation + executive directors 
Linear Existence of a compensation + Larger audit firms 
Andersson and committee Diffuse ownership Sweedon Agency theory regressIOn Corporation size + Board size Daoud (2005) Multiple Multiple listings + Board ownership 
regressIOn Existence of 
nomination 
committee 
Board activity 
Industry type 
Disclosure Strict regulation + 
Green and theory, i discourse Discourse , Graham Canada 
analysis, and analysis (2005) 
structuration 
theory 
Intention to raise capital [mance + 
Collett and Information Multivariate Intention to raise debt finance -Australia Industry classification + Hrasky (2005) asymmetry Analysis Multiple stock listing + 
Firm performance + 
-~ 
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Table 3.2: Review of Relevant Literature-Determinants of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Authors Country Theory Type of Analysis Variable witb a Significant Effect Variable witbout a Si2nificant Effect 
Isomorphi sm Multivariate Intention to raise capital + 
Bujaki and Disclosure analysis Size + 
McConomy Canada management Simultaneous Revenue -
(2002) theory Equations Unrelated directors + 
analysis Leverage + 
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The following sections provide a critical review of the existing literature on 
corporate governance disclosure. 
Regulation and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Several researchers have studied the level of corporate governance disclosure 
in the corporate communication of listed companies. Sharma (2014) analysed 
the extent of voluntary and mandatory corporate governance disclosures in the 
annual reports of 59 banking and financial companies in Nepal for the year 
2010. A disclosure index was constructed and the results of the study indicated 
that companies were disclosing information on 91 per cent of the mandatory 
items, while the level of disclosure for voluntary disclosure was 48 per cent. 
Thus the companies have been providing a significantly higher level of 
mandatory information on governance practices when compared with voluntary 
information. It might thus be inferred that corporate governance disclosure 
increases when it is made mnandatory for companies to disclose information 
and companies do not tend to disclose information voluntarily. 
Green and Graham (2005) studied the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure practices of the 35 largest companies listed on Toronto Stock 
Exchange as at 11 May 2011, analysing the annual reports and proxy circulars 
of these listed companies for the years 2000 and 2002. Voluntary disclosure in 
regard to board accountability, independence and directors' roles, 
responsibility and inter-relationships was examined using discourse analysis. In 
the analysis performed for the year 2000, it was found that these companies 
provided poor disclosure, while information on key aspects of governance was 
omitted. The information provided in these documents lacked clarity, 
consistency and explicitness. 
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However, in the annual reports and proxy circulars for 2002, Green and 
Graham found a better level of disclosure in comparison with 2000. They 
concluded that a culture of voluntary disclosure was developing on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange and that there was no need for strict disclosure regulation. 
This was a very useful study from the perspective of the analysis of corporate 
governance information in annual reports. The study focused on an in-depth 
analysis of narratives in annual reports. Moreover, instead of using quantitative 
techniques for the analysis of given disclosures, the focus was on the analysis 
of omitted information. 
Qu and Leung (2006) argue that corporate disclosure consists of financial 
disclosure and corporate governance disclosure. Qu and Leung thus developed 
an index for corporate governance disclosure and classified corporate 
governance information in eight broad categories. They analysed corporate 
governance disclosures in the annual reports of 120 Chinese listed companies 
from 19 industries for the year 2003. They found that 104 companies disclosed 
corporate governance information voluntarily. They observed that 85 per cent 
of the Chinese listed companies provided voluntary information regarding 
corporate governance in annual reports. The researchers themselves recognised 
the small sample size to be a limitation of this study. However, as the size of 
the sample was small, this study might also be criticised on the grounds of 
lacking depth in the analysis performed. 
Gandia (2008) examined corporate governance disclosures in the annual 
reports and web sites of listed Spanish companies. The study revealed that listed 
companies provided a low level of corporate governance information. In 
addition, only 20 per cent of the companies disclosed a good level of disclosure 
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on company websites, while the rest of the companies did not provide adequate 
online disclosure. 
Bhasin (2012) studied the voluntary disclosure practices of 50 companies for 
the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 from four different industries in India. He 
analysed voluntary disclosure practices of listed companies through the 
development of a disclosure index. Descriptive statistics were then applied for 
analysis of data. It was found that companies were disclosing a poor level of 
information about their corporate governance practices. This study did not use 
any sophisticated statistical tools for the analysis of data and the sample size 
was also small. Therefore, the results of the study cannot be generalised. In 
addition, despite a small number of annual reports, an in-depth analysis of 
disclosures was not carried out, meaning that the analysis lacked depth as well 
as breadth. 
Corporate Governance Disclosure and Capital Financing 
Several researchers have examined the relationship between voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure and the intention to raise external finance. 
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) examined the annual reports of 290 companies 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange for the year 1997. They applied 
multivariate analysis and found that the firms intending to raise capital in the 
future disclose more information in annual reports. However, the companies 
that do not intend to raise capital use less expensive means of disclosure, such 
as management information circulars. 
Collett and Hrasky (2005) examined data for 29 companies listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange for the year 1994. They used the data for year 1994 
being that they wanted to study voluntary disclosure practices of listed 
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companies before corporate governance regulations were introduced in the 
Australian Stock Exchange. They ran a regression analysis and found an 
association between firms' intentions to acquire finance and their voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure practices. It was found that companies 
intending to raise capital through equity financing provide better disclosure 
compared with the companies that intend to raise capital through debt 
financing. Although this study used quantitative techniques for data analysis, 
the sample used for this research was too small for a quantitative study, 
representing a major weakness in this research. Gandia (2008) studied 
corporate governance disclosures in Spanish companies and found that Spanish 
companies provide higher disclosure for attracting investors. 
Corporate Governance Disclosure and Size 
Sharma (2014) found that there is a significant relationship between the size of 
the company and the level of corporate governance disclosure in its annual 
reports. He argued that biglO companies possess the necessary resources 
required to finance the costs of disclosure. In addition, large firms are more 
visible and thus accountable to a larger number of stakeholders, thus providing 
more disclosure to meet the information needs of these stakeholders. Ben-
Amar and Boujenoui (2006) also found a positive relationship between firm 
size and the level of disclosure. 
Maingot and Zeghal (2008) analysed the corporate websites, annual reports and 
proxy circulars of eight Canadian banks and found that large banks disclosed 
more information on their websites, while smaller banks disclosed more 
governance information in their annual reports. They assert that the size of an 
10 Sharma (2014) considered a company to be 'big' if the value of its assets exceeded 20,000 million (Nepali 
Rupees.) 
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organisation can influence its disclosure practices. The coding sheet developed 
by Maingot and Zeghal (2008) was quite elaborate and it was used as a guide 
for initial coding of the data in this research. However, the results from 
Maingot and Zeghal (2008) were based on regression analysis carried out on a 
small sample of38 listed Indian banks for the year 2003. The small sample size 
points to limitations regarding generalisation of these results. Hossain (2008) 
also found that the size of a firm is positively related to the level of mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures. 
Muhamad et al. (2009) studied the factors affecting the quality and quantity of 
voluntary as well as mandatory disclosure in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Malaysia. They found that the size of the company is positively 
related to the level of corporate governance disclosure in its annual report, 
being that large companies provide more information in annual reports for the 
purpose of managing how they are perceived by the public. Desoky and Mousa 
(2012) studied the disclosure practices of 100 listed companies in Egypt and 
found that firm size is positively associated with the level of corporate 
governance disclosure in the annual reports and company websites. 
In turn, Andersson and Daoud (2005) studied the relationship between 
corporation size and the level of corporate governance disclosure in the annual 
reports of 54 companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange for the year 
2003. They found a positive relationship and argued that larger companies 
disclose more information as it facilitates their dealings with government 
agencies, the public and investors. Good disclosure also helps to build a better 
reputation for these companies. 
85 
Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations of the Research 
It might be inferred that the existing research indicates the presence of a 
positive relationship between the size of the firms and the level of disclosure. 
However, the study of this relationship does not fall within the scope of this 
research. All the companies studied in this research are medium-sized firms. 
Therefore, the size of these firms will not be an influential factor for examining 
variations in the level of disclosures. 
Corporate Governance Disclosure and the Audit Firm 
Existing research has also questioned the impact of the size and number of 
audit firms (more than the minimum statutory requirement at one point in time) 
on the transparency of corporate reporting. However, the research in this regard 
presents contradictory results. Desoky and Mousa (2012) studied the disclosure 
practices of 100 listed companies in Egypt and found that the size of the audit 
firm is positively associated with the level of corporate governance disclosure 
in the annual reports and company websites. They argued that bigger audit 
firms possess the experience and expertise necessary to convince company 
management to provide higher levels of disclosure. 
On the other hand, Andersson and Daoud (2005) found that the size of the 
audit firm does not influence the level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Hossain (2008) also studied the influence of the number of audit firms on 
mandatory corporate disclosure practices of listed banks. Here he found that 
the number of auditors does not have any significant impact on the level of 
disclosure in annual reports. 
Being that it is standard for statutory audit firms in Pakistan to issue a review 
report regarding corporate governance and disclosure practices of listed 
companies, their role is particularly important in the context of Pakistan. For 
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the same reason, this research has also interviewed the representatives of 
statutory audit firms. In addition, review reports from statutory auditors have 
also been analysed for the purpose of exploring any differences in the corporate 
governance disclosures provided in the audited annual reports of politically 
connected and non-connected firms. 
Corporate Governance Disclosure and Industry 
Prior research on the influence of industry type on corporate governance 
disclosure has provided contradictory evidence. Several researchers have 
argued that disclosure practices across various industries might vary. The 
reason for this variation might be traced in the difference in stakeholders' 
expectations and regulatory disclosure requirements across industries (Toms et 
aI., 2007; Muhamad et aI., 2009; An et aI., 2011). AI-Najjar and Ding (2014) 
studied corporate governance disclosure practices of 162 FTSE firms from the 
UK from 2001 to 2009. The results of the panel data analysis revealed that 
companies in less competitive industries 11, those with high entry costs and 
large market size, make better corporate governance disclosure. 
Collett and Hrasky (2005) argued that the firms in politically visible industries 
provide better voluntary disclosures becasue it positively contributes in 
managing their reputation. Collett and Hrasky (2005) studied the relationship 
between corporate governance disclosures and industry classification. Using 
the technique of multinomial regression analysis on 29 annual reports of 
Australian companies, they found that the companies in resource industries 
disclosed better quality corporate governance information than the companies 
II AI-Najjar and Ding (2014) consider those industries as less competitive where entry cost was high and 
market size was large. 
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in other industries. However, the small sample size is a major limitation of this 
study. 
Andersson and Daoud (2005) also studied the relationship between industry 
type and corporate governance disclosure but found no association. However, 
Andersson and Daoud (2005) clarified that their classification of industries was 
not well developed, being that they included firms carrying out significantly 
different nature of business into a single industry type. The results of the study 
might therefore be problematic. 
Hussainey and AI-Nodel (2008) used the technique of content analysis for the 
analysis of corporate governance information provided on the corporate 
websites of 64 Saudi listed companies across eight industries. They found that 
banks disclosed the highest level of information, while companies in the 
industry and service sectors provided minimum disclosure. They then argue 
that banking institutions provide higher level disclosure being that the banking 
industry is highly regulated and the sector is required to provide more 
disclosure to the public. Muhamad et al. (2009) found that companies in the 
infrastructure industry12 provides a higher level of voluntary as well as 
mandatory information in the annual reports. 
However, several researchers have argued that the type of industry does not 
influence corporate governance disclosure. Bhasin et al (2012) studied the 
voluntary corporate governance practices of listed companies across four 
industries in India and found that there were no differences in the level of 
disclosure across these industries. Andersson and Daoud (2005) also found that 
12Muhamad et al. (2009) have not provided any further information on the nature of industry. 
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industry type does not influence the disclosure of corporate governance 
information in the annual reports of Swedish listed companies. 
A review of the relevant literature indicates that the industry/sector of a listed 
company might have an influence on the disclosure practices of listed 
companies. In order to become aware of industry influence, listed companies 
from a number of different sectors have been examined; that is, sugar, textile, 
chemical, food, leather, packaging, construction, paper, wool, synthetic 
products and miscellaneous. It is important to note that no study in Pakistan has 
examined the influence of industry type on corporate governance disclosures to 
date. This research fills the current gap in the literature. 
Corporate Governance Disclosure and Board Attributes 
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) studied the voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure practices of 290 companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
for the year 1997. They found that the companies with more unrelated 13 
members of the board provide more voluntary corporate governance 
information. Samaha et at. (2012) studied the impact of various corporate 
governance mechanisms on voluntary corporate governance using regression 
analysis and found that the level of corporate governance disclosure is 
negatively related to CEO dualityl4. They also found that the level of corporate 
governance disclosure is positively related to the number of independent 
directors on the board. 
I3Bujaki and McConomy (2002, p. 107) defined an unrelated director as "a director who is independent of 
management and is free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could, or could 
~easonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director's ability to act with a view to the best 
Interests of the corporation, other than interests and relationships arising from shareholding." 
14Samaha et al. (2012) explained that CEO duality refers to the situation when the positions of Chief 
Executive Officer and Chairman ofthe board are held by the same person, and at the same time. 
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Steranescu (20l2a) studied how CEO duality affected the disclosure of 
corporate governance information in the annual reports and websites of 46 
banks listed on the London Stock Exchange for the year 2011. The results of 
linear regression revealed that CEO duality negatively affects corporate 
governance disclosures. ~teIanescu (2012b) also investigated the impact of 
existence and independence of board committees on corporate governance 
disclosure. Here, a positive relationship was found in the results of linear 
regression. 
Hossain (2008) researched the impact of board composition on mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure in the annual reports of 38 listed Indian banks 
for the year 2003. Regression analysis was used to determine this relationship 
and it was found that the number of independent directors is positively related 
to the level of corporate disclosure. Ben-Amar and Boujenoui (2006) found a 
positive statistical relationship between board independence and corporate 
governance disclosure in 587 Canadian listed companies over the period 2002-
2004. AI-Najjar and Ding (2014) also found a positive relationship between 
board independence and the level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Andersson and Daoud (2005) also studied the impact of various board 
attributes, such as CEO duality, board size, board compensation, the existence 
of a compensation committee, the existence of a nomination committee, an 
audit committee and the activity of the board. Multiple regression analysis was 
used to determine the relationship between these characteristics and the quality 
of corporate governance disclosure. Contrary to the results of previously 
mentioned studies, the results of the study indicate that the level of disclosure 
is positively related to CEO duality, the presence of an audit committee and the 
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presence of a nomination committee. However, these findings might be 
criticised as companies having role duality in the sample had foreign owners. 
Andersson and Daoud (2005) also acknowledge that differences in ownership 
structure were not taken into account when their analysis was carried out. 
Furthermore, Andersson and Daoud (2005) also found that the size of the 
board, proportion of non-executive members on the board, existence of 
nomination committee and board activity did not have any influence on the 
level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Samaha et al. (2012) found that the level of corporate governance disclosure 
decreases with an increase in ownership concentration. Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2008) analysed data from 130 firms from the FTSE Eurotop 300 
using regression analysis and found that ownership structure affects the level of 
voluntary corporate governance· disclosures, while higher ownership 
concentration results in poor corporate governance disclosure. Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2008) argue in turn that a separation of ownership and control 
results in better corporate governance disclosure. 
Hossain (2008) found that publicly owned banks provide less mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure compared to private banks. Hossain (2008) 
explained that private banks attempt to attract customers through provision of 
better services and that the same attitude is reflected in their disclosure 
practices, that is, they use annual reports as a marketing tool. 
Stefanescu (2012c) analysed the websites and annual reports of 46 banks listed 
on the London Stock Exchange for the year 2010. Here, Stefanescu (2012c) 
studied the relationship between corporate governance disclosures and 
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ownership concentration through correlation analysis. The results of the 
research revealed that corporate governance disclosures are negatively related 
to ownership concentration. 
Existing literature also argues that there is a negative relationship between 
family control and corporate governance disclosure (Arcot and Bruno, 2012; 
Darmadi and Sodikin, 2013). Considering this strong evidence from the prior 
literature recognising the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
governance disclosure, annual reports of family owned and controlled listed 
companies are studied in this research project. Therefore, ownership structure 
will not be a determinant of variation in the level of disclosure across the 
companies studied. 
Voluntary and Mandatory Disclosure Comparison 
Samaha et al. (2012) found that the level of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures in the financial statements and websites of 100 companies on the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange was higher than the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided therein. Muhamad et al. (2009) studied the voluntary as well as 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure practices of listed companies in 
Malaysia. They found that the level of mandatory disclosure was good, being 
that most of the companies were meeting regulatory requirements. They also 
found a high level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure in the annual 
reports of the companies. 
Multiple Listing and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
A number of researchers have studied the relationship between firms listing on 
multiple stock exchanges and corp~rate governance disclosure and found a 
positive relationship. Ben-Amar and Boujenoui (2006) found a positive 
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relationship between the multiple listing of firms and the level of corporate 
governance disclosure. Collett and Hrasky (2005) analysed the annual reports 
of 29 companies and found that the companies listed in multiple stock 
exchanges provided better corporate governance disclosure than the ones that 
were listed only in the Austalian Stock Exchange. Andersson and Daoud 
(2005) also found that there was a positive relationship between the multiple 
listing of the company and the level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Desoky and Mousa (2012) studied the corporate governance disclosure 
practices of 100 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Here they 
used the technique of multivariate analysis to find that corporate governance 
disclosure was positively associated with the foreign listing of the company. 
They argued that the companies listed on multiple stock exchanges have to 
comply with the disclosure requirements of all the stock exchanges where they 
are listed and that, therefore, they provide higher corporate governance 
disclosure. However, this study analysed the data of the annual reports and web 
pages of only 100 listed companies in Egypt. Therefore, the results of this 
study might not be widely generalisable. 
This literature review shows that various factors have been identified as having 
an influence on the level of corporate governance disclosure by listed 
companies. It may be noted that most of the research conducted so far is 
quantitative in nature and provides contradictory results. It might thus be 
argued that there is a need for more qualitative research in the field, being that 
qualitative research generates rich knowledge providing interpretation and 
explanation of observed phenomenon. Furthermore, the choice of a qualitative 
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methodology might enlarge a seemingly small body of qualitative corporate 
governance research within the emerging markets (Mcnulty et aI., 2013) 
This research fills the afore-mentioned gaps in the existing literature through 
qualitative analysis of research data. In addition, the use of qualitative methods 
also proved suitable in generating a deeper understanding so as to answer 
research questions in the most appropriate manner (Bluhm et aI., 2011). 
Corporate Governance and Disclosure - Research in Pakistan 
Several researchers have explored corporate practices regarding corporate 
governance and disclosure in Pakistan's context. Rais and Saeed (2004) carried 
out an assessment of corporate governance practices of listed companies in 
Pakistan. They conducted a survey of 29 listed companies, analysed 40 
corporate annual reports and conducted interviews with varrious stakeholders 
and found that most of the companies had started implementing the provisions 
of the Code of Corporate Governance (2002). 
Rais and Saeed (2004) found that the companies had started restructuring their 
boards, holding annual general meetings and providing more transparent 
disclosures. However, Rais and Saeed (2004) argued that companies had been 
facing the problem of a lack of awareness and t~aining for compliance with 
corporate governance requirements. Rais and Saeed (2004) further argued that 
although the Code of Corporate Governance had been implemented in form, it 
did not meet the underlying intention for implementation of corporate 
governance regulations. Therefore, companies provide minimum information 
to comply with the requirements of the regulation. 
The World Bank (2005) carried out an assessment of corporate governance 
framework in Pakistan. The World Bank (2005) argued that, in most of the 
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companies in Pakistan, family members dominate shareholder meetings and 
directors are not accountable to minority shareholders. It was also found that 
family owned companies are typically managed by the family owners 
themselves and that there has been no distinct separation between ownership 
and control. Typically, the boards have insufficient awareness about the 
fiduciary duties and are dominated by majority shareholders. 
The World Bank (2005) also found that since controlling families appoint their 
representatives on the board, the majority of the boards are not independent. It 
was found that the members of the board are not being paid adequate 
remuneration and, as a result, it is not attractive for qualified individuals to 
accept a directorship in these companies. The World Bank (2005) further 
claimed that the companies in question have realised the need for better 
corporate governance and that many corporate organisations are arranging 
training and seminars for the members of the board. In addition, the Pakistan 
Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) has been established with an aim of 
providing corporate governance training to the directors of the companies. 
The International Finance Corporation (2007) conducted a survey to 
investigate the practices of the companies in Pakistan's corporate sector. The 
International Finance Corporation (2007) found that although 98% of the 
respondents claimed that they comply with the provisions of the Code of 
Corporate Governance (2002), 89% of the respondents complied with the 
requirements of the code only because it was mandatory to comply. The 
respondents did not acknowledge any practical significance of following the 
Code of Corporate Governance, while 82% of the respondents considered that 
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compliance with regulation was the most important benefit of following the 
Code (as non-compliance might result in imposition of penalties). 
In addition, the International Finance Corporation (2007) found that the 
companies adopted only those corporate governance mechanisms to which they 
needed to adhere by law. The respondents to the survey did not show any 
interest in practising voluntary corporate governance. The results of the survey 
also indicated that 31 % of the respondents considered there was no barrier to 
adoption of corporate governance being that it was mandatory and was meant 
to be followed at all costs. 
Furthermore, 69 per cent of the respondents considered lack of training and 
lack of awareness to be obstacles in practicing corporate governance. These 
findings support the findings ofRais and Saeed (2004) who had argued that the 
lack of training was a major obstacle in the implementation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance (2002). Furthermore, 21 per cent of the respondents 
considered dissemination of sensitive proprietary information to be an 
important barrier, while 14 per cent of the respondents considered that lack of 
significance was a major reason for their lack of interest in adopting corporate 
governance practices. 
However, the survey conducted by International Finance Corporation (2007) 
was subject to certain limitations. Firstly, this survey used questionnaires, 
along with semi-structured interviews conducted with corporate directors, 
CEO's, CFO's and company secretaries. However, the survey did not include 
responses from regulatory bodies and statutory audit firms. Thus, this survey 
does not capture a regulatory perspective regarding corporate governance 
practices. Secondly, the survey included participants from listed as well as non-
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listed companies. Being that non-listed companies are not legally required to 
comply with the mandatory provisions of the Code, there might be significant 
differences in perceptions and knowledge of corporate governance amongst 
research particiapants. Significant differences might also exist in the corporate 
governance practices of listed companies compared with non-listed companie, 
while this factor might have introduced significant bias into research findings. 
Thus, the survey findings do not represent the corporate governance practices 
of listed companies. 
Thirdly, the survey relied on questionnaires and semi-structured interviews in 
its analysis of corporate governance practrices. Thus, the results obtained from 
these sources of data might provide a good representation of respondents' 
perceptions about corporate governance practices. However, the findings might 
not provide evidence of the actual corporate governance practices of the 
companies. The current research has addressed these limitations through the 
conduct of semi-structured interviews with the representatives of listed 
companied, regulatory bodies and audit firms. Furthermore, this research goes 
beyond the analysis of respondents' perceptions regarding corporate 
governance practices and carries out an analysis of annual report data with the 
objective of gaining insights into the actual disclosure of listed companies. In 
addition, the survey was conducted in 2007, that is, only five years after the 
introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance in Pakistan. This research 
involves data collection and analysis in 2013; that is, almost 11 years after the 
introduction of the Code in the country. This research thus captures the most 
recent perceptions, knowledge and practices regarding corporate governance 
amongst the listed companies of Pakistan. 
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009) analysed 
the mandatory corporate governance disclosure practices of the 30 largest 
companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange and found that these 
companies were disclosing only about half of the items in the disclosure index. 
The benchmark used for analysis was developed from International Standards 
of Accounting and Reporting. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (2009) thus pointed out that most of the companies were 
disclosing information implicitly through general statements regarding 
compliance and there was a need for increased explicit disclosures. 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2009) found that 
all the 30 companies provided information on directors' remuneration; 28 
companies provided information on composition and duration of the board; and 
25 companies provided information on independence of the board. Only nine 
companies provided information on the qualifications and biography of board 
members, while only three companies disclosed information on professional 
development and training attended by the board. Information on the role of the 
board was provided by 13 companies while only nine companies disclosed 
information on the type and nature of duties performed by board members. In 
tum, Ali et al. (2011) analysed the annual reports of 83 companies listed in the 
KSE from 2005-2009. The results of regression analysis indicated a lack of 
transparency in corporate disclosures. 
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (2011) also conducted a survey on 
board practices in Pakistan and found that 75 percent of the respondents 
acknowledged that the board of directors plays an important role in strategic 
decision making of the companies. However, the respondents shared their 
98 
Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations ofthe Research 
concerns regarding timeliness and accuracy of the disclosures provided. The 
respondents also stated that compliance with the Code of corporate governance 
should not be mandatory. 
An analysis of literature on corporate governance disclosures in Pakistan 
reveals that companies are complying with mandatory requirements of the 
Code of Corporate Governance (2002). However, the literature also indicates 
that the companies prefer not to provide disclosure voluntarily. In addition, the 
information provided in the annual reports is not explicit, while researchers 
have also questioned the transparency of the information. The literature also 
argues that, although corporate governance has been implemented in form, the 
information provided does not meet the underlying intention for regulation 
implementation. Analysis of the literature also highlights that research on 
corporate governance disclosure in Pakistan is limited and that no study has yet 
attempted to understand how the institutional environment both affects and 
shapes the corporate governance disclosure practices of listed companies. As 
the prior literature has argued, corporate disclosure is one of the most 
important mechanisms of corporate governance framework (Treadway, 1987; 
Cadbury, 1992; Green and Graham, 2005; Lin et aI., 2014). However, there is a 
lack of research exploring corporate governance disclosure practices in real life 
in terms of the context of its implementation. This research fills the gaps in 
literature through an in-depth empirical investigation of corporate governance 
disclosure practices of listed companies in Pakistan and has important policy 
implications (explained in detail in Chapter 7). Furthermore, no study in 
Pakistan has explored the impact of political influence on corporate governance 
disclosure. This study also fills this gap in the existing research. 
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The following section will now provide an overview of the research on the 
impact of political influence on corporate disclosure. 
3.4 Political Influence and Corporate Disclosure 
Roe (2003) argues that a firm's political environment can have a deep impact 
on the development of national as well as firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms in a country. Roe (2003) further argues that political context has 
the power to determine which type of ownership structure and corporate 
governance arrangements should persist and develop in an economy. These 
views are consistent with the argument presented by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, p. 738) who claim that corporate governance mechanisms can be altered 
by political process. 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that political differences between countries give 
rise to differences in laws. The processes of regulation formation, 
implementation and compliance involve constant human interaction and are 
influenced by politics. It might then be argued that since corporate governance 
systems and mechanisms (such as corporate disclosure) are also introduced by 
regulatory bodies through the introduction of formal regulations, then the 
development and enforcement of corporate governance might also be 
influenced by political power held by various stakeholders. 
The impact of political influence on corporate disclosure has been recognised 
by the prior literature. Several empirical studies have found a negative 
relationship between political connectedness and the quality of accounting 
disclosure. Piotroski et al. (2015) investigated the impact of political 
connectedness on the disclosure of bad news in corporate communication 
within Chinese firms. They found that politically connected firms avoid 
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disclosure of bad news both prior to and after the occurrence of a political 
event in China. The purpose of restricting this flow of information is to save 
the politicians from the resulting embarrassment. 
Fan et al. (2014) used a sample of 45 high profile corruption cases from 1996 
to 2007 in China. Here they investigated the impact of political connectedness 
of the bureaucrats involved in these cases on the earnings' informativeness 15 of 
the connected firms. It was found that, owing to the difficulties in measurement 
of the value of political relationships, the ability of accounting earnings to track 
firms' economic performance diminishes. Thus, accounting information is 
more opaque in politically connected firms. They also argued that accounting 
information in developing countries is less informative than in developed 
countries. 
Huang et al. (2014) also studied the influence of political connectedness on the 
quality of earnings information. They examined Chinese family listed 
companies from the Shenzen Stock Exchange from 2003-2008 and found that 
politically connected firms provide poor quality information on their earnings. 
In tum, Stuart and Wang (2014) studied the financial data from 467 Chinese 
firms, among which 102 firms were politically connected. The results of 
multivariate analysis indicated that politically connected firms manipulate their 
accounting information to a larger extent when compared with non-connected 
firms. Politically connected firms are less likely to be scrutinised by the 
regulators and this factor increases their likelihood of involvement in 
fraudulent reporting. In addition, in the case of the detection of a fraudulent 
15Z . 2 arowm ( 006, p. 4) defined earnings informativeness as "the amount of information about future earnings 
and cash flows that is reflected in current period stock returns." 
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behaviour, politically connected firms are not penalised efficiently or 
effectively which encourages poor reporting practices. 
Chen et al. (2010) analysed the data from 114 politically connected firms from 
1997-2001 from 17 countries. Statistical analysis of the data revealed that 
political connectedness makes it difficult to forecast a firm's earnings 
accurately. This in tum adversly affects the accuracy of the forecasts. The 
study also indicated that higher levels of corruption decrease the accuracy of 
earnings' forecasts by politically connected firms. 
Studies on corporate disclosure and transparency have also found that political 
influence is negatively related to corporate transparency.16 Bushman et al. 
(2004) studied the impact of legal structure and political economy on corporate 
transparency through an analysis of data extracted from the annual reports of 
1,000 companies, listed across several countries around the world. They 
applied factor analysis to the quantitative data extracted from these annual 
reports and found that a firm's financial transparency was related to a country's 
political economy. 
Through an analysis of data of firms from 32 countries, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) 
found that the political connectedness of the firms results in greater earnings' 
opacity,17 low accountability and inferior quality of accounting practices. 
Boubakri et al. (2008) also conducted a study of 245 politically connected 
firms across 27 developing and 14 developed countries. They found that 
politically connected firms influence appointments to boards of directors in 
newly privati sed firms and that political connectedness is negatively related to 
~6 Bushman et al. (2004, p. 208) defined corporate transparency as the availability of firm specific 
Information to company outsiders. 
~7 Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) defined earnings' opacity as a measure reflecting the insufficiency of disclosed 
Information regarding a firm's true but unobservable economic performance-
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firm performance. Chaney et at. (2011) investigated the impact of political 
connectedness on the quality of accounting information and found that the 
quality of financial reporting in politically connected firms is significantly 
poorer than in non-connected firms. 
However, some of the researchers investigating the relationship between 
political influence on corporate disclosure and transparency have found 
contradicting results. Batta et al. (2014) studied financial information from 29 
listed Venezuelan companies from 2000 to 2008. They found that in economies 
experiencing high levels of expropriation risk, politically connected firms tend 
to disclose a better quality of accounting information. 
Yen (2013) studied the impact of political connectedness on financial reporting 
in China-based companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Yen 
(2013) analysed annual reports and corporate governance information of ten 
companies accused of fraudulent reporting and 99 companies not accused of 
fraudulent reporting from 2006 to 2008. The results of regression analysis 
indicated that political connectedness does not increase the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting. However, this research only studied a small 
sample of ten politically connected firms, while the number of non-connected 
firms was 99. The results of the study might be influenced by this factor and 
their reliability might therefore be questioned. 
Similarly, Khemakhem and Dicko (2013) studied the corporate governance 
compliance practices of 300 Toronto Stock Exchange firms for the year 2010. 
The analysis of directors' circulars and annual notices revealed that politically 
connected firms comply with regulatory requirements as non-compliance 
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results in an increase in the risk of penalties, an increase in financial costs and 
accusations of favouritism. 
These results contradict with the findings of Stuart and Wang (2014), who 
argued that politically connected firms are under a lower level of scrutiny from 
regulators. However, it is important to note that Khemakhem and Dicko (2013) 
conducted their study on companies listed on Toronto Stock Exchange, while 
Stuart and Wang's (2014) research was carried out on the technology 
compaines operating in China. There might be significant variations in the 
nature of regulations, the expectations relating to regulatory compliance and 
other institutional factors prevailing in these two different research settings. 
These contradictions in the existing quantitative corporate governance research 
have higlighted the need for more in-depth research. This research will attempt 
to understand these phenomena in the context of Pakistan by conducting an in-
depth analysis. 
Sari and Anugerah (2011) studied the impact of political influence on corporate 
transparency using government ownership as a proxy for political influence 
and found a positive relationship between the two. Sari and Anugerah (2011) 
also studied this relationship using the existence of politicians on the board of 
directors as another proxy for political influence and found no significant 
relationship between them. 
Various researchers have explained the different reasons for poor disclosure in 
the corporate communication of politically connected firms. Bushman et at. 
(2004) argue that politicians might restrict the flow of information to the public 
with the aim of hiding the favours they extend to their acquaintances through 
nepotism, bribery and political support. Tinker and Neimark (1987) argue that 
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accounting information and disclosure are not merely ways of transmitting 
objective accounting facts, but constitute a socially constructed reality and are 
used as a tool for dissemination of wealth and power amongst social actors. 
Green and Graham (2005) argue in tum that the board of directors uses 
corporate disclosures as a tool for management of perceptions regarding a 
company situation. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) claim that large companies 
are more politically visible, and in order to limit political interference, they 
disclose more information. Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) assert that politically 
powerful leaders use their power to provide benefits to their friends, family 
members and connected firms through distortion of incentives, rent seeking 
and corruption. Although these connections provide the benefits of easier 
access to bank finance, lower taxation and market power, these firms do not 
perform better than their peers in the long run. Consequently, directors perform 
more opportunistically through shirking and rent seeking. In order to hide the 
poor performance of the firm, they manipulate financial statements, thus 
increasing earnings opacity and decreasing disclosure quality (Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004). 
An analysis of the existing literature highlights a few important gaps. First, 
most of this research focuses on the analysis of the influence of political 
connectedness on the quality of financial information disclosure. None of these 
studies focuses on determining the relationship between political 
connectedness and corporate governance disclosure. In addition, the existing 
literature has predominantly used quantitative methods for investigation. In 
order to deal with the problem of contradictory evidence, many researchers 
have emphasised the need to understand corporate governance through in-
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depth research, conducted in the real life context of organisations (Lan and 
Heracleous, 2010; Mcnulty et aI., 2013). Furthermore, in spite of the fact that 
Pakistan is a country with a high level of political networking and corruption, 
no study has investigated the influence of politics on corporate disclosures. 
This research project fills these gaps in the literature through an in-depth 
empirical investigation carried out in the context of Pakistan. 
The following section explains the various theoretical lenses utilised for the 
purpose of developing an understanding of the phenomena under research. 
3.5 Corporate Governance and its Disclosure - Theoretical Underpinnings 
The following section provides a review of the relevant literature recognising 
the impact of political influence on corporate governance disclosure. 
3.5.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory provides the most dominant theoretical explanation in corporate 
governance literature (Daily et aI., 2003). An agency theory perspective views 
corporate governance as a mechanism devised for resolving agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control in corporate organisations 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Agency theory assumes that the principal (owner) hires the 
agent (manager) to seek benefit from the agent's expertise, skills and 
knowledge to maximise returns on hislher investment. 
However, in order to maximise the returns on investment, the principal has to 
delegate certain decision-making rights to the agent. The agent thus serves the 
principal and is entitled to remuneration for these services. However, agency 
theory assumes that human beings are opportunistic in nature and that. 
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managers (agents) will not always work in the best interest of the principal 
(owner), maximising their personal gains over organisational interests. 
As managers are opportunistic in nature, they are expected to maximise their 
self-interest, the principal (owner) will use two basic instruments to control 
managerial opportunism. First, shelhe will offer the manager incentives in the 
form of suitable remuneration packages. Second, shelhe will have to incur 
costs in monitoring the manager's possible misappropriation. Moreover, the 
owner will pay incentives to the manager, in order to ensure that he/she keeps 
on working for the enhancement of the firm's wealth and resources, instead of 
taking any actions that are harmful to the business. All these costs, collectively, 
are referred to as agency costs. Agency theory is therefore grounded in the 
basic assumption of neo-classical economic theory that human beings make 
rational choices after making a careful assessment of risk and so work for the 
maximisation of their self-interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). 
The traditional agency perspective views a business organisation as a 'nexus of 
contracts' between various participants within and outside of the organisation. 
Fligstein and Choo (2005) state that these contracts delegate specific rights and 
obligations to the agent and also indicate the compensation to which the agent 
is entitled, after fulfilling hislher obligations under the contractual terms. The 
contract between the principal and agent also specifies the mechanisms 
available to the principal for monitoring the performance of the agent. 
However, owing to the limited ability of human beings to draft complete 
contracts, it is not possible to incorporate all the possible disputes and 
contingencies that might arise during the span of the contract (Hart, 1995). 
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An agency theory perspective views corporate governance as a set of cost 
effective arrangements aimed at monitoring the activities of managers and 
aligning the interests of owners and managers, in order to minimise the costs of 
opportunistic managerial behaviour that owners may suffer. This is achieved 
through remuneration incentives, the provision of legal protection and through 
devising the means for formulating the most efficient and cost effective 
contract (Eisenhardt, 1989; Daily et aI., 2003; Feldman and Montgomery, 
2015). 
Agency Theory in Developing Countries 
The existing literature has investigated the nature of the agency problem in 
capital markets with high levels of ownership concentration. It is argued that 
the traditional model of agency (as explained above) is appropriate for well-
developed and efficient capital markets and cannot be suitably applied to 
markets in developing countries characterised by concentrated ownership 
(Young et aI., 2008). Young et ai. (2008) argue that shareholders are widely 
dispersed in developed countries, resulting in a separation of ownership and 
control in corporate organisations. The classical model of agency addresses 
agency problems arising from separation of ownership and control between 
principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In contrast, however, the agency problem is distinct in developing countries. 
These countries are characterised by high levels of ownership concentration 
and strong family control (Gilson, 2007). There is a lack of strong external 
governance mechanisms. The conflict of interest prevails between 
majority/controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, often termed as a 
principal-principal conflict (Filatotchev et aI., 2005; Young et aI., 2008). Lau 
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(2010) argues that, in family owned and controlled listed companies, decision 
making and management roles are held by the same individuals; that is, the 
controlling members. 
Fan and Wong (2002) state that in markets with high levels of ownership 
concentration, owing to weak legal institutions and external corporate 
governance mechanisms, it becomes easier for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the rights of minority shareholders. These controlling shareholders 
also control the reporting and disclosure practices of companies. Being that 
these majority shareholders are engaged in rent-seeking opportunistic 
behaviours at the cost of minority shareholders, they restrict the flow of 
information while providing disclosures. 
Fan and Wong (2002) further elaborate another reason for poor disclosure in 
these markets. The controlling shareholders restrict the flow of such 
information that they consider to be of a proprietary or sensative nature. Young 
et at. (2008) explain that the flow of sensative information is especially an 
issue in developing economies. Owing to weakness in institutional 
environment and lack of legal protection, there is a lack of trust between 
parties. As the principal-managers in these economies do not trust outsiders, 
they show reluctance to share information. Being that Pakistan is also a 
developing country with a highly concentrated capital market (as explained in 
Chapter 2), the nature of agency conflict and its influence on corporate 
governance disclosure is worth exploring in Pakistan's capital market. 
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Agency Theory and the Study of Political Influence on Corporate 
Governance Disclosure 
An agency theory perspective provides a good explanation for the existence of 
the political power and influence in companies. Wong (2004) argued that 
agency conflict in politically connected firms is more severe than in non-
connected firms. He argued that, in non-connected firms, conflict only exists 
between managers and shareholders. However, in politically connected firms 
the interests of politically connected members of the board also diverge from 
the interests of shareholders. Politicians have vested political interests. They 
have the power to influence managerial decision-making, being that they may 
use subsidies and bribes to influence management in the firm. Thus, in 
politically connected firms, two forms of agency conflict exist; first, between 
shareholders and politically connected members of the board and secondly, 
between managers and shareholders. Thus, the involvement of politicians in the 
firms gives rise to a double agency problem. 
La Porta et al. (1998) argued for the existence of a negative relationship 
between investor protection, the rule of law and ownership concentration. It is 
argued here that, owing to poor law enforcement and weak investor protection, 
ownership is concentrated in Pakistan (Mumtaz, 2005; Iqbal, 2008; Mirza and 
Azfa, 2010; Nawazish and Sara, 2012). Concentrated ownership structures 
result in a concentration of power in the hands of dominant shareholders 
(Bebchuk, 1999), who then use controlling rights to maximise their own 
private benefits. 
Nam et al. (2001) argue that the appointments of members of the board of 
directors in highly concentrated firms are made under direct influence from the 
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controlling shareholders. In emerging economies, firms having concentrated 
ownership structures demonstrate a high level of political connectedness 
(Chen, 2004; Morck et aI., 2005). Politically connected powerful shareholders 
use their power to influence managers to engage in activities that might be 
harmful for minority shareholders, so serving their political interests 
(Charreaux and Desbrieres, 2001; Roe, 2003). Correia (2009) argues that, 
owing to poor law enforcement mechanisms being in place, politically 
connected firms exercise political power and display high levels of 
misreporting. 
Fan and Wong (2002) and Morck et al. (2005) explain the political nature of 
agency conflict in the markets displaying concentrated ownership structures. 
Fan and Wong (2002) argue that owing to the considerations related to political 
lobbying and information disclosure to competitors, keeping proprietary 
information confidential is one of the key interests of the controlling 
shareholder. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue in turn that politicians' 
involvement in company affairs (such as being members of the board) results 
in their bargaining with managers, whereby they offer bribes to the managers 
in pursuit of their political interests. Thus despite being the agents of the 
shareholders, politically connected members of the board work to fulfil their 
personal political interests. Consequently, the presence of politically connected 
members on boards ultimately leads to a lower level of disclosures and 
transparency. 
Several studies have explored the impact of political connectedness on the 
quality of disclosure and transparency in firms through conducting a cross-
country analysis (Bushman et aI., 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Chaney et aI., 
111 
Chapter 3 - Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations of the Research 
2011}. A few studies have explored this relationship in developing countries, 
such as that of Liu and Lu (2007) in China and Sari and Anugerah (20 II) in 
Indonesia. However, all of these studies have used quantitative method for 
analysis of data and there remains a scarcity of qualitative research in the field.; 
The existing literature does not 'explore, describe and compare' corporate 
governance phenomenon in the real life context of these countries (Mcnulty et 
aI., 2013, p.184). Therefore, the existing quantitative corporate governance and 
disclosure literature is institutionally insensitive and fails to generate a deep 
understanding of contextual factors. 
The agency theory perspective might then be utilised for the development of 
the following propositions relevant to this research. 
Considering the high levels of ownership concentration 18 in the capital market 
of Pakistan, the existence of agency conflict between minority and politically 
powerful majority shareholders is expected. Politically connected majority 
shareholders have strong control over company management and work to foster 
their political interests. 
Politically connected firms face a double agency problem. Politically powerful 
members of the board use their power to provide benefits to their friends, 
family members and connected firms through the distortion of incentives, rent 
seeking and corruption. In order to hide these rent-seeking activities, they are 
expected to constrain flows of information to minority shareholders by 
influencing management. 
~8 Javed and Iqbal (2010) defined ownership concentration as the percentage of ownership in a firm by large 
Investors. They argued that ownership is highly concentrated in Pakistan's capital market being that only a 
small number of shareholders own a majority of shares in listed companies. 
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Politically connected members of the board may want to present accounting 
information and performance in the annual reports in such a way as suits their 
personal and political interests, which ultimately results in a poor level of 
corporate governance disclosure. 
Since there is a lack of qualitative research in this field, this research project 
will investigate these propositions through a context-based enquiry into the 
institutional environment of corporate organisations of Pakistan. The use of 
qualitative research will assist in creating a deeper understanding about the 
institutional complexities in the capital market of Pakistan and help in finding 
explanations for the corporate governance disclosure behaviour of the 
companies. 
Several researchers have criticised the assumptions oftraditional agency theory 
(as explained above) for being too rigid and insensitive to institutional factors. 
Some of the researchers have called for expansion in this traditional approach 
and have also proposed generalised/institutionally sensitive models of agency 
theory. The following section provides an account of this criticism, along with 
an explanation of various generalised/institutionally sensitive models proposed 
by various researchers. 
Agency Theory: A Critique 
Although prior literature has widely utilised the traditional agency theory 
perspective (as explained above) for explaining the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and economic outcomes, agency theory has 
also been widely criticised on the grounds of not providing convincing 
evidence in support thereof (Roberts et aI., 2005; Brennan, 2006; Heracleous, 
2008). An increasing number of researchers now emphasise the investigation 
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of corporate governance in the context of its application; that is, in relation to 
the institutional environment where corporate governance is introduced and 
implemented (Herac1eous, 2008; Heracleous and Lan, 2012). 
Fligstein and Choo (2005) point out the failure of agency theory to account for 
the differences in effective corporate governance systems in different 
economies across the world. They argue that the agency theory perspective 
emphasises on the role of corporate governance institutions in meeting the 
functional requirement of the owners of capital. However, this perspective 
completely ignores the role of political and historical processes in fonnation of 
the institutions in these contexts. 
Wiseman et al. (2012) also criticised traditional agency theory for its over-
emphasis on the design of economically efficient contracts, while completely 
ignoring the role of social nonns in controlling agency costs. Wiseman et al. 
(2012) argue that this approach has resulted in an over-emphasis on testing 
agency theory assumptions through a calculative analysis of transactions. In 
order to deal with this inability of agency theory to recognise institutional 
factors, Wiseman et al. (2012) stress the need to move beyond the traditional 
agency perspective. Instead, they propose a socialised approach to the agency 
theory. 
Wiseman et al. (2012) argue that the rigid assumption of self-interest was 
introduced by neo-classical economists for the purpose of attaining 
computational efficiency. This assumption restricts the application of agency 
theory in the context of varying institutional settings. They instead suggest the 
replacement of the assumption of self-interest in the traditional agency model 
with the broader assumption of conflict of interest between the principal and 
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agent, where the conflict does not necessarily arise because of wealth 
maximisation. 
On the other hand, Hendry (2005, p. 55) proposes a generalised version of 
agency theory for gaining deep insights into the conduct of a board of directors 
in a real life situation. He also recognises the limitations of the traditional 
agency perspective (based on the rigid assumptions of agent's self-interest and 
opportunism for maximisation of wealth), so proposing an expansion to the 
theory. Hendry (2005, p. 58) hence proposes that the assumptions of 
opportunism and competence made about the agents should be replaced with 
the assumptions of 'honest endeavour' and 'bounded rationality'. In this 
generalised version the agent is expected to work honestly and yet he may be 
incompetent; thus he might not always be able to act in the best interest of 
principal. Therefore, this generalised version of agency theory might also be 
testable through measurable economic models. Hendry (2005, p. 58) so 
proposes that, by using this model of agency theory, researchers can also 
benefit from the assumptions of traditional agency theory. Nonetheless, the 
scope of the theory broadens according to the availability and use of alternative 
assumptions. 
Heracleous and Lan (2012) also suggest the development of an institutionally 
sensitive model of the agency perspective. Heracleous and Lan (2012) propose 
a legal perspective of agency theory. They criticise this assumption of the 
traditional agency model where shareholders are the principals in corporate 
organisations. Instead, Heracleous and Lan (2012) argue that the corporation is 
a separate legal entity and should thus be considered as a principal. Therefore, 
the aim of the board should be to work to maximise the corporation's interest 
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as a whole instead of protecting only shareholders' interest. Heracleous and 
Lan (2012) further argue that directors should not be considered as self-
interested individuals, but rather as fiduciaries. In addition, the directors act as 
mediators between various stakeholders in corporate organisations. It is then to 
be argued that the agents are trustworthy and intend to serve the corporation in 
creating collective benefit for all organisational stakeholders. 
Research based on the agency theory perspective is predominantly quantitative 
in nature. This emphasis on quantitative testing of agency theory assumptions 
has resulted in the development of a vast quantitative literature in the field. 
However, the existing literature completely ignores the factor that economic 
transactions are socially embedded in phenomena where human perceptions 
and interaction play an important role in shaping economic contracts and 
determining economic outcomes. 
Many researchers stress the application of the agency theory perspective in a 
real life context. Eisenhardt (1989) stresses the utilisation of an agency theory 
perspective in conducting an in-depth investigation of agency problems. 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that agency theory might be applied for exploring 
real life phenomena in a similar fashion to which institutional and resource 
dependence theories are applied. The application of agency theory becomes 
most relevant in the situations where there are goal conflicts, information 
asymmetry and opportunism. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 71) emphasises utilisation of 
the agency theory perspective "with complementary theories." Even though 
agency theory provides only a partial view of the world, this shortcoming of 
ignoring real life complexities does not undermine its power and usefulness in 
explaining conflict within organisations. 
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It might be inferred that the current quantitative research on the agency conflict 
in corporate governance literature has attempted to explain the actions of 
agents (such as poor disclosure) on the basis of the rigid agency theory 
assumptions. However, these assumptions may not be true. It might be inferred 
that, in Pakistan's context, politicians might be acting benevolently instead of 
being opportunistic. They might be working in best interests of their principals; 
therefore the model developed on the claims of opportunism and self-interest 
may not provide any useful explanation of their actual behaviour (Hampsher-
Monk and Hindmoor, 2010). Their behaviour might, in fact, be the result of 
various other overlooked institutional factors. However, these aspects need to 
be explored further and it is an aim of this research project to investigate these 
aspects through an in-depth analysis of corporate governance disclosure. 
This investigation is informed by a combination of the institutional and agency 
theory perspectives. The decision to use both of these theoretical perspectives 
together is consistent with the suggestions of prior literature which stresses the 
need to explore complex social phenomena using multiple theoretical 
perspectives. For example Eisenhardt (1989, p.71) recommends that 
researchers should "use agency theory with complementary theories." Cohen 
argued that whereas agency theory provides a useful lens to view the world 
partially, it is inadequate to capturing fully the complexity in phenomena. 
Cohen et at. (2008) argue that the use of multiple theoretical perspectives can 
help in dealing with this shortcoming of agency theory. Thus, the limited 
ability of agency theory to explain real life situations might well be dealt with 
through the use of additional perspectives presenting the possibility of 
capturing the complexity inherent in real life situations. 
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Many researchers have combined institutional and economic perspectives to 
understand complex organisational phenomena. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) 
argue that the combination of an institutional perspective with the economic 
perspective of self-interest enabled them to understand how environmental 
factors determine the choice of accounting regulations in public sector 
organisations in the USA. Dacin (1997) argues that it is not only institutional 
forces that affect organisations over time, but ecological and economic factors 
also play an equally important role and should be addressed carefully in 
organisational studies. 
Meanwhile, Cohen et al. (20 I 0) used institutional and agency theory 
approaches to explore auditors' perceptions regarding corporate governance 
structure under the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms. They found that both agency and 
institutional perspectives provide explanations regarding the studied 
phenomenon. The findings of this interview based in-depth study by Cohen et 
al. (2010) supported the explanations provided by the agency theory 
perspective. Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) also utilised both agency and 
institutional perspectives for the study of the effectiveness of the audit function 
in organisations. They argue that neither theory alone is capable of providing a 
complete view, so emphasising the need for a fusion of theories to study the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007) examined the link between the board of directors 
and firm performance using agency, stewardship and resource dependence 
theories. A case study approach was followed and the methods of data 
collection included in-depth interviews and analysis of organisational 
documents. Nicholson and Kiel (2007) stress the need to examine 
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organisational processes in a real life context, rather than simple co-relational 
studies linking various variables quantitatively. 
Therefore, this research project addresses the afore-mentioned gaps in the 
existing literature through the utilisation of rational choice institutionalism and 
agency perspective in the development of careful and logical propositions. The 
empirical research was carried out using an institutional framework, whereby 
the established propositions were assumed to be subject to variations specific 
to a unique context. The aim has been to take into account the complex nature 
of real world phenomena and to seek an explanation of the phenomenon under 
research. The assumptions of one theoretical lens might be used to complement 
the weakness of the other theory, rather than highlighting the theoretical 
contradictions. The adoption of a critical realist stancel9 also indicates the 
acceptance of the existence of economic and institutional structures (such as 
self-interest, rationality, etc.), while recognising the importance of the 
perceptions of social actors. 
3.5.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory provides a perspective for understanding any rich and 
complex phenomenon in real life situations. It explicates the powerful role of 
formal and informal constraints in shaping and facilitating human interaction. 
This theory suggests that institutions might emerge as exogenous constraints -
that is, the rules of the game arising from external sources such as government 
- or that they might arise as endogenous constraints arising within the 
organisation, in the form of institutional arrangements such as organisational 
policies (Shepsle, 2006). Zucker (1987) calls these constraints normative 
19 A detailed discussion on critical realism can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.1. 
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pressures, claiming that such constraints pressurise organisations to follow 
such procedures and regulations as they might help them attain legitimacy20 in 
the institutional environment (Scott, 1987; Suchman, 1995). 
Institutional theory offers deep insights into the social construction of the 
institutional environment. Scott (2005) argues that institutional forces are most 
powerful in socially constructed cultural and network systems, and can be 
examined most readily through an analysis of such systems. Institutional theory 
recognises an organisation to be an 'open system,21 taking into account the role 
played by the organisational environment in influencing organisational 
practices, such as the level of corporate governance disclosure. Institutional 
theorists argue that, in addition to the production and information functions, 
organisational context is also influenced by social and cultural forces. These 
forces play an important role in shaping organisational practices (Scott, 1995; 
Bjorck, 2004). Therefore, organisational context is not only a simple 
construction of the interactions between various institutional actors; rather, it 
emerges out of complex historical and social phenomena (Meyer, 2008). 
Furthermore, institutional theory suggests that the institutional environment 
influences organisational behaviour through the establishment of informal 
norms and beliefs, along with formal rules and regulations. Organisations 
follow these norms and regulations for the purpose of obtaining legitimacy and 
support (Scott and Meyer, 1983). 
2°S~ch!llan (1995, p. 574) defined legitimacy as a socially constructed assumption about the actions of an 
entity Insofar as they are desirable, appropriate or proper and are in alignment with social beliefs, values and 
norms. 
21Zsidisin et al. (2005) explained that in an open system, organisations interact with their internal and 
external environments. These environments exert an influence on organisations, while they are themselves 
also capable of influencing these environments. 
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Institutional theory recognIses that institutional environments are 
interconnected and organisations might be subject to "conflicting institutional 
demands and constraints" (Oliver, 1991, p. 147). These demands and 
constraints arise as a result of individual behaviour being affected by the 
institutional environment while, at the same time, exerting influence on the 
institutional environment. Powell and Colyvas (2008) argue that institutional 
theory recognises the important role of institutions in shaping human 
interaction. However, Powell and Colyvas (2008) emphasise the need for 
understanding the role played by individuals in institutional construction. An 
effort must therefore be made to understand how the interests and actions of 
the individuals influence the rich institutional context. It is therefore argued 
that institutional theory offers rich insights into the social construction of 
various actors22 in the institutional environment. 
Scott (1995, pp. xiii-xiv) argues that institutional analysis can be useful for 
acquiring answers to the following questions. 
• Do rational interests and conscious choices of individuals (for example, 
politically connected members of the board) play any role in the 
construction of the collective behaviour (of the board) in an 
organisation? 
• Why does the behaviour of organisational participants (for example 
politically motivated behaviour of connected members of the board) 
depart from the formal rules (corporate governance disclosure 
22 An institutional actor might be an individual person, a government, a state or an organisation created by 
persons or state. An institutional environment emerges as a result of the interaction between these actors. 
(Powell and Coiyvas, 2008, p. 789). 
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regulations) and stated goals of the organisation (for example, a 
company's stated objective of transparency)? 
• Are the interests of the organisational participants socially constructed 
or are they guided by human nature (for example, assumptions about 
human self-interest and opportunism)? This implies the need to explore 
whether human beings are intrinsically self-interested and opportunistic 
or whether their behaviour is shaped under the influence of social 
perceptions and interpretations. 
This research will therefore provide insights into a similar phenomenon 
focusing on the behaviour of individual participants (politicians), who are 
assumed to be rational individuals holding personal interests and preferences. It 
will investigate how the political connectedness of the members of the board of 
directors influences the level of disclosures in organisations. It will explore 
how disclosure practices vary in listed companies, with varying levels of 
political connectedness, within their boards of directors. 
Institutional theory has undergone a process of transmission and development 
over time (Granovetter, 1992). These developments have resulted in the 
emergence of various theoretical approaches within the institutional approach. 
The following section discusses a distinct approach to institutionalism called 
'rational choice institutionalism', as it provides useful insights to the 
phenomena under research. 
Rational Choice Institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism has its roots in rational choice theory. Rational 
choice theory assumes that the collective behaviour of the society is an 
aggregate of individual behaviour and that individuals act rationally to 
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maximise personal interest. Rational choice theory did not take into account the 
impact of institutions and institutional arrangements and their interaction with 
individuals in conducting social and economic analysis. It resulted in a failure 
on the part of rational choice theory to explain why different individuals had 
varying preferences and how they came into being. 
Rational choice institutionalism overcame this limitation through the study of 
individual behaviour in the context of its institutional environment and 
arrangements. Rational choice institutionalism hence bridges the gap between 
the study of individual behaviour and institutional context, arguing that 
individual behaviour should be studied with reference to the institutional 
settings in which that behaviour is exhibited (Rakner, 1996; Hampsher-Monk 
and Hindmoor, 2010). On the one hand, rational choice institutionalism shares 
the assumptions of self-interest, utility and wealth maximisation with the 
agency perspective; while on the other hand, it recognises the rich and complex 
role of institutional forces in shaping human interaction. 
Rational choice theory represents an important theory in the study of political 
science and economics. It is argued that individuals are rational beings and 
utility maximisation is and will always remain their primary motivation. An 
individual's preferences and strategic calculations are the basic units of 
analysis in rational choice institutionalism. Institutions and institutional 
outcomes are the results of individual behaviour and interaction (Wu, 2009). 
However, rational choice institutionalists argue that although institutions serve 
as intervening variables and thus influence individual actor's behaviour, they 
are not its core determinants (Rakner, 1996). Rational choice theory recognises 
that the utility maximising behaviour of individuals gives rise to such 
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organisational problems as shirking and the institutions23 (for example, 
corporate regulations) should be designed in such a way, so as to direct the 
self-interested behaviour of individuals to achieve desirable collective 
outcomes (such as better corporate governance disclosure) (Peters, 2005). 
Hall and Taylor (1996) explain the four basic assumptions of rational choice 
institutionalism. These assumptions are explained as follows, along with an 
elaboration of how they explain the phenomena under research. 
1. Institutional actors (for example, politicians) possess sets of utility 
maximising preferences (for example, a display of politically motivated 
behaviour in setting company's strategic decision making and political 
influence on management for execution of politically motivated 
activities) and they behave in a strategic manner for the attainment of 
those preferences. 
2. In pursuit of their own preferences, the individual actors are likely to 
opt for such outcomes that might be collectively unfavourable (for 
example, politically connected board members might expropriate 
shareholder rights and conceal that behaviour through poor corporate 
governance disclosure leading to a loss for shareholders). 
3. Each actor's behaviour is driven by hislher strategic calculations 
regarding another actor's behaviour (politically connected members of 
the board might become involved in expropriation of shareholder rights 
as they are aware of weak legal protection available to those weak 
shareholders). Institutions (such as weak regulatory institutions) help 
institutional actors to make calculations according to the provision of 
23'1 . . 
nstltuhons are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction' (North, 1990, p. 3). In this 
sense, corporate governance and disclosure regulations represent regulatory institutions. 
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information regarding other actors' behaviour and enforcement 
mechanisms and thus reduce uncertainty. This is how institutions affect 
human behaviour. (For example, strong legal institutions in the US and 
the UK protect dispersed shareholders and thus result in a good quality 
of corporate governance disclosures. However, in developing countries, 
weak legal institutions coupled with strong political corruption result in 
poor reporting quality and the expropriation of minority shareholders' 
rights/interests ). 
4. Rational choice institutionalism explains the development of 
institutions with an aim of value creation. The actors cooperate with 
each other for creating value and this process creates a distinct 
institution (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Rational choice institutionalism aims at the development of such institutions 
that account for the expected human response to various institutional 
arrangements. It is believed that the creation of such institutions results in the 
maximisation of collective benefit. For example, the development of 
appropriate corporate and disclosure regulations might improve corporate 
governance disclosure, which will be collectively beneficial for all 
stakeholders, including minority shareholders. The theoretical perspective of 
rational choice institutionalism is thus utilised to develop following 
propositions. 
Politically connected members of the board have utility maximising 
preferences, and for meeting their self-interests they opt for such actions 
that are not favourable to (minority) shareholders. 
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The behaviour of a politically connected board of directors is supported by 
their awareness of weak legal protection rights available to (minority) 
shareholders. 
In order to hide their politically motivated rent seeking activities, politically 
connected member of the board may constrain the dissemination of 
information to shareholders, leading towards poor quality of corporate 
governance disclosures. 
This research will investigate these propositions empirically, focusing on how 
political connectedness of the members of the board influences shareholders' 
rights to disclosure regarding corporate governance. 
Institutional Theory and the Study 01 Corporate Governance Disclosure 
There exists an emerging literature on the study of accounting practices from 
an institutional perspective. Accounting has been recognised as a socially 
constructed phenomenon and its standards, techniques and practices are 
influenced by institutional factors (Meyer, 1986; Hines, 1988). Hopwood and 
Miller (1994, p. 1) stresses that accounting is a socially constructed practice 
and various accounting techniques are used by organisations for gaining 
legitimacy in their institutional environment. The accounting techniques and 
practices are not only influenced by the institutional environment, but they also 
impose an influence on 'individuals, entities and processes' for achieving 
specific goals. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that accounting functions are 
supposed to be performed in a particular fashion in order to be seen as 
appropriate, legitimate and rational in the context of society. 
It is argued that propositions drawn from rational choice institutionalism and 
agency theory will provide useful explanations regarding the impact ofpolitical 
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connectedness on the quality of corporate governance disclosures in Pakistan. 
This study will therefore make a significant contribution in literature as no 
study, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, has explored the dynamics of 
the influence of political influence on corporate governance disclosure in the 
context of Pakistan. 
3.6 Identification of Research Gaps 
This review of the prior literature concerning the impact of political 
connectedness on corporate governance disclosures has highlighted the 
following gaps in the existing research. 
1. There is a lack of research on corporate political connectedness in the 
South Asian region, especially Pakistan. To the best of the researcher's 
knowledge, this study is the first study on Pakistan to investigate this 
phenomenon. 
2. Existing research has focused on determining how political 
connectedness influences the quality of financial reporting in the firms. 
No research, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, has so far 
investigated the influence of political connectedness on non-financial or 
corporate governance disclosure. This research intends to address this 
gap in the existing literature through an investigation of corporate 
governance disclosure practices. 
3. Most ofthe existing research is quantitative in nature and there is a lack 
of qualitative research in the field. This study is then expected to 
contribute towards filling this gap through a detailed analysis of real 
life phenomena (Mcnulty et aI., 2013). Qualitative research enables the 
researcher to seek explanations and draw comparisons in regard to 
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corporate governance phenomena. Therefore, qualitative research 
provides an opportunity to explore the context in which annual reports 
are prepared and decisions made in regard to corporate disclosures in 
Pakistan. Explanations have been sought regarding the influence of 
politically connected members of the board on the process of decision 
making regarding the level and nature of disclosure. The use of 
qualitative methodology has also allowed for a comparison between the 
disclosure practices of politically connected and non-connected listed 
companies. 
This research project fills these gaps in the existing literature through the 
utilisation of the theoretical underpinnings of agency theory and rational choice 
institutionalism. Considering the institutional environment of Pakistan with its 
highly concentrated capital market coupled with high levels of political 
corruption, this research will be a valuable addition to the existing literature 
exploring corporate governance disclosure practices of listed companies along 
with the study of the impact of political connectedness on the corporate 
governance disclosures. Thus, in pursuit of the objectives of this research (see 
Chapter 1), an answer to the following research question will be sought: 
'How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of corporate 
governance infonnation in annual reports oflisted companies in Pakistan? 
To answer this main research question, the following research sub-questions 
will be addressed. 
1. How do listed companies in Pakistan disclose corporate governance 
related information in annual reports? 
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2. How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of 
mandatory corporate governance information in the annual reports of 
listed companies in Pakistan? 
3. How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of voluntary 
corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Pakistan? 
3.7 Contributions of this Research - Addressing the Existing Gaps 
This research therefore makes the following contributions to knowledge. 
1. This research has combined the theoretical underpinnings of agency 
theory and institutional theory. It is argued that both perspectives, if 
utilised together, jointly provide a better and more robust understanding 
of complex real life phenomena. 
2. This research contributes to the limited body of empirical qualitative 
literature on corporate governance disclosure through an in-depth 
investigation of how political connectedness affects corporate 
governance disclosures. 
3. This research involves a context based enquiry in the corporate settings 
of an under -researched developing country, namely Pakistan. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an account of the relevant literature related to the 
impact of political connectedness on corporate governance disclosure. A 
critical review has enabled the researcher to identify gaps in prior literature. It 
was observed that there is a lack of research exploring corporate governance 
disclosure practices of listed companies in Pakistan. It was also found that 
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there is a lack of research on the study of influence of political connectedness 
on the disclosure of corporate governance disclosure. The existing literature 
has mainly focused upon analysis of the quality of financial reporting. Thus, 
the disclosure of corporate governance information is specifically an under-
researched area. 
Furthermore, existing research has primarily utilised an agency theory 
perspective. This chapter has highlighted the need for and the usefulness of 
combining agency perspective with other complementary theories for 
explaining real life phenomena. An explanation has been provided regarding 
the use of agency theory, in combination with rational choice institutionalism, 
so serving as the theoretical foundation for this research. Research propositions 
have been developed for carrying out the research effectively. This chapter also 
highlighted that the existing research in the field is mainly quantitative and 
provides contradicting evidence. Thus this research addresses the calls for 
more qualitative research in the field of corporate governance disclosure. 
Chapter 4 provides an explanation and justification regarding philosophical and 
methodological underpinnings ofthis research. 
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4.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis outlined the institutional background for this research 
in relation to Pakistan. Chapter 3 provided a detailed account of prior literature 
in the field of corporate governance disclosures and highlighted the theoretical 
underpinnings of this research. The review of the prior literature highlighted 
that most of the research in the field of corporate governance and disclosure 
has been quantitative and provides contradicting evidence. Chapter 3 also 
explained that many researchers have stressed the need for carrying out 
qualitative research in the field of corporate governance. 
This chapter will outline the philosophy informing this research project. 
Explanations will be provided regarding research regarding the design of this 
research project. Furthermore, this chapter will elaborate upon the methods 
used for data collection and analysis. 
Figure 4.1 shows how Chapter 4 is positioned in the thesis as a whole. 
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Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 - Positioning in the Thesis 
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This chapter justifies the motivations for the selection of a qualitative research 
methodology informing the collection and analysis process of the research 
data. Section 4.1 will explain the philosophy, approach and design of the 
research project. Section 4.2 elaborates the methods used for collection of 
research data. Section 4.3 outlines the strategy for data analysis and explains 
various methods used for analysis of data. Since it was a qualitative research, 
section 4.4 explains the ethical considerations with regard to this project. 
Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
4.1 Research Philosophy, Research Approach and Research Design 
This section will outline the philosophy, approach and design adopted for this 
research. For this purpose, the framework used by Saunders et al. (2012) has 
been used. The modified research onion in Figure 4.1 was originally provided 
by Saunders et al. (2012, p. 128). The modified research onion summarises the 
research philosophy and approach in the first two layers, while research design 
consists of research strategies, choices, time horizons and techniques is 
outlined in next four layers. 
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Figure 4.2: Modified Research Onion 
Source: Saunders et al. (2012, p.128) and modi fied for this research. 
Philosophy 
Strategy 
Choices 
Time Horizon 
Techniques and 
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The following sections will provide an explanation of the choices being made 
during the research process. 
4.1.1 Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy focuses on 'what' kind of knowledge is acquired and 
' how' it is acquired (Saunders et aI. , 2012). Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) assert 
that a clear understanding of philosophical stance determines the type of 
evidence required for conducting research, the identification of an appropriate 
research design and the creation of such research designs that might be best 
suited for investigating a research problem. The main elements of research 
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philosophy, as explained by Saunders et al. (2012) are ontology and 
epistemology. 
Research ontology refers to the researcher's view about how the social world 
operates. The two main ontological positions held by researchers are 
subjectivism and objectivism. 
Subjectivism assumes that all social phenomena are the creation of human 
interaction. Thus social actors' perceptions and resulting actions shape 
organisational and managerial processes. This approach is closely linked to the 
philosophy of social constructionism. Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) explain that 
social constructionism assumes reality to be socially constructed. The aim of 
the research process under this ontological stance is to understand the 
meanings and interpretations that people allocate to a particular phenomenon. 
Objectivism refers to the ontological position whereby social entities are 
assumed to exist independent of the perceptions of the social actors. 
Organisations and management processes are assumed to exist as objective 
realities. The organisations operate within formal structures and they are 
supposed to adhere to these structures (Saunders et aI., 2012, p. 131). 
This research draws upon the assumptions that social structures prevail in the 
management and business entities and thus constitute reality. From this 
perspective, this research project recognises objectivist ontology. However, 
this research also acknowledges the influence of social interaction, human 
perceptions and behaviour of individuals and groups on these social structures. 
Furthermore, it is recognised that these social structures also influence these 
human interventions. Therefore, this research also recognises the subjective 
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dimension of human action as an important constituent of knowledge and 
reality. 
Research epistemology refers to the nature of the knowledge regarded as 
acceptable by the researcher. There are three main philosophical positions that 
a researcher might adopt in accepting research data as value laden. These 
philosophies include positivism, realism and interpretivism (Saunders et aI., 
2012). 
Positivism refers to the philosophy under which the researcher adopts the 
position of a natural scientist and prefers to work with observable data that 
might lead towards the testing of one or more research hypotheses. Positivist 
researchers assume that there is a single objective reality that is observable and 
awaits discovery by the researcher. Positivist philosophy assumes that the 
purpose of enquiry is to generate testable theories that reveal universal laws 
and will provide the same results when replicated and repeated (Punch, 2013). 
Such studies are typically highly structured and exhibit greater elements of 
generalisability and replication. 
Positivism is criticised by various researchers for Ignonng the social 
embeddedness of knowledge (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) argued that positivist research aims to provide a neutral 
and unbiased view of reality, although it is impossible for the researcher to 
carry out research without bias. Marshall (2006) also argued that it is not 
possible for positivist researchers to carry out value-free research as 
researchers have their own values, objectives and experiences. The social 
background of the researcher inevitably influences the research process either 
intentionally or unintentionally. A researcher has to make many subjective 
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decisions during the research process. For example, choices regarding research 
topic, research settings, sampling techniques and methods are most often 
affected by the researcher's social role and position. 
Fineman and Opie (1987) argued that social phenomena are not 'objective' 
facts and positivist philosophy fails to incorporate alternative explanations of 
those factors that are not considered as objective. Although positivism leads 
towards determination of relationships between variables, it may fail to answer 
why and how those relationships exist. Thus it has a limited ability to answer 
how society can deal with real life problems. 
Interpretivism assumes that the perceptions and beliefs of social actors 
influence their actions. Thus human behaviour is determined by their 
understanding of the social world around them (Saunders et aI., 2012). Data are 
typically collected from fewer sources and the purpose is to generate an 
understanding and explanation of the researched phenomenon. The 
interpretivist methodology is criticised on account of its limited 
generalisability. However, the aim of interpretivist research activity is not to 
generalise findings to a wider population. A researcher can only provide an 
account of subjects' perceptions, while no predictions can be made utilising 
interpretivist epistemology. 
Realism assumes that the reality exists independent of human perceptions and 
interpretations. Realists advocate the application of scientific approach for 
knowledge development in management sciences. Realism is further divided 
into two branches; that is, direct realism and critical realism. Direct realism 
assumes that our perceptions about the world are an accurate description of the 
actual reality that exists 'out there'. 
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Critical realism, however, recognises the role of human imagination and 
sensations. It is argued that the world is composed of actual reality, however 
our experience and senses affect our perceptions about that reality. We may, 
therefore, experience illusions and deceptive representations of the actual 
world. Critical realists argue that reality exists in two stages. In the first stage, 
the world exists with its actual structures. In the second stage, our mind 
develops an impression about the existence of the world under the influence of 
our sensations and experiences (Saunders et aI., 2012). 
The Position Adopted 
This research follows critical realism. The position of critical realism was 
developed by Bhaskar (1978). It was considered to be the most suitable 
paradigm for this research as, on the one hand, it recognises the existence of . 
such normative 'structures, mechanisms and processes' as institutions, utility 
functions, opportunism, etc., while, on the other hand, critical realism also 
accepts that reality in management and social research is a result of the 
perception and experimentation of social actors and is thus socially constructed 
(Bhaskar, 1978). Thus, these normative structures are affected by the influence 
of the perceptions of social actors, human agency and social mechanisms. 
Critical realists further acknowledge that the actions and discourses of 
individuals are also influenced by underlying social (normative) structures as 
these structures can constrain or facilitate human actions (Mcevoy and 
Richards, 2006). Critical realism also recognises that the subjective 
interpretations of social actors are affected by existence of underlying causal 
mechanisms. 
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Corporate disclosure research has been criticised on the grounds of treating 
accounting information as a commodity. Parker (2007) argued that, in existing 
research, an excessive emphasis is placed on objective measurement of utility 
maximising behaviour, while the institutional, political and social context of 
research is reduced to variables, thus ignoring subjectivity altogether. Parker 
(2007, p.40) states that reality is socially constructed and so are accounting and 
disclosure practices. Therefore, it might be argued that, in accounting 
communication, the reality is not merely 'out there'. It is rather argued that the 
human thoughts, behaviours, practices and language used also play an 
important role in shaping reality. This research deals with this criticism by 
utilising critical realism, whereby objective structures and processes are studied 
along with recognition of the subjectivist standpoint. 
Considering the fact that corporate governance literature has recently been 
criticised for its excessive dependence on positivist theoretical approach and 
over-utilisation of quantitative research methods (Parker, 2007; Othman and 
Rahman, 2011), critical realism also allows for an in-depth understanding of 
the influence of political connectedness on the disclosure practices of listed 
companies. It is argued that concepts mean different things to different people. 
Human behaviour is not an objective social fact; rather, it is influenced by the 
interpretations and the meanings assigned to the social world. The actions and 
reactions of human beings differ significantly when they are subjected to 
varying interests, locations and contexts (Bevir and Rhodes, 200 I). The actions 
of social actors can be explained only if we look into their social context, their 
location, perceptions, interests and needs. 
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This research will take into account the complex nature of real world 
phenomena and will seek explanation of the phenomenon under research 
through an in-depth approach. As proposed by agency theory and rational 
choice institutionalism, it is argued that political interests might provide a 
motivation to members of the board of directors to engage in rent seeking and 
opportunistic activities. In order to hide these activities, they influence the 
quality of disclosures by listed firms. 
The standpoint of critical realism is also in alignment with the theoretical 
underpinnings of this research. Agency theory recognises the existence of 
underlying structures and mechanisms (self-interest, utility functions, 
rationality), while rational choice institutionalism recognises the existence of 
institutions (such as political institutions) and institutional arrangements (such 
as corporate governance regulations) as normative social structures. However, 
rational choice institutionalism also recognises that social actors take strategic 
decisions after analysing their institutional environment, and that these 
decisions also affect the institutional environment. These theoretical 
perspectives give rise to the claim that agents (politically connected members 
of the board) are self-interested and opportunistic and will take advantage of 
information asymmetry between the stakeholders of the firms. 
The current positivist research on agency conflict in corporate governance 
literature has attempted to explain the actions of agents (such as poor 
disclosure) on the basis of assumptions drawn from these claims. However, 
these claims, may not always be true. If, in a particular context, politicians act 
benevolently, instead of being opportunistic, and work in the best interests of 
their agents, the model developed on the claims of opportunism and self-
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interest will provide no useful explanation of their actual behaviour 
(Hampsher-Monk and Hindmoor, 2010). Thus critical realist epistemology 
seeks to explain how social actors in a particular context perceive nonnative 
structures that are assumed to be given (independent of human perception) in 
positivist epistemology. 
As argued by Maxwell (2004) the philosophy of critical realism allows for 
explanations to be sought in regard to phenomena, while exploring contextual 
factors qualitatively. Therefore, the use of critical realism here enabled the 
researcher to explore the impact of political connectedness on corporate 
governance disclosure. However, it is important to note that qualitative 
research is carried out in natural settings; that is, without controlling for 
various intervening variables. Guba and Lincoln (1989) argued that in natural 
settings, any single action is caused and affected by multiple actions and 
forces. Similarly, a single movement affects a multitude of other actions. This 
poses a difficulty in the detennination of the causal influence of one 
factor/action on another. Guba and Lincoln (1989, p.ISI) state that: 
Everything influences everything else, in the here and now. Many 
elements are implicated in any given action, and each element interacts 
with all o/the others in ways that change them all while Simultaneously 
resulting in something that we, as outside observers, label as outcomes 
or effects. But the interaction has no directionality, no need to produce 
that particular outcome. 
It might be inferred from the above arguments that owing to the lack of control, 
although qualitative research provides explanations regarding the occurrence of 
events and indicates the existence of relationships between them, it has a 
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limited ability to measure precisely the extent and direction of such 
relationships. The purpose of the current research has been to establish a 
connection between political connectedness and corporate governance 
disclosure practices. However, this research has not made use of such 
techniques as probability sampling, the use of statistical techniques or 
correlational designs. Rather, this research has been carried out in complex and 
natural institutional settings. Therefore, this research has not controlled for 
various institutional factors that might also have an influence on the disclosure 
practices of listed companies. Although the findings of this research provide an 
indication that political connectedness influences the corporate governance 
disclosure practices of listed companies, the research does not provide an 
explanation regarding the extent and direction of the relationships between 
these variables. This limitation of the current study has been acknowledged in 
Chapter 7 and research involving a quantitative study exploring the direction of 
causal relationship between variables is intended to be carried out in future. 
4.1.2 Research Approach - Deduction or Induction 
Another significant classification within the research onion (Figure 4.1) 
pertains to the extent to which deduction or induction is used as the research 
begins. Saunders et al. (2012) assert that deduction relates to the development 
of a rigorous theory, along with testable hypothesis at the beginning of the 
research project. Deductive enquiry is closely linked to scientific research. 
Research questions aim at testing the developed hypothesis. Induction, on the 
other hand incorporates development of theories from the findings of the 
empirical research. The theoretical underpinnings of the research are subject to 
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constant revisions, as theory, data and analysis are carried out in an iterative 
manner and keep on informing each other (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). 
However, in practice it is hard to stick to one particular classification for 
practical reasons; rather, it is beneficial to combine both approaches in a single 
research project (Saunders et al., 2012). This research identified the theories for 
informing the research questions. However, the propositions drawn from those 
theories were not considered be the only explanations for the research 
phenomena. Instead, the researcher had been open to accept any alternative 
explanations. Findings of the research have been arrived at through an iterative 
process, whereby theory, data and analysis continued to influence each other. 
The propositions drawn from rational choice and agency theoretical 
perspectives provided a starting point for in-depth analysis. The propositions 
helped the researcher in determining the nature and framing of interview 
questions for in-depth investigation. However, the enquiry did not limit its 
focus to testing those propositions. Instead any possible alternative 
explanations were taken into account and an explanation was sought of how 
political influence affects the level of disclosures. The following section 
provides details of the data collection methods selected for conducting 
research. 
4.1.3 The Design ofthe Research Project 
The third, fourth and fifth layer of the research onion (Figure 4.1) provide 
information about the design of this study. As stated by Saunders et al. (2012), 
the research design comprises of research strategy, choices and time horizons. 
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Research strategy should be developed so as to obtain effectively the answers 
to the research questions and to achieve the research objectives. In addition, the 
resources available for research, the context of research, the work done by 
other researchers in the field and the philosophical underpinnings of the 
research also influence the choice of research strategy (Saunders et aI., 2012). 
Critical realism allowed for an investigation in the real life context of listed 
companies through the adoption of a case study strategy using multiple types of 
data and different analytical methods. 
This research is a multi-method qualitative study as data were collected from 
various sources, such as annual reports and interviews, while different 
qualitative data analysis techniques were employed, such as qualitative content 
analysis, analysis of silence and template analysis. The use of multiple methods 
in this study provided an opportunity to obtain answers to the research 
questions and to improve the level of trust and credibility on the findings 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 7) drawn from the research. 
Longitudinal research was conducted because the annual reports of 40 listed 
companies were analysed for the period of five years. The choice of a 
longitudinal design provided the benefit of gaining insights into the 
developments in the corporate governance disclosure practices of listed 
companies. It also provided the advantage of conducting a comparison between 
the level of disclosure amongst politically connected and non-connected firms 
over different reporting periods. 
The use of multiple methods of data collection and analysis allowed for the 
triangUlation of the findings of this research. Triangulation refers to the 
collection of data from multiple sources in a single study and is used for 
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seeking an assurance about the findings of the research (Saunders et aI., 2012). 
The concept of triangulation is based on the argument that agreement in the 
results obtained from two different sources of data, which are measured 
independently, reduces the chances of the misinterpretation of data and 
eliminates uncertainty about the results obtained. Thus, triangulation enhances 
confidence over the results obtained (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Figure 4.3 
shows how various methods of data collection and analysis were used in this 
research for the purpose of triangulation. 
Figure 4.3: The Use of Triangulation 
Multiple Sources for Data 
Semi Structured Interviews Audited Annual Reports 
Multiple Techniques for 
Template 
Analysis Content 
Analysis of 
Silence 
Multi-method 
study 
1. Allowed 
comparison of 
results 
obtained from 
various 
sources of 
research data 
2. Strengthened 
confidence of 
the 
truthfulness of 
research 
findings 
3. Enhanced the 
quality of 
research 
4.1.4 Research Objectives and the Choice of Qualitative Research Methods 
. 
An important decision regarding the research methods to be employed revolves 
around the choice of qualitative or quantitative methods for enquiry. The 
choice of qualitative or quantitative methods for research depends on the nature 
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of research questions and the purpose and objectives of the research (Punch, 
2013). Quantitative research involves collection and analysis of numeric data, 
and large amounts of data are collected. Qualitative research typically involves 
an inductive approach to analysis and it attributes importance to the 
perceptions and interpretations of participants. As argued by Easterby-Smith et 
a1. (2008), qualitative research contributes towards development of new 
theories or expansion of existing theories. 
Since the nature of this study is exploratory as well as explanatory, a case study 
strategy proved best suited for enquiry. The aim of this study was to investigate 
the influence of political links on the disclosure practices of listed companies. 
It was then considered most appropriate to conduct an in-depth investigation of 
the disclosure practices of listed companies in the context of the country so as 
to enable a rich study. Many researchers have criticised existing corporate 
governance research for being overly quantitative and have called for more 
qualitative research in the field (Mcnulty et aI., 2013). 
McNulty et a1. (2013) argue that qualitative research is characterised by the 
collection of data in real life settings by the researcher, whereby mUltiple 
sources are used for data collection. Qualitative methods are used in this 
research project, based on the argument that qualitative enquiry generates deep 
understanding of human behaviour and actions, helps to extract meaning and 
explain the phenomena. In addition, qualitative research also allows for 
identification of unanticipated patterns in the data, whereas such unanticipated 
patterns are ignored for being overly simplistic in quantitative research 
(Buchanan et aI., 2014). 
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Qualitative research allowed for the generation of an understanding of 
corporate governance disclosure practices, along with an analysis of the 
influence of political connectedness on these practices through an 
interpretation of annual report narratives and interviewing participants' 
accounts. The analysis of corporate narratives in annual reports was 
particularly useful, being that an increasing number of researchers now 
recognise that corporate narratives are not merely expressions of accounting 
performance; instead, they are drafted carefully to meet firms' strategic 
objectives (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012), enable impression management 
and facilitate the provision of addition useful information to the users (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan, 2007; Cho et aI., 2010). Thus, qualitative research helped 
in providing detailed explanation of the phenomena observed during the 
research (Pettigrew, 2013, p. 124). 
Moreover, the collection and analysis of interview data exposed participants' 
perceptions regarding corporate governance disclosure practices of listed 
companies in Pakistan. Interview data analysis helped in the generation of 
useful inferences that provided answers to research questions and informed the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research. Figure 4.4 provides a model for this 
research. 
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Political Influence - Connectedness 
Politically connected members of the board have 
utility maximising preferences, and for meeting their 
self-interests they opt for such actions that are not 
favourable for (minority) shareholders. 
The behaviour of a politically connected board of 
directors is supported by their awareness of weak 
legal protection rights available to (minority) 
shareholders. 
In order to hide their politically motivated rent 
seeking activities, politically connected member of 
the board may constrain dissemination of 
information to shareholders, leading towards poor 
quality of corporate governance disclosure. 
r 
Research Question 1: How do listed companies in 
Pakistan disclose corporate governance related 
information in annual reports? 
/' Template Analysis: Based on semi structured 
interviews to study corporate governance disclosure 
practices and processes 
Content analysis: enabled the comparison of voluntary 
and mandatory corporate governance practices of 
listed companies. It also allowed a comparison of 
disclosure practices across the sugar and textile 
sectors. 
t---
Figure 4.4: Research Architecture 
Rational Choice 
Institutionalism 
(Hall and 
Taylor, 1996) 
J 
Agency Theory 
(Janson and 
Mackling, 1976) 
Central Research Question: How does 
political connectedness influence the 
disclosure of corporate governance 
information in annual reports? 
I 
I--
Research Question 2: How does political connectedness 
influence the disclosure of mandatory corporate 
governance information in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Pakistan? 
I 
Template Analysis: Based on semi structured interviews 
to study mandatory corporate governance disclosure 
practices of politically connected firms 
Content analysis: enabled the comparison of mandatory 
corporate governance practices of politically connected 
and non-connected firms. 
, ~ 
Corporate Governance Disclosure ] 
Politically connected members of the board are self-
interested and opportunistic. 
Politically connected members of the board provide 
benefits to their friends, family members and connected 
firms through the distortion of incentives, rent seeking and 
corruption. In order to hide rent seeking activities, they are 
expected to constrain flows of information to minority 
shareholders. 
Politically connected members of the board might want to 
present accounting information and performance in the 
annual reports in such a way as it suits their personal and 
political interests which ultimately results in a poor level of 
corporate governance disclosure. 
I 
Research Question 3: How does political connectedness 
influence the disclosure of voluntary corporate governance 
information in the annual reports of listed companies in 
Pakistan? 
1 
Template Analysis: Based on semi structured interviews to 
study voluntary corporate governance disclosure practices of 
politically connected firms. 
Analysis of silence in annual report narratives allowed a 
deeper analysis of silence on corporate governance 
information by politically connected firms 
Content analysis: enabled the comparison of voluntary 
corporate governance practices of politically connected and 
non-connected firms. 
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4.2 Data Collection Methods 
This research involved the collection of primary data through semi-structured 
interviews. The main source of the secondary data was the audited annual 
reports of listed companies from a range of sectors; namely, sugar, textile, 
chemical, food, leather, packaging, construction, paper, wool, synthetic 
products and miscellaneous. In order to strengthen the analysis of real life 
phenomena within the corporate context of Pakistan, secondary data available 
from media reports, economic publications and World Bank/international 
agencies' publications/reports were also taken into account, although they are 
not considered to be a major data source. The following section provides 
details of each of the data collection methods. 
4.2.1 Audited Annual Reports 
Audited annual reports of listed companies were used for the purpose of 
analysis. Although it is recognised that annual reports are not the only source 
for corporate disclosure of companies; they provide an excellent source of 
information for the following reasons. Firstly, annual reports are considered to 
be the principal tool for the dissemination of corporate information from 
corporate organisations and are widely used as a data source for research into 
corporate disclosure (Wiseman, 1982). Annual reports are a mandatory 
document and all listed companies issue them. They are easy to access as they 
are a publicly available document. Secondly, annual reports are the most 
appropriate document for the analysis of mandatory disclosure in the context of 
Pakistan because Pakistan's Code of Corporate Governance (2002) requires 
that listed companies should provide, in their annual reports, a statement 
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disclosing their compliance with the mandatory requirements of corporate 
governance. Therefore, the annual reports of listed companies contain this 
disclosure statement. This statement thus proved to be a key document for 
analysis of mandatory corporate governance disclosures. 
Thirdly, annual reports follow a standard format for various statements, which 
increases their comparability (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). As the objectives 
of this research called for a comparison of annual reports across various 
industries and also with respect to the status of political connectedness, it was 
most appropriate to analyse a document that was standardised and thus 
comparable. In addition, annual reports are the only low cost and readily 
available source of information available to investors in Pakistan (Ali et aI., 
2011). 
Several prior studies on corporate disclosure have used websites as a source of 
data (Basuony and Mohamed, 2014; Alam and Rashid, 2014). However, here it 
was decided to exclude the analysis of disclosures provided on corporate 
websites. This decision was made because some of the companies in the 
sample did not have well developed websites. Although, in 2012, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan issued a notice to all the listed 
companies to maintain a fully functional website. However, the web sites of 
some of the companies had not been created at the time the research was 
undertaken or were still under construction. 
Audited Annual Reports - Selection of the Sample 
The objective of study was to analyse the disclosure practices of listed 
companies in Pakistan. Disclosure in annual reports can be divided into two 
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main categories: mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Following is 
an explanation of these categories. 
Voluntary Disclosure of Information 
Disclosures are deemed to be voluntary when the information is provided over 
and above the minimum regulatory requirements. Meek et at. (1995, p.555) 
define voluntary disclosures as "disclosure in excess of requirements, 
representing free choices on the part of company managements to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of 
users of their annual reports." 
Mandatory Nature of Disclosure 
Disclosures are termed as mandatory when the regulation makes it compulsory 
to reveal information on prescribed items. The provision of information over 
and above what is mandatory is called voluntary disclosure. Companies 
constituting the sample of the research were required to disclose all the items 
pertaining to mandatory disclosures. However, as demonstrated by previous 
research, owing to weak law enforcement and inadequate regulatory 
framework, compliance with corporate governance regulation was poor in the 
country and it could not be assumed that all the companies would disclose 
mandatory information. 
The choice of research sample was influenced by the objectives of the research 
project. The annual reports for some of the companies were available on their 
websites. For the rest of the companies, hard copies of annual reports were 
obtained from their corporate offices. The annual reports of 40 listed 
companies are analysed. 
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The first question of the research focused on exploring the corporate 
governance disclosure practices of the listed companies. The aim was to assess 
the level and tendency of disclosure practices to understand the disclosure 
environment and prevailing disclosure trends in the capital market of Pakistan. 
Initially, data were analysed from 20 firms in the sugar and textile sectors. The 
research results from the data analysis of ten firms in the sugar industry were 
compared with the findings of data analysis from ten firms in the textile 
industry. This analysis was conducted in view of the high levels of political 
influence on the sugar industry, as reported by various media sources in 
Pakistan (Cheema, 2009; Malik, 2009). In order to eliminate industry bias in 
the research, it was decided to analyse annual reports from several different 
industries. Therefore, data were analysed from 20 additional firms from eight 
different sectors. Ten of these firms were politically connected, while the 
remaining ten firms were non-connected. The data from these 20 firms from 
several industries are termed as the 'several sectors' group in the thesis. Later 
on, research results from the several sectors group were compared with the 
earlier findings from the sugar and textile sectors. The analysis of data from 
several sectors helped in the enhancement of the rigour and robustness of the 
research findings. The analysis of data from various sectors also helped in the 
study ofthe disclosure practices oflisted companies across industries. 
In order to analyse the trends in the level of disclosure, annual reports were 
analysed for a period of five years; that is, from 2009-2013. Code of Corporate 
Governance was issued in 2002 in Pakistan, and until 2009, a period of seven 
years had lapsed after implementation of the Code. This period was chosen 
because a period of seven years was considered to be a reasonable time for the 
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development of an understanding regarding corporate governance principles by 
the listed companies and the subsequent development of a culture for 
disclosure in the capital market of the country. Furthermore, this period has 
provided the most recent insights into the disclosure practices of listed 
companies in Pakistan, thus entailing that research findings might have 
important policy implications. 
Ownership structure is considered to have an influence on the disclosure 
practices of listed companies (Chau and Gray, 2002; Ali et aI., 2007). In 
Pakistan, the capital market is dominated by family owned businesses24 (Hasan 
and Butt, 2009); therefore, in order to ensure homogeneity in the ownership 
structure of the sample companies, all the companies chosen were family 
owned and controlled, so as to represent the capital market. Table 4.1 shows 
the corporate governance characteristics of the firms chosen. 
24 International Finance Corporation (2011) defines a family owned business as a firm in which the 
controlling family holds the majority of voting rights. The controlling family consists of the founders of 
the fi~~ with an intention of passing on the business to the next generation. This research uses the same 
defimtlon for family firm. 
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Table: 4.1 Characteristics ofthe Sample Firms (N=40) 
Number of Number of 
Firm Name Sector Directors in Independent Ownership Structure Status of Political Connectedness 
2013 Directors in 2013 
Textile Sector 
Tl Textile 7 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
T2 Textile 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
T3 Textile 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
T4 Textile 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
T5 Textile 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
T6 Textile 9 3 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
T7 Textile 7 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
T8 Textile 7 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
T9 Textile 6 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
TIO Textile 7 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
SU2ar Sector 
SI Sugar 7 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
S2 Sugar 9 1 Family_Owned Firm Connected 
S3 Sugar 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
S4 Sugar 7 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
S5 Sugar 9 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
S6 Sugar 9 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
S7 Sugar 8 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
S8 Sugar 8 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
S9 Sugar 8 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
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Table: 4.1 Characteristics ofthe Sample Firms (N=40) 
Number of Number of 
Firm Name Sector Directors in Independent Ownership Structure Status of Political Connectedness 
I 2013 Directors in 2013 i 
S10 Sugar 9 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected J 
Several Sectors I 
SSI Wool 11 2 Family Owned Firm Connected 
SS2 Paper 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
SS3 Construction 8 3 Family Owned Firm Connected 
SS4 Miscellaneous 8 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
885 Chemical 11 0 FamilyOwned Firm Connected 
886 Chemical 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
887 Leather 9 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
S88 Packaging 10 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
889 Miscellaneous 7 0 Family Owned Firm Connected 
SS10 S)'!lthetic 7 1 Family Owned Firm Connected 
SSll Chemical 12 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
SS12 Chemical 10 2 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
SS13 Chemical 8 2 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
8814 Food 8 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
S815 Food 7 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
8816 Food 8 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
8817 Food 7 3 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
8818 Packaging 9 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
8S19 Miscellaneous 7 0 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
SS20 Paper 9 1 Family Owned Firm Non-Connected 
_._--
--
155 
Chapter 4 - Research Methodology, Design and Methods 
Table 4.1 shows that 15 out of the 40 companies do not have an independent 
director on their board. The lack of independent directors indicates reluctance 
towards having credible role for independent director as a mechanism of 
corporate governance. 
The second and third research questions focused on studying the influence of 
political connectedness on mandatory and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures respectively. In order to address these questions, corporate 
governance disclosures in the audited annual reports of politically connected 
and non-connected firms were compared. In order to facilitate such a 
comparison, the main criterion that guided the choice of companies in the 
research sample was the status of political connectedness. Such listed 
companies were selected for content analysis where clear distinction could be 
established between politically connected and non-connected companies. A 
company having a politician as the member of its board was considered to be a 
politically connected company, whereby a politician is a person who 
participated in elections. 
Table 4.1 shows that 20 of the firms in the sample were politically connected, 
while 20 were non-connected. In order to determine the political connectedness 
of a firm, the names of the board members were obtained from audited annual 
reports of the companies. The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) 
maintains the data for participation in elections in all national and provincial 
constituencies in Pakistan. Thus the lists of candidates participating in general 
elections for both national and provincial assemblies in the years 2002, 2008 
and 2013 were downloaded from the ECP website. The first, middle and last 
names of the members of the board were then matched with the candidates who 
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had participated in the electoral process. In order to ensure that no politically 
connected firm was erroneously considered as a non-connected firm, only 
those firms were considered as non-connected where the name of none of their 
directors matched with any name in the electoral participation data. For those 
firms where the names of members of the board matched with a politician in 
electoral participation data, a further in-depth check was conducted through a 
detailed search by means of the Internet, company website, annual reports, 
newspapers and media. Thus, only those firms were considered politically 
connected where the political participation of the members of the board was 
established through these sources. 
The following section provides an explanation for the choice of semi-structured 
interviews as an additional source of data. 
4.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
There are several types of interviews for example, formal, informal, structured, 
semi-structured or highly structured. The choice of the type of interview is 
informed by the research design and questions (Saunders et aI., 2012). Semi-
structured interviews are a useful research technique for exploratory and 
explanatory studies; that is, where the purpose of the research is to seek causes 
for the occurrence of events. Being that the purpose of this research has been to 
seek explanations regarding the influence of political connectedness on 
corporate governance disclosures, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
from the representatives of regulatory bodies, statutory audit firms and listed 
companies from the sugar and textile sectors. The following sections elaborate 
the choice of research participants and the process of interview data collection 
in detail. 
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Choice of Research Participants 
A judgement sampling technique (Marshall, 1996) was used and participants 
were identified and selected so as to provide rich information that would help 
in the development of a deep insight into the phenomena researched. Marshall 
(1996) explained that a judgement sampling technique entails the selection of 
such participants who might be in a position to provide the most productive 
insights into the studied phenomenon, either because of their prior experiences 
or their subject knowledge and expertise. Another important characteristic of 
the judgement sampling approach is that research participants may introduce 
other useful and informative participants to the researcher. This research 
strategy requires intelligent decision making on the part of the researcher in 
order to choose the most appropriate participants for obtaining answers to the 
research questions. 
The interviews for this research were conducted with representatives from 
listed companies in the sugar and textile sector, statutory audit firms and 
regulatory bodies. These in-depth interviews with the representatives of listed 
companies enabled the researcher to understand the perspectives of the 
companies regarding corporate governance disclosure in annual reports. The 
respondents from regulatory bodies were directly involved in the development 
of corporate governance regulations and the enforcement of listing regulations 
and the Companies Ordinance (1984). All the respondents from the statutory 
audit firms were partners in those firms. The interviews from the partners of 
audit firms enabled the researcher to understand the perspective of those 
institutions regarding the current disclosure and compliance practices of listed 
companies. All the respondents were working at key positions in their 
158 
Chapter 4 - Research Methodology, Design and Methods 
respective institutions. The position occupied by the respondents from listed 
companies meant that they would have a profound influence on the preparation 
of annual reports in their respective firms. All of the respondents had extensive 
experience of working in the corporate sector. Therefore, these participants 
were credible in terms of providing an opinion on the disclosure of corporate 
governance information in the annual reports. Following judgment sampling 
technique, these participants were chosen because they were considered to be 
professionally competent and experienced in the field of corporate governance 
and disclosure. 
Table 4.2 provides information about the profile of the interviewees. 
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Table 4.2: Profile of the Research Participants 
No. Organisation (Anonymised) Position Held Experience Type of Organisation 
1 Listed Company Textile A Company Secretary 15 years Politically connected 
2 Listed Company Textile B Company Secretary 13 years Politically connected 
3 Listed Company Textile C General Manager (GM) Finance 6.5 years Non-connected 
i 4 Listed Company Textile D Deputy Financial Controller 7 years Non-connected 
i 5 Listed Company Textile E Chairman and CEO 25 years Non-connected 
I 6 Listed Company Textile F CFO 8 years Non-connected 
I 7 Listed Company Textile G Director of Finance 40 years Non-connected 
8 Listed Company Sugar H Company Secretary and CFO 22 years Politically connected 
9 Listed Company Sugar I CFO 18 years Non-connected 
10 Listed Company Sugar J CFO 12 years Politically connected 
11 Listed Company Textile K Manager Accounts, Finance and Taxation 15 years Non-connected 
12 Statutory Audit Firm L Partner 12 years Statutory Audit Firm 
13 Statutory Audit Firm M Partner 14 years Statutory Audit Firm 
14 Statutory Audit Firm N Partner 17 years Statutory Audit Firm 
15 Statutory Audit Firm 0 Partner 23 years Statutory Audit Firm 
16 Statutory Audit Firm P Partner 10 years Statutory Audit Firm 
17 Statutory Audit Firm Q Partner 9 years Statutory Audit Firm 
18 Regulator R Chief Operating Officer (COO) 20 years Regulatory Body 
19 Regulator S Ex-Registrar 35 years Regulatory Body 
20 Regulator Joint Director 12 years _ Regulatory Body 
------ --
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The Process of Interview Data Collection 
All the interviews were scheduled through e-mail and telephonic 
communication. An information sheet, along with the consent form, was 
provided to all participants. The information sheet stated the purpose of the 
research and assured the anonymity of the participant's name and the 
confidentiality of data. It was explained that the research did not involve any 
foreseeable risks to the participant. Appendix A provides research project 
information and consent form used for the purpose of obtaining informed 
consent. 
Permission was sought for digital audio recording of the interviews and signed 
copies of consent forms were obtained from the participants. Interviews were 
conducted at the business premises of the participants. As the participants were 
senior managers, all of them were allocated separate rooms within the business 
premises, which helped in obtaining a clear and good quality recording. It also 
allowed the participants to talk freely and confidentially. 
Each interview began with an introduction of the researcher to the participant. 
The researcher then informed the respondent orally about the time limit and the 
purpose of the project. The researcher also informed the participant about the 
conditions of confidentiality. The researcher asked the participant about hislher 
role and responsibilities for the specific job which he/she carried out for the 
organisations, how long he/she has held the position and what was the level of 
hislher authority in the organisation. 
Appendix B provides a copy of the outline guide developed by the researcher 
for this purpose. The interview guide helped the researcher to cover the topics 
that needed to be covered for understanding research phenomena. The 
161 
Chapter 4 - Research Methodology, Design and Methods 
interview guide also prevented the researcher from losing focus. The researcher 
followed the guide in all the interviews. However, the researcher also explored 
certain conversation trajectories that were felt appropriate for understanding 
certain phenomena. The interview guide prepared initially was then sent to two 
experts in the field of corporate governance in Pakistan and their advice was 
sought on the suitability of questions, considering the prevailing institutional 
context in Pakistan. The interview guide was thus further refined after 
obtaining their feedback, as it proved to be very useful in the improving 
interview guide. 
Most of the interviews were conducted in English. However, some participants 
could not speak fluent English and, in order to ensure a good flow of 
information, a few interviews were conducted in Urdu (Pakistan'S national 
language). On average, each interview lasted for approximately 45 minutes. 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim. In order to ensure a timely 
management of work load, transcription services were acquired from a 
Pakistan-based company for some of the interview data. The purpose of using a 
local transcription company was to ensure accuracy in translation as the 
translators/transcribers understood the context in which certain terms were 
used. The quality of all the transcripts was cross-checked and the researcher 
reviewed each transcript at least twice against the recorded interview. 
The process of interview data collection started with the generation of access to 
the interview participants. Following transcription of the interviews, template 
analysis of the data was conducted. The data were interpreted to understand 
how they informed initially developed research propositions. During this phase 
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of interpretation, some of the research participants were contacted again to seek 
additional insights into some of the aspects of their earlier statements. 
The following section will elaborate the choice of the methods used for 
analysis of research data. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The choice of data analysis technique should be consistent with the research 
philosophy. This research utilised the technique of qualitative content analysis 
for evaluating the level of disclosure in annual reports. In order to obtain an in-
depth understanding of the disclosures, silence on corporate governance 
disclosures in annual report narratives was also analysed. Template analysis 
was used for the analysis of interview transcripts. Qualitative data analysis 
software (NVivo) was used to assist in the process of data analysis. The 
following sections elaborate the methods used for the analysis of research data. 
4.3.1 Qualitative Content Analysis 
Elo and Kyngas (2008, p. 108) define content analysis as a systematic and 
objective method for describing and quantifying written and spoken 
phenomena. Bruce and Lune (2014, p. 242) argue that items in content analysis 
of the text are counted for "identifying, organising, indexing and retrieving 
data." They further state that due consideration should be given to the literal 
meanings of the text and the context and manner in which these words are 
used. According to this perspective, the purpose of content analysis is to collate 
the data in an organised form so as to facilitate interpretation and analysis by 
the researcher. 
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In accordance with the views of Bruce and Lune (2014), this research has 
utilised qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis goes beyond 
the quantification of texts through word frequency counts. Instead, it focuses 
on understanding social reality through analysis of texts in a subjective manner. 
Qualitative content analysis allows for the examination of underlying meanings 
embedded in the text. It provides the researcher with descriptions of how the 
producers of the text construct their social world (Zhang and Wildemuth, 
2009). 
Therefore, the technique of qualitative content analysis harmonises well with 
the philosophical underpinnings of this research. In addition, the choice of 
qualitative content analysis was appropriate for obtaining answers to the 
research questions. The technique not only allowed for an examination of 
disclosure practices of the listed companies, but also for a comparison of the 
level of corporate governance disclosures across politically connected and non-
connected firms. 
Bruce and Lune (2014, p. 242) argue that there are two main categories of 
content analysis; that is, manifest analysis and latent analysis. They described 
these categories in the following manner. Manifest content analysis refers to 
the surface analysis of the data, organised through word counts. Latent content 
analysis refers to the interpretation of data beyond the manifest characteristics. 
The researcher looks for the presence of in-depth meanings in the data through 
an analysis of the structural elements of the text. Bruce and Lune (2014, p. 
243) advocate the use of both manifest and latent content analysis methods in 
research, as word frequencies do not reflect the nature of data, and so a 
researcher has to look into latent meanings to generate useful interpretations. 
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This research has examined the level of the disclosure using a binary scheme 
for coding corporate governance disclosure. In the case of an absence of 
information on a corporate governance attribute, a score of 0 was attributed, 
while a score of I was attributed in the case of presence of the information. 
Later on, an in-depth analysis of narratives was performed to develop an 
understanding of disclosures across the various dimensions of corporate 
governance. Patterns of similarity and difference were identified across both 
industries, while explanations for variation in patterns of disclosure were also 
sought. This in-depth analysis allowed the development of a rich understanding 
of disclosure practices and the context in which these practices were 
performed. 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, p.2) explain that the process of content analysis 
can be based in the context of either inductive or deductive reasoning. In 
research based on inductive reasoning, the researcher can develop themes from 
the data. However, in the case of deductive research, themes and categories are 
initially developed from a theory. Later on, the researcher adds or deletes the 
categories as they emerge out of the data. 
Initially, this research developed propositions from existing theory using a 
deductive strategy, whereby the initial categories were developed from existing 
literature. However, as the research progressed and researcher started the data 
analysis, new categories were added and some of the initial categories were 
deleted or merged. Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, pp. 4-5) outline a detailed 
process of qualitative content analysis, using the following eight steps: 
• Preparation of data: decision on the choice of the content to be 
analysed and transcription of data. 
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• Define the unit of analysis: either individuals, themes, ideas or concepts 
are to be analysed. 
• Develop categories and a coding scheme: categories are developed 
from the theory used, the data or from other relevant studies. 
• Testing the coding scheme: a pilot may be conducted to test the validity 
of the coding scheme. 
• Code all the text: once the pilot is conducted and consistency achieved 
in the coding scheme, all of the data will be coded. 
• Assessment of coding consistency: verification of the consistency in 
coding scheme, to ensure once again that all the data were coded in a 
consistent manner and according to the initially defined coding rules 
• Draw conclusions from the coded data: Revisiting the coded data again 
and again to draw meaningful inferences, leading to conclusions and 
findings. 
• Reporting research methods and findings: Report detailed research 
process and findings truthfully to allow replicability. 
The above process outlined by Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, pp. 4-5) was used 
as a guideline to carry out analysis in this research. The following is an 
elaboration of the process of qualitative content analysis followed by the 
researcher. 
Preparation of Data 
As elaborated in Section 4.2.1, the narrative section of annual reports of 40 
listed companies were analysed for a period of five years; that is, from 2009 to 
20l3. Twenty of these companies were politically connected, while the rest of 
the companies were non-connected. 
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The Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis refers to the basic unit of text to be coded during the 
process of content analysis (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p. 3). Zhang and 
Wildemuth (2009) further explain that defining the unit of analysis is one of 
the most important decisions in content analysis, as the choice of the unit of 
analysis ultimately affects the comparability of the study with other similar 
researches. Previous studies using a content analysis technique have used a 
number of different units of analysis, such as the number of words (ling et al., 
2008; AI-Najjar and Abed, 2014), the number of sentences (Mazurina Mohd 
and Taylor, 2014), the space occupied on a page (Dagiliene, 2010) and a theme 
or construct (Green and Graham, 2005; Gunawan and Hermawan, 2012). 
However, Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) argue that qualitative content analysis 
usually entails the use of a theme as a unit of analysis and the use of words, 
sentences and percentage of page space are often used for quantitative studies. 
Therefore, a theme was used as the unit of analysis in this research. Every 
instance providing governance-related information in the annual reports was 
considered as the occurrence of a theme. All such instances were thus recorded, 
whether they were expressed in a word, sentence or paragraph in the document. 
Development of Categories of Corporate Governance 
In the beginning of this research, a detailed review of the literature was 
conducted (see Chapter 3). The review of existing literature helped in the 
development of the constructs for corporate governance disclosure. The 
constructs/categories of corporate governance practices developed by Green 
and Graham (2005) were combined with the components of corporate 
governance listed down by Maingot and Zeghal (2008) for the development of 
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a basic categorisation structure for corporate governance disclosure. The 
adoption of the coding scheme used by previous studies yielded the advantage 
of increased comparability of research findings across relevant studies. The 
following categories served as the basis of content analysis: (1) accountability; 
(2) independence; (3) roles, responsibility and inter-relationships; (4) profile; 
and (5) executive/director remuneration. This initially developed categorisation 
scheme was further refined and separate categories were developed for 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures (as defined in Section 4.2.1). 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) recommend that a coding manual should be 
developed for ensuring consistency in the coding scheme. The coding manual 
should provide the names of the categories along with the definitions and rules 
for coding. Therefore, two coding sheets were prepared. Each of these coding 
sheets outlined voluntary and mandatory disclosure items under the following 
categories: accountability, independence, roles, responsibility and inter-
relationships, profile and executive/director remuneration. Existing literature 
helped in the development of an initial voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure coding sheet. Additionally, the coding sheet was adjusted to fit to 
the Code of Corporate Governance (2002). Later on, additional items were 
added following a pilot study of four randomly selected annual reports from the 
research sample. The number of total voluntary disclosure items is 39. Table 
4.3 provides details of the coding manual prepared for voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. 
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Table: 4.3 List of Voluntary Governance Disclosure Items 
Accountability 
1 Responsibility regarding shareholder value creation. 
2 Accountability regarding strategic decision making. 
3 Responsibility of boards towards compliance. 
4 Responsibility towards provision of information and disclosure. 
Independence 
5 Separate role of CEO and Chairman. 
6 Number of independent directors. 
7 Independence of audit committee. 
8 Chairman of the audit committee is an independent director. 
9 Composition of HR and Remuneration Committee. 
10 Board has formed HR and Remuneration committee. 
11 Independence of Human Resource Committee. 
Roles, Responsibility and Inter-relationships 
12 Number of directors. 
13 Duties of the board. 
14 Board meeting attendance details. 
15 Board approves corporate objectives. Management has to meet those objectives. 
16 Board reviews CEO performance. 
17 Board has developed a procedure for determining the effectiveness of the board and board committees. Board's own performance 
evaluation. 
18 Board's approval for company's risk management practices. 
19 Responsibility for succession planning. 
20 Responsibility towards integrity of internal controls. 
21 Policy on election of institutional investors (if any). 
22 Number of directorships held in other companies. 
23 Disclosure of interest in buying, selling or other transactions in company shares. 
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24 Disclosure of interest and association with the recipients of donations made by the Company. 
Profile 
25 Name. 
26 Residence. 
27 Occupation. 
28 Number of years on board. 
29 Qualification of directors. Their skills, competence, knowledge, experience and diversity. 
30 Biography. 
31 Photographs. 
32 Qualification of CFO and Head of internal audit. 
Executive! Director Remuneration 
33 CEO salary with break-down. 
34 Number of shared held by CEO. 
35 Loans to CEO. 
36 Directors' salary with break-down 
37 Number of shares owned by directors. 
38 Loans to directors. 
39 Information on procedure for fl2Cin~fboard's salaTY--
-
--
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The Code of Corporate Governance (2002) served as a basic document for the 
preparation of the coding manual for mandatory disclosure items. The Code of 
Corporate Governance (2002) requires that each listed company should publish 
and circulate a statement of compliance with the requirements of the Code of 
Corporate Governance along with the annual report. A specimen statement for 
compliance with the Code is also annexed to the Code. Drawing upon the Code 
of Corporate Governance (2002) and the annexed specimen statement, a list of 
governance specific mandatory items was then prepared. 
The coding sheet so prepared comprises of 26 disclosure items. Table 4.4 
provides the list of items constituting the mandatory disclosure coding sheet for 
the study. 
171 
Chapter 4 - Research Methodology, Design and Methods 
Table 4.4: List of Mandatory Governance Disclosure Items 
Accountability 
1 Complete record of particulars of significant policies along with the dates on which they were approved or amended has been 
maintained. 
2 All the ~owers of the board are duly exercised regarding decisions on material transactions. 
3 Directors' report is prepared in compliance with the requirements of the Code and discloses all salient matters. 
Independence 
4 Board authority for hiring/firing of CEO. 
Roles, Responsibility and Inter-relationships 
5 Composition of the board - balance of executive and non-executive directors and those r~resentinK minority shareholder interests. 
6 Directorships held in not more than ten companies. 
7 None ofthe directors is a defaulter. 
8 Casual vacancy created on (date) 
9 Number of days for filling up of casual vacancy for director's position. 
10 Preparation and dissemination of company's code of ethics or conduct. 
11 Development ofvisionlmission statement. 
12 Board meetings were presided over by the Chairman or, in his absence, by a director elected by the board for this purpose. 
13 Number of board meetings. 
14 Circulation of notice regarding board meeting along with the agenda and working papers. 
15 Recording and circulation of minutes of board meetings. 
16 Provision of ()pportunities for directors' training and development P!ogrammes. 
17 The board has approved appointment of CFO, Company Secretary and Head of Internal Audit, including their remuneration and 
conditions of employment. 
_ ... -
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18 The Directors, CEO and executives do not hold any interest in the shares of the company other than that disclosed in the statement 
reporting pattern ofshareholding25. 
19 Board had formed audit committee. 
20 Composition of the audit committee. 
21 Number ofthe meetings of the audit committee. 
22 The terms of reference of the audit committee have been formed and advised to the committee for compliance. I 
23 The board has set u~ an effective internal audit function. 
I 
24 Independent and satisfactory statutory audit function. 
Profile I 
25 I Corporate governance training attended by board members. 
I 
Executivel Director Remuneration 
26 Decision on remuneration and terms and conditions of employment of the CEO, other executives and non-executive directors has I 
b~en jaken by the board/shareholders. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .__ _ _ _ __ 
25 The Pakistan Code of Corporate Governance (2002) requires that the companies must disclose a pattern of shareholding providing the aggregate number of shares held by various 
shareholders including executives, directors, their spouses and minor children (name-wise details). 
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Coding 
The binary coding scheme used by Maingot and Zeghal (2008) was applied for 
content analysis. A positive rating of 1 was given to the listed company if it 
disclosed the item in question. In the case of the absence of information, the 
company received a rating of O. 
Assessment of Coding Consistency 
The coding consistency was validated at two different stages. In the first stage, 
a pilot study was conducted before coding the whole data. The data from four 
annual reports were coded. The results from the pilot were assessed and certain 
items were added and deleted from the initially developed coding sheets. Later 
on, the rest of the annual report data were coded. After completing the coding 
of data from all annual reports, the consistency of the coding scheme was 
reviewed one more time. It was ensured that all the data were coded in a 
consistent manner and according to the initially defined coding rules. In order 
to confirm the content validity of the coding sheet, two UK academics also 
reviewed the pilot study and it was thus confirmed that the coding scheme 
satisfactorily captured the aspects of the research phenomena under 
investigation. Accordingly, the resulting coding manuals were deemed rigorous 
and reliable in capturing the voluntary and mandatory disclosure practices in 
companies' annual reports. 
Draw Conclusions from the Coded Data 
This step involved making sense of the coded data. Patterns of disclosure were 
identified and inferences were drawn regarding the disclosure practices of the 
listed companies. Variation in the level of disclosure was analysed across 
various disclosure categories and explanations were sought regarding this 
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variance. Variation in the disclosures provided by politically connected and 
non-connected firms was also analysed and conclusions were drawn from this 
analysis. 
Reporting Research Methods and Findings 
The researcher has reported the findings from the content analysis using tables 
and diagrams providing research results. This description of data is supported 
by an interpretation of the variation in disclosures and patterns identified in the 
data. Interpretation of research data is supported by reference to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research. It is therefore explained where the data 
supported initially developed theoretical standpoint and how this research 
makes a theoretical contribution to the existing literature. 
4.3.2 Analysis of Silence in Annual Reports 
This section provides the meaning and explanation of the concept of silence. 
Researchers have recognised silence as a mechanism for the hiding or 
concealment of information. This section also elaborates how silence tn 
communication has been studied by earlier researchers in the fields of 
corporate and political communication. It might be explained that although 
silence has been studied as a distinct tool for analysis in political 
communication, its use in the study of corporate communication is recent. 
Furthermore, this section justifies an analysis of silence as an additional, 
appropriate methodological tool for the study of corporate governance 
disclosure in annual reports of politically connected firms. 
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The Concept of Silence 
Silence is often defined as an absence of speech, although the role of silence in 
communication is considered as important as speech (Ehrenhaus, 1988; 
Paulston et aI., 2012). Silence has been studied in a large variety of disciplines, 
such as linguistics, health sciences, psychology, anthropology, linguistics, 
political science, business and organisational studies. The literature on silence 
suggests that silence occurs when the receivers of the information are neither 
provided adequate information nor are they provided any signal that might help 
them comprehend the information provided. 
A large number of studies on silence argue that silence is used as a tool for 
resistance (Mac1ure et aI., 2010), maintaining status quo, communicating 
existence of power relationships and protest (Junglrunz, 2012). Another type of 
silence characterises absence of speech when something is expected to be 
talked about at a particular place or occasion (Paulston et aI., 2012). The 
silence in such a case is strategic and meaningful. 
Ephratt (2011) argues that silence performs the functions of revealing and 
hiding information. In some cases, information is provided while one remains 
silent, but in other cases, one speaks without delivering any information at all 
through the use of empty speech. Ephratt (2011) states that 'empty speech' is 
speech that is meaningless. In empty speech, the narrator speaks words without 
saying anything meaningful or useful. This strategy of not saying the expected 
is deliberate. 
Study of Silence and Concealment in Political Communication 
The literature on political science has recognised the importance of silence in 
political discourse. Schroter (2013) argues that the study of what remains 
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unsaid is highly important in the analysis of political discourse. Bull (2003) 
found that politicians use silence as a strategy to deal with unfavourable 
questions. As argued by SchrOter (2013), in political communication, some of 
the viewpoints are made implicit so as to suppress information on other 
alternative viewpoints. Information on these alternative viewpoints is not 
desirable and thus these subjects are side-lined. Thus, when one issue is over-
emphasised in political discourse, it may imply that information on some other 
issue is concealed through silence. Schroter (2013) further argues that such 
silences can be identified through a deeper analysis of political communication, 
while silence in communication occurs when one does not intentionally 
communicate relevant information when expected to speak. 
Brummett (1980) studied strategic silence in politics. It was argued that silence 
is strategic when it breaches expectations. Brummett (1980) further argued that 
the public attributes meanings to that silence and silence is intentionally 
directed towards some audience. It was argued that politicians use silence as a 
political strategy for expression of mystery, uncertainty and passivity. 
Schroter (2013) explained that there is a small number of studies on the 
analysis of silence in the literature on political communication, and stressed 
that there is a need for more empirical research in the field. This research 
analyses the silence in the annual reports of politically connected firms through 
a comparative analysis of corporate governance narratives in politically 
connected and non-connected firms. 
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Study of Silence in Corporate Communication 
Existing literature on the analysis of disclosure in annual reports argues that 
companies use narrative sections in annual reports for promoting a positive 
impression regarding company affairs, whereas negative information is ignored 
or under-emphasised. Corporate silence or non-disclosure of information is 
thus used as a tool to flee from assumption of responsibility (Buhr, 200 I; 
Brennan et al., 2009). 
As explained above, the use of analysis of silence as a method for the study of 
corporate communication is recent. However, a few studies in corporate 
communication have analysed silence. Chwastiak and Young (2003) studied 
how corporations use silence as a tool to hide the negative impact of 
corporations' environmental losses in corporate annual reports. Chwastiak and 
Young (2003) emphasise the need to break these silences in corporate 
communication so as to save earth from the negative environmental practices 
of corporations. 
Hollander et al. (20 I 0) studied the silence of managers in corporate 
communication and found that managers provided incomplete disclosure and 
did not release adequate information to investors during conference calls. 
Therefore, the provision of inadequate information or what remains unsaid is 
recognised as a tool used by both politicians as well as corporate managers. 
This research is an empirical investigation of the same phenomenon. 
It might be argued that, according to the positivist perspective, structures such 
as corporate governance and disclosure regulations, rationality, utility functions 
and self-serving behaviour exist as normative constructions and influence the 
disclosure practices of listed companies. However, various researchers argue 
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that accounting information is socially constructed and corporate disclosures 
are prepared under the influence of perceptions of the preparers of annual 
reports (Buhr, 2001). Organisational actors therefore, take the decisions 
regarding disclosure/non-disclosure of information based on their own 
perceptions. The viewpoint of critical realism takes both of these arguments 
into account, and suggests that the choices regarding inclusion or exclusion of 
any particular piece of information might be shaped by social conditioning, as 
well as by existing normative structures. The analysis of silence so allows for 
the study of corporate governance disclosures both from positivist as well as 
social constructionist standpoints. 
Analysis of Silence 
Considering the initially developed research propositions drawn from agency 
theory and rational choice institutionalism, the analysis of silence was 
considered to be the best suited technique for gaining in-depth understanding 
of research phenomena. According to these theories, self-interest and the 
opportunism of board members might result in poor disclosure and in order to 
hide their rent-seeking activities, members of the board constrain the 
dissemination of information to minority shareholders, leading to limited 
corporate governance disclosure. 
This research analysed audited annual reports of companies to generate an 
understanding of the disclosures made therein. It focused on the instances 
where the annual reports remained either completely silent or provided 
alternative information, so failing to address the actual question/subject on 
which they were expected to provide information. Existing research on silence 
argues that such techniques are used when the narrators want to avoid, deny or 
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deflect from the topic under discussion (Morison and Macleod, 2013). For the 
purpose of analysis of annual report data, the following steps were followed: 
• First, the parts of the annual reports covering information on corporate 
governance practices were identified. 
• The parts containing information on corporate governance were read 
iteratively. 
• Politically connected and non-connected reports were classified. A 
politically connected firm being one having at least one politician on its 
board. 
• The iterative reading eventually led to the determination of similarities 
and differences in the information provided in regard to corporate 
governance practices in the annual reports of politically connected and 
non-connected firms. 
• It was then analysed whether the corporate governance information was 
totally absent or empty speech was used for concealment. 
The following chapters provide a description of the process of application of 
qualitative content analysis and the analysis of silence along with an 
explanation of the results drawn from these techniques of analysis. 
4.3.3 Analysis of Interview Data 
Qualitative research provides an element of flexibility in development of 
theoretical propositions, data collection and data analysis as the researcher 
keeps on revisiting each of these areas as the research process progresses. The 
analysis of interview data gives rise to the emergence of new themes and 
categories, those that might not be taken into account in the phase of 
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development of propositions and initial data collection. Alternative 
propositions may then be developed, with the subsequent data collection 
process thus continues, under the influence of newly developed propositions 
(Saunders et aI., 2012). 
This research used existing theories to inform research propositions and 
provide possible explanations for the researched phenomena, but the scope of 
data analysis was not limited to examining the explanatory power of those 
propositions. A fairly flexible approach was instead adopted and the researcher 
remained open to consider any alternative explanations of the phenomenon. 
Saunders et aI. (2012) explain that various techniques can be used for 
qualitative data analysis such as grounded theory, narrative analysis, etc. 
However, the technique of 'template analysis' was utilised for the purpose of 
the interview data analysis performed here. 
Template Analysis 
The interview data was analysed using the approach of 'template analysis' 
provided by Saunders et al.(2012). Saunders et al.(2012) defined a template as 
a list of categories derived from data, after performing a thematic analysis on 
it. This technique was chosen as Saunders et al. (2012) explained that template 
analysis allows the researcher to combine the deductively developed 
propositions with the inductively developed themes and categories from the 
interview data. Template analysis enabled the researcher to identify the 
relationships and develop hierarchies between the themes and categories. The 
use of template analysis also helped the researcher in seeking explanations 
regarding the phenomena researched in the light of the propositions developed. 
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The use of this technique enabled the researcher to obtain answers to the 
research questions through an analysis of the themes developed from the 
theoretical propositions informed by agency theory and rational choice 
institutionalism. In addition to verification of the initially developed 
propositions, template analysis also allowed the researcher to identify any new 
themes emerging in the interview transcripts. The following section provides a 
description of the process of template analysis. 
a. Categorisation 
This stage involved the identification of the 'categories' from interview 
transcripts. The groups of data were labelled using these categories in order to 
provide a structure for further analysis. The arrangement of these categories 
was directed by the theoretical propositions of the research project. However, 
the researcher did not limit these categories to the pre-established propositions. 
Any important themes that emerged from the data were identified and 
considered so that the answers to the research questions were pursued in the 
most appropriate manner. Since NVivo was used for the purpose of analysis, 
the categories were represented by the nodes in the software. Table 4.5 
contains the template representing the most important categories that emerged 
from the analysis. 
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1. Preparation of Annual Reports - The Process 
2. Role of Directors in Preparation of Annual Reports 
3. What to Disclose in Annual Reports? - Financial Infonnation 
4 Good Disclosure means Mandatory Disclosure 
5 Mandatory Disclosure - Monitoring and Compliance 
6 Drivers Underlying Reluctance to Corporate Governance Disclosure 
7 Political Connectedness and Mandatory Disclosure 
8 Political Connectedness and Truth and Fairness of Mandatory Disclosure 
9 Political Connectedness and Voluntary Disclosure 
10 Voluntary Disclosure is not Useful 
b. Unitising 
This step involved the allocation of relevant portions of transcripts under each 
of the categories/nodes. The identified sections of data were allocated to the 
relevant nodes. This approach helped to organise data in a manner so that the 
resulting display of data would provide a better understanding regarding the 
phenomena researched. 
Development of Categories 
This stage of data analysis involved the identification of relationships between 
various categories. Various themes emerging from the data were analysed and 
re-analysed and their allocation to various categories changed as the process of 
analysis continued. Some of the previously identified categories were 
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eliminated, while some new categories also emerged as the analysis 
progressed. Meaningful relationships between categories were established so as 
to obtain the answers to the research questions. 
c. Testing of Propositions 
The analysis of the research data provided insights into the initially developed 
research propositions. Alternative explanations for various relationships were 
sought. These alternative explanations to the research problem were helpful in 
enabling the researcher to reach useful findings regarding researched 
phenomena. 
It is important to note that the methods of qualitative content and template 
analysis appear to share many similarities. However, a number of differences 
exist between these techniques. Firstly, the process of interpretation in template 
analysis always places the emphasis on research context. However, qualitative 
content analysis runs the risk of losing focus on the context. Secondly, the 
categories in qualitative content analysis are based on the frequency of their 
occurrence. On the other hand, the categories in the template analysis have 
been developed on the basis of conceptual and thematic mapping. Furthermore, 
content analysis entails a peer review in order to ascertain consistency in the 
coding scheme. In contrast, thematic analysis does not generally require a peer 
review (Vaismoradi et aI., 2013). 
4.4 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics in the context of research, refer to the rules that guide researchers in 
respect to their responsibilities towards other parties (Chalk et aI., cited by 
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Kimmel, 1988). Since this research activity involved human participants, 
ethical issues were of considerable importance. 
Being that the participants in the research were senior level managers, gaining 
access to them was the most critical practical issue. The researcher hence 
sought permission from each participant for the use of a digital recorder and for 
note-taking. The research data were collected after obtaining consent from the 
research participants. Appendix A provides the 'research project information 
and consent form' used for the purpose of obtaining informed consent. 
Anonymity and confidentiality of responses were ensured to all participants, 
while every possible precaution was taken in protecting the confidentiality of 
the research data. 
Pseudonyms were used for the purpose of securing confidentiality for research 
participants. The researcher made every possible effort to keep the data safe 
from unauthorised access, accidental loss or destruction. The provisions of the 
UK Data Protection Act 1998 and Freedom of Information Act 2000 were 
followed. 
The researcher took due care to protect the participants from all types of 
psychological distress and physical risks, although it was not anticipated that 
any such issues would need to be addressed. The methods of data collection 
and analysis were chosen so as to provide accurate results. As far as possible, 
no personal bias affected the writing up of the research findings. Ethical 
approval was also obtained from the Open University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Appendix C) for conducting this research. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the design of the proposed research. Various 
philosophical approaches were discussed and a suitable methodological 
position was used for investigation. The reasons for proposing a qualitative 
research design incorporating two methods for data collection and three 
different methods for data analysis have been outlined. This research used 
interviews and audited annual reports as methods of data collection, while the 
use of the techniques of template analysis, analysis of silence and qualitative 
content analysis have been explained, in terms of their being tools used for the 
analysis of the research data. 
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Chapter 5 - Interpreting the Annual Report Data 
5.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis outlined the institutional background for this research. 
Chapter 3 provided a detailed account of prior literature in the field of 
corporate governance disclosures, along with an explanation of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this research. Chapter 4 outlined research philosophy and 
methodology and elaborated the methods to be used for data collection and 
analysis. As explained in Chapter 4, in order to understand the impact of 
political connectedness on corporate governance disclosure this research used 
two main sources of data, that is, audited annual reports and semi structured 
interviews. 
This chapter will provide a detailed analysis of annual report data, whereby 
voluntary as well as mandatory corporate governance disclosure practices of 
politically connected and non-connected listed companies in Pakistan were 
examined. Audited annual reports have therefore been analysed using two 
methods; that is, qualitative content analysis and the analysis of silence. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the structure of the thesis. 
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Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 - Positioning in the Thesis 
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Section 5.1 of this chapter elaborates the results of qualitative content analysis. 
Analysis was undertaken on the annual reports of 40 listed companies for a 
period of five years; that is, from 2009 to 2013. For the purposes of 
comparison, 20 of the companies in the sample were politically connected, 
while the remaining 20 companies were non-connected. Qualitative content 
analysis was undertaken to investigate voluntary as well as mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure practices in audited annual reports. Qualitative 
content analysis proved to be a useful tool for analysis, being that it helped in 
the identification of differences in the disclosure practices of politically 
connected and non-connected companies. 
Section 5.2 provides results of the analysis of silence. Silence on corporate 
governance information has been analysed in the same annual reports. The 
analysis of silence allowed the researcher to examine in-depth what remained 
unsaid regarding the companies' corporate governance practices in the annual 
reports. It also helped in the identification of such instances where text has 
been provided without providing relevant and meaningful information 
regarding corporate governance practices of the firms. 
Section 5.3 offers some conclusions. 
5.1 Qualitative Content Analysis 
As indicated in Chapter 4, several studies on the analysis of disclosure in 
annual reports have used the technique of content analysis (Green and Graham, 
2005; Maingot and Zeghal, 2008). The process of content analysis outlined by 
Zhang and Wildemuth (2009, pp. 4-5) was used as a guideline for the analysis 
performed in this research, as it was considered to be the most appropriate 
method for investigating the research phenomenon. The following sections 
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elaborate how qualitative content analysis addressed the various sub-questions 
examined by this research. 
5.1.1 Level of Disclosure on Corporate Governance 
It was discussed earlier in Chapter 3 that the corporate disclosure is an 
important mechanism of the corporate governance framework (Treadway, 
1987; Cadbury, 1992; Green and Graham, 2005; Lin et aI., 2014) and that there 
is a lack of research exploring corporate governance disclosure practices of 
listed companies in Pakistan. This research has sought to fill the gaps in 
literature through an in-depth empirical investigation. Furthermore, this study 
presents important practical implications and provides useful insights for 
regulators and policy makers in Pakistan (explained in detail in Chapter 7). 
This section analyses the first question of this research: 'How do listed 
companies in Pakistan disclose corporate governance related information in 
annual reports?' In order to obtain answers to this question, this section focuses 
on analysis of the level of voluntary and mandatory disclosures in the annual 
reports of listed companies from the textile, sugar and several other sectors. 
The level of voluntary and mandatory disclosure in all of these sectors is then 
compared to understand the disclosure tendency of the companies. 
a. Voluntary Disclosure 
Table 5.1 shows the calculation for the level of voluntary disclosure on various 
corporate governance constructs across all the firms analysed. 
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Table 5.1: Level of Voluntary Disclosure across Various Corporate Governance Constructs for Years 2009-2013 
Maximum Actual Scores Obtained by the Percentage Disclosure on Corporate No. of Obtainable Score Firms on Various Corporate Grand Total 
Governance Items in = No. of Items in Governance Constructs of Actual Each Construct=Actual 
Disclosures Each Each Construct x Scores Score Obtained! Maximum 
Constructs Construct No. of Years x No. 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Obtained Obtainable Score in Each 
of Firms Construct 
Textile Sector 
Accountability 4 200 27 28 27 32 35 149 75% 
Independence 7 350 15 16 16 50 57 154 44% 
Roles, 
Responsibility 13 650 55 57 59 63 62 296 46% 
and Inter-
relationships 
Profile 8 400 10 10 10 10 16 56 14% 
Executive! 
Director 7 350 39 40 40 40 43 202 58% 
Remuneration 
SU2ar Sector 
Accountability 4 200 31 32 32 33 23 151 76% 
Independence 7 350 22 16 15 32 41 126 36% 
Roles, 
Responsibility 13 650 64 71 70 60 70 335 52% 
and Inter-
relationships 
Profile 8 400 16 16 19 20 21 92 23% 
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Table 5.1 : Level of Voluntary Disclosure across Various Corporate Governance C~nstructs for Years 2009-2013 
Maximum Actual Scores Obtained by the Percentage Disclosure on Corporate No. of Obtainable Score Firms on Various Corporate Grand Total Each Construct=Actual Governance Items in = No. of Items in Governance Constructs of Actual Score Obtained! Maximum Disclosures Each Each Construct x Scores 
Constructs Construct No. of Years x No. 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Obtained Obtainable Score in Each 
of Firms Construct 
Executive/ 
Director 7 350 37 41 40 38 41 197 56% 
Remuneration 
Several Sectors 
Accountability 4 400 55 56 57 55 65 288 72% 
Independence 7 700 44 51 52 85 107 339 48% 
Roles, 
Responsibility 13 
I 
and Inter- 1300 107 110 109 111 120 557 43% 
relationships 
Profile 8 800 31 32 39 38 42 182 23% 
Executive! 
Director 7 700 80 78 81 85 87 411 59% 
Remuneration 
- --~-.-- -
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The second column of Table 5.1 shows the number of items in each corporate 
governance construct. Column three of the table shows the maximum 
obtainable score. The maximum obtainable score in a construct is calculated by 
mUltiplying the number of items in the construct with the total number of firms 
in each industrial sector in the sample and then by further multiplying it with 
the number of years under consideration. The fourth column provides the 
actual scores obtained across various constructs by the firms in each industrial 
sector from year 2009-2013. Column five provides the grand total for the 
actual scores obtained by firms across various corporate governance constructs 
over five years. 
For example, in the construct of accountability, if all the (10) firms in textile 
sector disclosed information on all (4) items pertaining to accountability over 
the period of five years, then the maximum obtainable score would be 10 x 4 x 
5 = 200. However, the actual score obtained by the firms in the textile sector is 
149. Therefore, the percentage of disclosure on accountability is calculated by 
dividing the actual score obtained (149) by the maximum obtainable score 
(200), that equals 75%. Similarly, the number of total firms in the 'several 
sectors' group is 20, while the maximum obtainable on the construct of 
accountability will be 20 x 4 x 5 = 400. 
Figure 5.2 provides a presentation by graph showing the level of disclosure in 
all the firms across the various corporate governance constructs (calculation 
provided in Table 5.1 above). It may be observed that in all of the sectors, the 
companies provided minimum information on the profile of the board, 
reflected in a 14% level of disclosure in the textile sector and a 23% level of 
disclosure in the sugar and 'several sectors' group. The level of disclosure on 
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executive/director remuneration was also poor; that is, 58% for the textile 
sector, 56 % for the sugar sector and 59% for the 'several sectors' group. 
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The findings of the qualitative content analysis in regard to voluntary 
disclosure on the construct of board profile support the findings of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1. The findings of the survey conducted by 
International Finance Corporation (2007) had indicated that 86% of the listed 
companies in Pakistan did not provide biographies of the directors. The survey 
indicated a clear resistance in disclosure of voluntary information in the annual 
reports. The evidence found in Figure 5.2, reflecting a low level of disclosure 
on the construct of profile, shows that companies are still reluctant to share 
information on the skills, competencies, trainings and seminars attended, as 
welI as the experience and biographies of the members of the board. It is 
Important to consider that, unlike this research, the survey conducted by 
International Finance Corporation (2007) was merely a study of perceptions of 
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directors and executives of listed and non-listed companies, being that the 
responses of research participants were captured through questionnaires and 
semi-structured interviews conducted in 2007. The survey did not analyse the 
actual disclosure practices of listed companies. On the other hand, the current 
research is an investigation of the actual corporate governance disclosure 
practices of listed companies in analysing annual report data over a period of 
five years. 
The World Bank (2005) had put forth an expectation that the formation of the 
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance would have a positive impact in 
improving corporate governance and disclosure environment in Pakistan. 
Furthermore, an increased emphasis on the part of regulatory bodies in 
enhancing awareness regarding corporate governance through trainings and 
seminars was also expected to bring significant improvements in corporate 
governance and disclosure environment. The World Bank (2005) had asserted 
that, up until 2005, companies in Pakistan had already begun to recognise the 
importance of corporate governance and were arranging corporate governance 
seminars and trainings for the members of the board. However, the findings of 
this research indicate that corporate governance disclosure on board profile is 
still limited, contrary to the expectations put forth by World Bank (2005). 
It might be useful to find the explanation for this continued poor disclosure on 
board profile. The reasons for this poor disclosure might be sought through an 
analysis of Pakistan's business environment. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 
2, in Pakistan's capital market, most of the firms are family-owned (Mirza and 
Azfa, 2010; Nawazish and Sara, 2012), and these family owners are the 
members of the board. Thus the appointments to the board are made on the 
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basis of nepotism, personal relationships and family inheritance (Afghan and 
Wiqar, 2007). Existing literature suggests that there is a scarcity of expert and 
qualified directors in family firms in South Asia in general and in Pakistan in 
particular (GuIzar and Wang, 2010; Hashim and Ibrahim, 2013). 
Afghan and Wiqar (2007) claim that, in Pakistan, family members are included 
in the business regardless of their qualifications and experience. This results in 
the inclusion of those family members who may be incompetent and ill-
qualified. According to the agency theory perspective, agency problem in 
organisations may arise if the agent lacks required skills and capabilities 
(Feldman and Montgomery, 2015). Therefore, a lack of expert~se in the board 
of directors may prove detrimental to shareholders interests. 
It might be implied from the analysis of the data that the scarcity of well-
qualified members of the boards might be the reason for limited disclosure on 
board members' qualifications and experience. Being that these members of 
the board do not have relevant experience or qualification, they may avoid 
disclosure of it. This results in a lower level of disclosure on the construct of 
profile. 
Figure 5.2 shows that there is a low level of disclosure on the construct of 
board independence; that is, 44% in the textile sector, 36% in the sugar sector 
and 48% in the several sectors group. It might be inferred here that family 
owners keep a strong control on the management of the firm. The findings of 
this research are consistent with Chakroun (2013), who had carried out 
research in the context of Tunisia, wherein it was found that firms with high 
levels of family control are characterised by low levels of board independence, 
ultimately leading to a poor level of voluntary disclosure. Various researchers 
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have argued that board independence is positively related to the level of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure (Ben-Amar and Boujenoui, 2006; 
Samaha et aI., 2012). It might be inferred that the number of independent 
directors may improve the quality of monitoring regarding corporate 
governance reporting and disclosure. Being that most of the businesses in 
Pakistan are family owned and controlled, and there is a lack of independent 
members on the boards, there is hence a resistance towards disclosure of this 
information. 
Similarly, the low level of disclosure on the construct of roles, responsibility 
and inter-relationships of 46%, 52% and 43% in the textile, sugar and 'several 
sectors' groups respectively, might reflect that, in these firms, a clear 
distinction between the roles, responsibilities and inter-relationships of firm 
management and the board does not exist. The board members hence strongly 
influence firm's management and operations. These findings are consistent 
with Green and Graham (2005), who found that annual reports of Canadian 
listed companies did not indicate a division of responsibilities between the 
members ofthe board and corporate management. 
In this research, accountability received the highest score among all corporate 
governance constructs; that is, 75%, 76% and 72% in the textiles, sugar and 
several sectors groups respectively. These findings contradict the arguments 
presented by the World Bank (2005), who argued that the aspect of board 
accountability was totally absent in Pakistan's business environment. However, 
the findings of this research support the findings of the Pakistan Institute of 
Corporate Governance (2011), who had argued that majority of the boards of 
directors in Pakistan feel accountable for strategic decision making in the 
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firms. It might thus be inferred that the boards feel answerable for their 
responsibility towards value creation, strategic decision making, compliance 
and disclosure. The analysis of silence (section 5.2) within this construct shows 
that most of the firms disclosed information on boards' accountability towards 
strategic decision making, shareholder value creation and compliance with 
regulation. However, only a few firms expressed their responsibility towards 
dissemination of information and disclosure to shareholders. These findings are 
consistent with those of Green and Graham (2005), who argued that most of 
the companies in Canada did not assume responsibility for the dissemination of 
corporate information to the shareholders. 
Here, it might be inferred that since these family owners have been handling 
these businesses for years and are well-aware that strategic decision making, 
profitability and compliance of regulations are central to the success of 
business operations. However, as strong family owners are the part of the board 
in such concerns, better disclosure may only benefit minority shareholders and 
outsiders of the firm. Therefore, they do not assume responsibility for the 
dissemination of information and better disclosures in the annual reports. This 
finding therefore supports the initial theoretical propositions that the members 
of the board make strategic calculations about weak minority shareholder rights 
and, as an expected outcome, the disclosure of information to these 
shareholders is not considered important. These findings are consistent with 
prior literature, where it was found that family control has a negative 
relationship with the extent of corporate governance disclosure. For example, 
in the context of the UK, Arcot and Bruno (2012) found that family firms often 
deviate from the best practices of corporate governance and disclosure. 
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Darmadi and Sodikin (20l3) carried out research in the context of Indonesia 
and found that family control negatively influences corporate governance 
disclosure. 
Figure 5.2 also shows that the average level of voluntary disclosure across 
corporate governance constructs in the textile sector firms is 47%, while it is 
49% in both the sugar sector and the other sectors group. It might then be 
concluded that the average level of voluntary disclosure on various corporate 
governance constructs was inadequate in all the three sector groups. However, 
disclosure of information was better in terms of the construct of accountability, 
when compared to the constructs of roles, responsibilities and inter-
relationships, executive/director remuneration, board independence and profile. 
Furthermore, it may also be observed that the practices and level of voluntary 
disclosure on various corporate governance constructs do not vary considerably 
among industries. As discussed in Chapter 3, research on the relationship 
between corporate governance disclosure and industry type has provided 
contradictory evidence. However, these findings are consistent with the 
findings of the existing research arguing that the level of disclosure remains 
unchanged across industries in developed as well as in developing countries; 
for example, Sweden (Andersson and Daoud, 2005) and India (Bhasin et aI., 
2012). 
Figure 5.3 provides a presentation by graph showing the changes in the level of 
voluntary disclosure across corporate governance constructs from 2009 to 20 l3 
in the textile sector. The graph shows that there is a sharp increase in the level 
of disclosure on the construct of independence in 2011. However, an in-depth 
analysis of silence revealed that the increase in the level of disclosure on 
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independence is actually an incidence of empty speech (refer to section 5.2.1). 
This construct therefore shows an improvement as companies either replaced 
the term 'non-executive director' with 'independent' director or started using 
both the terms together as 'independent non-executive' director. Thus the level 
of information provided seems to have improved over these years. The 
construct of accountability also showed a rising disclosure trend. However, the 
level of disclosure has remained similar in regard to the constructs of profile, 
executive/director remuneration and roles, responsibility and inter-
relationships. 
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The graph in Figure 5.4 presents the voluntary disclosure trend in various 
corporate governance constructs in the sugar sector from 2009-2013. This 
figure also indicates a sharp upward trend in disclosure on board independence, 
while there is a decrease in disclosure regarding board accountability in 2012. 
Similar to the trend in the textile sector, the constructs of profile, 
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executive/director remuneration and roles, responsibility and inter-relationships 
remain almost constant over time. 
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Figure 5.4: Voluntary Disclosure on Various Corporate Governance 
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The graph in Figure 5.5 presents the trend for the level of voluntary disclosure 
for the firms in the several sectors group. This trend for the disclosure on 
various constructs in this group is also similar to the sugar and textile sectors. 
There is also a rise in the level of disclosure on the construct of independence, 
while the constructs of accountability, profile, executive/director remuneration 
and roles, responsibility and inter-relationships also show a slight upward 
trend. 
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Figure 5.5: Voluntary Disclosure on Various Corporate Governance 
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Mandatory Disclosure 
Table 5.2 provides an explanation of how the level of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure in the annual reports is calculated. Table 5.2 was 
prepared in the same way as Table 5.1. For example, in the construct of 
accountability, if all the (10) firms in textile sector disclosed information on all 
(3) items pertaining accountability over the period of five years, the maximum 
obtainable score would be 10 x 3 x 5 = 150. However, the actual score 
obtained by textile sector firms is 149. Therefore, the percentage of disclosure 
on accountability is calculated by dividing the actual score obtained (149) by 
the maximum obtainable score (150), that equals 99%. On the other hand, the 
several sectors group had 20 firms, so and maximum obtainable score for the 
construct of accountability would therefore be 20 x 3 x 5 = 300. 
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Table 5.2: Level of Mandatory Disclosure across Various Corporate Governance Constructs 
No. of Maximum Actual Scores Obtained by the Grand Percentage Disclosure on 
Corporate Governance Items in Obtainable Score= Firms on Various Corporate Total of each Construct =Actual No. of Items in Each Governance Constructs Actual Score Obtained/Maximum Disclosures Constructs Each Construct x No. of 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Scores Obtainable Score in each Construct Years x No. of Firms Obtained Construct 
Textile Sector 
Accountability 3 150 29 30 30 30 30 149 990/0 
Independence 1 50 10 10 10 9 9 48 96% 
Roles, Responsibility and 20 1000 187 187 187 187 186 934 93% Inter-relationships 
Profile 1 50 1 1 4 4 5 15 30% 
Executive/ Director 1 50 10 10 Remuneration 10 10 9 49 98% ! 
Sugar Sector 
Accountability 3 150 26 29 29 27 29 140 93% 
Independence 1 50 8 9 10 9 9 45 90% 
Roles, Responsibility and 20 1000 167 180 183 185 183 898 90% Inter-relationships 
Profile 1 50 3 3 4 4 5 19 38% 
Executive/ Director 1 50 8 9 8 8 8 41 82% Remuneration 
Several Sectors 
Accountability 3 300 56 57 59 60 60 292 97% 
Independence 1 100 16 17 17 18 20 88 88% 
Roles, Responsibility and 20 2000 339 346 349 357 360 1751 88% Inter-relationships 
Profile 1 100 3 3 11 12 11 40 40% 
Executive/ Director 1 100 16 14 16 18 19 83 83% Remuneration 
---
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Figure 5.6 provides an overview of the level of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure in the annual reports. Figure 5.6 shows that the firms in 
all of the sectors provide minimum information regarding the profile of the 
board, whereas the level of disclosure is higher for the constructs of 
executive/director remuneration, accountability, independence, roles, 
responsibility and interrelationships. The average level of disclosure on various 
corporate governance constructs in the textile sector is 83%, the level of 
disclosure in the sugar sector is 79%, while the average level of disclosure in 
the several sectors group is also 79%. 
100% 
90% 
~ 80% 
.. 
= 
'" 
70% Q 
<:i 
'" 60% is 
... 50% Q 
.. 
40% > ~ 
....J 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Figure 5.6: Level of Mandatory Disclosure 
Accountability Independence Roles, 
Responsibility 
and Inter-
relationships 
Profile 
Corporate Governance Constructs 
• Textile 
=c-I-- Avg 
Executive/ 
Director 
Remuneration 
Disclosure 
= 83% 
• Sugar Avg 
Disclosure 
= 79% 
• Severa l 
Sectors 
Avg 
Disclosure 
= 79% 
It is worth noticing that there is a similarity in the tendency for disclosure 
across each corporate governance construct in all of the industrial groups. In all 
of these groups, the companies provide minimum information on the construct 
of profile, while the level of disclosure is highest for the construct of 
accountability across all the sectors. The average for mandatory disclosure 
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across the various constructs was 79% in the sugar sector and the several 
sectors group, whi le it was 83% in the texti le sector, therefore showing no 
difference in the pattern and level of disclosure across various constructs in 
these industries. 
Figure 5.7 shows the trend for changes in the level of mandatory disclosure 
across corporate governance constructs in the textile sector from 2009 to 2013. 
It might be observed that the level of disclosure on all corporate governance 
constructs, with an exception of profile, stayed at a healthy and constant level 
during the time span considered. However, a noticeable improvement can be 
observed from 20 I 0- 20 13 in the level of disclosure regarding profile. 
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Figure 5.7 Level of Mandatory Disclosure Across Various 
Corporate Governance Constructs from 2009 - 2013 
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Figure 5.8 shows the trend for changes in the level of mandatory disclosure 
across corporate governance constructs from 2009 to 2013 in the sugar sector. 
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Figure 5.8: Mandatory Disclosure Across Various Corporate 
Governance Constructs from 2009 - 2013-
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The results from the sugar sector show a similar trend to that observed in the 
textile sector, whereby there is a rise in disclosure on the construct of profile, 
while the level of disclosure of all other constructs is almost constant with a 
slight decline on the construct of executive/ director remuneration. 
Figure 5.9: Mandatory Disclosure on Various Corporate 
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Figure 5.9 presents the trend of disclosure of various corporate governance 
constructs in the several sectors group. The figure shows that, in conformity 
with disclosure trends in the textile and sugar sectors, there is an increase in the 
level of disclosure on the construct of profile. It may also be observed that the 
level of disclosure on all other constructs also shows a steadily rising trend. 
As explained in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.1, prior research on the influence of 
industry type on corporate governance disclosure has provided contradictory 
evidence. Some researchers found that industry type can have an impact upon 
the disclosure practices of the companies. For example, Collett and Hrasky 
(2005) found that, in Australia, politically visible industries26 provided better 
disclosure, while AI-Najjar and Ding (2014) affirmed that firms in less 
competitive industries provide better disclosure in the context of UK. However, 
some researchers did not find any relationship between industry type and 
corporate disclosure (Andersson and Daoud, 2005; Bhasin, 2012). Hence, the 
results obtained in this research reinforce the notion that there is no variation in 
the level of corporate governance disclosure across the industries analysed. 
c) A Comparison Bewteen Voluntary and Mandatory Disclosure 
Green and Graham (2005) studied the relationship between corporate 
governance regulation and corporate governance disclosure in the context of 
Canada. They found that companies in Canada avoided strict regulation but 
were willing to provide information about their corporate governance practices 
voluntarily. Green and Graham (2005) concluded that since companies had 
developed a culture for voluntary disclosure, there was no need for introduction 
of mandatory corporate governance disclosure requirements in the context of 
26 ~~lIett an? !lrasky (2005) classified resource industries, metals, oil and gas and diversified resources as 
politically VISIble industries. 
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Canada. In order to investigate the tendency towards corporate governance 
disclosure in the listed companies of Pakistan, a comparison has hence been 
carried out between the level of voluntary and mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure in annual reports. 
Figure 5.10 below provides a comparison between the level of voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure on various corporate governance constructs in the textile 
sector. It shows that the mean for voluntary disclosure across all the constructs 
is 47 %, while that for mandatory disclosures is 83%. The difference between 
the two means is 36% which shows a large discrepancy. 
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Figure 5.11 shows a comparison between the level of voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure on the various corporate governance constructs in the sugar sector. It 
shows that the mean for voluntary disclosure across all the constructs is 48 %, 
while that for mandatory disclosure it is 79%. The difference between the two 
means is 31 % which again shows a large discrepancy. The reason for this 
margin might be the fact that most of the firms disclose mandatory infonnation 
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to comply with legal requirements. The voluntary disclosure of information 
does, however, not seem to be a priority for them. 
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Figure 5.12 presents a comparison between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure across various corporate governance constructs in the several sectors 
group. 
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of Voluntary and Mandatory Disclosure 
Level Across Various Corporate Governance Constructs 
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It might be observed that there is also a large discrepancy between the level of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure across various corporate governance 
constructs in the several sectors group: the difference between average 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure is 26% (79%-53%). These findings 
indicate that companies in Pakistan are not willing to disclose corporate 
governance information voluntarily. Instead, there is a need for strict regulation 
to ensure the disclosure of corporate information. These findings contradict 
those of Green and Graham (2005), who had found that a culture of disclosure 
was developing in Canada and that there was hence no need for the 
introduction of mandatory corporate governance regulation. 
These findings support the initially developed research propositions, whereby 
corporate governance regulation serves to minimise agency problem and 
information asymmetry between family members and minority shareholders, 
while the level of mandatory information disclosure remains high. However, 
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the low level of voluntary disclosure shows reluctance on the part of 
companies' management towards information sharing. 
These findings also support the findings of Sharma (2014). Sharma (2014) had 
found that the level of mandatory disclosure in the companies in Nepal was 
91 %, while the level of voluntary disclosure was only 48%. The findings of 
Sharma (2014) might also be considered relevant for this research as Nepal is 
also a South Asian developing country and most of the listed companies in 
Nepal's capital market are also family owned and controlled. Hence the 
findings of this research suggest a potential general pattern that could be 
investigated in other countries that have a similar capital market structure and 
context to Pakistan and Nepal. 
Table 5.3 provides a comparison between average disclosure level across 
various constructs in the sugar, textile and the other sectors group. It also 
shows that there is minimal variation between the levels of mandatory 
disclosure in these industries. In fact, there is a difference of only 4%; that is, 
83% in the textile sector and 79% in the sugar sector and the other sectors 
group. The variation in the average level of voluntary disclosure is also very 
small across the different sectors; that is, 47% in the textile sector, 48% in 
sugar sector and 53% in the other sectors group. Moreover, the level of 
mandatory disclosure is considerably higher than voluntary disclosure in all of 
the industries. 
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Table 5.3: Average Disclosure across Various Corporate Governance 
Constructs 
Su~ar, Textile and Other Sectors 
A verage Mandatory A verage Voluntary 
Disclosure Disclosure 
Textile Sector 83% 47% 
Sugar Sector 79% 48% 
Other Sectors 79% 53% 
It can be concluded from the above analysis that the average level of 
mandatory disclosure is evidently higher than the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Being that this research has compared the annual report data between the sugar 
sector, textile sector and the several sectors group, it may also be inferred that 
the level of disclosure does not change very much across industries. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, prior research into the impact of industry type on 
corporate governance research has found contradictory results, whereby several 
researchers found that the level of corporate governance disclosure varies 
across different industries (Toms et aI., 2007; Muhamad et aI., 2009; An et aI., 
2011). However, this research supports the findings from studies by Andersson 
and Daoud (2005) and Bhasin (2012) where no relationship was found between 
industry type and level of disclosure. It might also be considered that this 
research compares the disclosure practices of 40 small and medium size firms. 
A study involving a larger number of firms might therefore provide further 
confirmation of these results. 
The findings of this research are in accordance with the theoretical propositions 
set out at the beginning of the project. As proposed by agency theory and 
rational choice institutionalism, the members of the board are self-interested 
and opportunistic and extract benefits from information asymmetry. However, 
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they make strategic calculations about the institutional environment and thus 
make rational decisions. The results of the study indicate that the members of 
the board are self-interested and opportunistic and therefore avoid providing 
information voluntarily, as can be observed in the low level of voluntary 
disclosure. However, they make calculations about the strict regulatory 
environment of the country and make a rational decision to disclose a good 
level of mandatory information (further evidence in support of this claim was 
found during the analysis of interview data and is provided in detail in Chapter 
6). 
5.1.2 Level of Mandatory Disclosure across Politically Connected and 
Non-Connected Firms 
This section aims to answer the second sub-question of this research; that is, 
'How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of mandatory 
corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed companies in 
Pakistan?' 
Disclosure scores have been calculated across politically connected and non-
connected firms. In order to enhance the rigour and robustness of the research 
results, disclosure scores were calculated separately across politically 
connected and non-connected firms. On the basis of these scores, the 
percentage of disclosure level was thus calculated for each firm in these 
sectors. Table 5.4 provides the scores obtained on the mandatory disclosure 
coding sheet in the sugar and textile sectors. 
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Table 5.4: Mandatory Disclosure Across Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms- Sugar and Textile Sectors 
Status of Firms Maximum Obtainable Score = No. Actual Score Obtained by the Average %age Disclosure-
Political (Names of Items in the Mandatory Firms Grand Total Actual ScorelMaximum 
Connectedness Anonymised) Disclosure Index x No of Years 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Obtainable Score 
Tl 130 24 24 24 24 23 119 92% 
T2 130 24 24 24 24 23 119 92% 
T3 130 23 23 23 22 22 113 87% 
T4 130 22 22 22 22 22 110 85% 
Politically T5 130 24 24 24 22 23 117 90% 
Connected Sl 130 25 25 24 20 23 117 90% 
S2 130 17 20 20 20 21 98 75% 
S3 130 1 20 24 24 23 92 71% 
S4 130 23 21 21 24 22 111 85% 
S5 130 23 23 23 22 23 114 88% 
T6 130 24 25 25 25 25 124 95% 
T7 130 24 24 25 25 24 122 94% 
T8 130 24 24 25 26 25 124 95% 
T9 130 24 24 24 24 26 122 94% 
Non- TlO 130 24 24 25 26 26 125 96% 
Connected S6 130 23 23 24 25 24 119 92% 
S7 130 25 26 26 24 24 125 96% 
S8 130 25 25 24 25 25 124 95% 
S9 130 25 24 24 24 24 121 93% 
S10 130 25 23 24 25 25 122 94% 
• Average disclosure in connected firms= 85%. Average disclosure in Non-connected firms= 94% 
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Table 5.4 shows the scores obtained by the firms from 2009 to 2013 in the 
sugar and textile sectors. The maximum obtainable score is the maximum score 
a firm can obtain if it provides disclosure on all disclosure items across all five 
years. It is calculated by multiplying the number of items in the mandatory 
disclosure index (26) by the number of years (5), which equals 130. The grand 
total is the sum of the actual score obtained by each firm from 2009-2013. The 
average percentage disclosure in the last column of Table 5.4 is calculated by 
dividing the actual score obtained by each firm by the maximum obtainable 
score. For example, Tl obtained a score of 119. Its average percentage 
disclosure is calculated as 119/130 x 100 which is equal to 92%. 
Table 5.4 shows that the average level of disclosure in connected firms is 85%, 
while for non-connected firms it is 9% higher at 94%. 
In order to strengthen the results of this earlier analysis, level of mandatory 
disclosure across politically connected and non-connected firms was carried 
out in other sectors group. The results of this analysis are provided in table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Mandatory Disclosure across Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms in the Several Sectors Group 
Status of Firm Maximum Obtainable Score = Actual Score Obtained by the Firms Grand Average %age Disclosure= I Political Name No. of Items in the Mandatory 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total Actual Score/Maximum Connectedness Disclosure Index x No of Years Obtainable Score 
SSI 130 20 21 21 22 23 107 82% 
SS2 130 19 20 21 22 23 105 81% 
SS3 130 19 19 19 19 20 96 74% 
SS4 130 22 22 23 24 24 115 88% 
Politically SS5 130 21 20 24 22 22 109 84% I 
Connected SS6 130 19 19 19 19 21 97 75% 
SS7 130 25 25 25 24 22 121 93% 
SS8 130 22 25 23 26 24 120 92% 
SS9 130 19 19 22 24 24 108 83% 
SS10 130 20 22 20 20 20 102 78% 
SSIl 130 23 23 23 26 24 119 92% 
SS12 130 20 21 21 26 26 114 88% 
SS13 130 24 24 25 25 25 123 95% 
SS14 130 22 22 22 22 22 110 85% 
SS15 130 21 22 21 21 22 107 82% Non-Connected 
SS16 22 22 24 26 25 119 130 92% 
SS17 130 25 23 25 26 26 125 96% 
SS18 130 23 24 25 24 25 121 93% 
SS19 130 21 21 24 22 23 111 85% 
SS20 130 23 23 25 25 29 125 96% 
• Average disclosure in connected firrns= 83%. Average disclosure in Non-connected firms= 90% 
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Table 5.5 shows the scores obtained by all the finns from 2009 to 2013 in the 
annual reports of the finns in the several sectors group. Table 5.5 was prepared 
in the same way as Table 5.4. The maximum obtainable score is the maximum 
score a finn can obtain if it provides disclosure on all the disclosure items over 
all five years. It is calculated by multiplying the number of items in the 
mandatory disclosure index (26) by the number of years (5) and equals 130. 
The grand total is the sum of the actual score obtained by each finn from 
2009-2013. The average percentage disclosure in the last column of Table 5.5 
is calculated by dividing the actual score obtained by each finn by the 
maximum obtainable score. For example, SS 1 obtained a score of 107. Its 
average percentage disclosure is calculated as 107/130 xl 00 which is equal to 
82%. 
Table 5.5 shows that the average level of disclosure in connected firms is 83%, 
while for non-connected finns it is 7% higher at 90%. These results strengthen 
the findings of the earlier analysis, whereby the level of mandatory disclosure 
in the finns from the sugar and textile sectors was lower in politically 
connected finns in comparison with non-connected finns (85% and 94% 
respectively). In order to understand in depth the disclosure practices of 
politically connected and non-connected finns, a detailed analysis was carried 
out, whereby the level of disclosure across each corporate governance 
construct was calculated for comparison purposes. The results of the analysis 
are presented in the following sections. 
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a. Mandatory Disclosure across Corporate Governance Constructs 
• Sugar and Textile Sectors 
Figure 5.13 provides a presentation by graph, showing the level of mandatory 
disclosure across corporate governance constructs in politically connected and 
non-connected firms. 
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Figure 5.13: Level of Mandatory Disclosure on Various Corporate 
Governance Constructs Across Politically Connected and Non-
connected Firms - Sugar and Textile Sectors 
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It is evident from Figure 5. I3 that, except for the construct of accountability, 
politically connected firms display lower levels of disclosure in comparison 
with non-connected firms. The construct of profile shows the highest variation, 
where the disclosure level in the non-connected firms is 62%, while in the 
connected firms it is only 6%. This amounts to a margin of 56%. This margin 
is 16% in the case of independence, 7% for roles, responsibility and inter-
relationships and 18% for executive/director remuneration. 
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Table 5.6: Mandatory Disclosure on Various Corporate Governance Constructs across Politically Connected and 
Non-Connected Firms - Textile and Sugar Sectors 
Maximum Maximum Obtainable Obtainable Score Level of Score by All Non- Actual Level of No. of by All Connected Actual Score Score Corporate Items in Firms=No. Of By Disclosure Connected Firms=No. Obtained by Disclosure Governance in Of Items in Each in Non-
Constructs Each Items in Each Connected Connected construct x No. of All Non- Connected Construct construct x No. of Firms Firms Years x No. of Non- Connected Firms Years x No. of Connected Firms Firms Connected Firms 
Accountability 3 150 143 95% 150 146 97% 
Independence 1 50 42 84% 50 50 100% 
Roles, 
Responsibility 20 1000 881 88% 1000 951 95% and Inter-
relationships 
Profile 1 50 3 6% 50 31 62% 
Executive/ 82% Director 1 50 41 50 50 100% 
Remuneration 
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Table 5.6 provides the information on the calculation of the level of mandatory 
disclosure across politically connected and non-connected firms in the sugar 
and textile sectors. The second column of the table provides the number of 
items in each construct. The third column provides the maximum obtainable 
score across all connected firms. This is obtained by multiplying the number of 
items in each construct by the number of years (5) and then by further 
mUltiplying it by the number of politically connected firms (10). For example, 
in the construct of accountability the number of items is three. Thus the 
maximum obtainable score is calculated as 3 x 5 x 10= 150. 
Column four provides the actual score obtained by connected firms, which is 
143 in the construct of Accountability. In column five, the level of disclosure 
for connected firms is calculated by dividing the actual score obtained by the 
maximum obtainable score. Thus, the level of disclosure for accountability in 
politically connected firms is calculated as 1431150 x 100, which is equal to 
95%. This disclosure for non-connected firms is calculated in a similar way in 
the other columns of the table. 
• Several Sectors 
Figure 5.14 provides a comparison of mandatory disclosure across politically 
connected and non-connected firm in the several sectors group. It might be 
observed that, as was observed in earlier analysis of mandatory disclosure in 
the sugar and textile sectors, politically connected firms are disclosing lower 
level of information on all the constructs of corporate governance. In 
conformity with the results from the sugar and textile sectors, the construct of 
profile shows the highest variation where the disclosure level in connected 
firms is 50%, while in the non-connected firms it is 30%, amounting to a 
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margin of 20%. This margin is then 4% in the case of independence, 7% for 
roles, responsibility and inter-relationships and 2% for executive/director 
remuneration. 
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Figure 5.14: Mandatory Disclosure in Politically Connected and Non-
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The results of this analysis reveal that the level of disclosure on the profile of 
the board is considerably less in politically connected firms . In the construct of 
profile, the requirement for attending corporate governance trainings is 
mandatory and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan can 
impose penalties in the case of non-compliance. However, disclosure regarding 
this construct is poor in the annual reports of politically connected firms. In 
other words, these firms face the risk of being penalised (a monetary threat) but 
do not attend training; nor do they explain the reasons for not-compliance. 
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Ta ble 5.7: Manda tory Disclosure on Various Corporate Governance Constructs across Politica lly Connected a nd 
Non-Connected Firms - Sever al Sectors 
Maximum 
Maximum O btainable Score 
Obtainable Score by All Non- Actual 
No. of by All Connected Actual Level of Connected Score Level of Corporate Items in Firms=No. Of Score By Disclosure in Firms=No. Of Obtained Disclosure Governance Each Items in Each Connected Connected Items in Each by All in Non-Constructs Construct construct x No. Firms Firms construct x No. of Non- Connected 
of Years x No. of Years x No. of Connected Fir ms 
Connected Firms Non-Connected Firms 
Firms 
Accountability 3 150 144 96% 150 148 99% 
Independence 1 50 43 86% 50 45 90% 
Roles, 
Responsibility 20 1000 839 84% 1000 912 91% and In ter-
relationships 
Profile I 50 15 30% 50 25 50% 
Executive/ 
Director I 50 41 82% 50 42 84% 
Remuneration 
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Table 5.7 provides information on the calculation of the level of mandatory 
disclosure across politically connected and non-connected firms in the several 
sectors group. The second column of the table provides the number of items in 
each construct. The third column provides the maximum obtainable score 
across all connected firms, one obtained by multiplying the number of items in 
each construct by the number of years (5) and then by further multiplying it by 
the number of politically connected firms (10). For example, in the construct of 
accountability the number of items is three. Thus the maximum obtainable 
score is calculated as 3 x 5 x 10= 150. 
Column four provides the actual score obtained by connected firms, which is 
144 in the construct of Accountability. In column five, the level of disclosure 
for connected firms is calculated by dividing the actual score obtained by the 
maximum obtainable score. Thus, the level of disclosure for accountability in 
politically connected firms is calculated as 1441150 x 100, which is equal to 
96%. This disclosure for non-connected firms is calculated in a similar way for 
the other columns of the table. 
h. Trend of IncreaseIDecrease in the Level of Mandatory Disclosure from 
2009-2013 
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the differences in mandatory 
disclosure level between politically connected and non-connected firms, the 
trend of increase/decrease in the level of disclosure was observed across the 
period under analysis. Figure 5.15 shows the results of that analysis for the 
sugar and textile sectors. 
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Figure 5.15: Trend of Increase/Decrease in the Level of Mandatory 
Disclosure from 2009-2013 
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Figure 5. 15 shows a higher level of disclosure in non-connected firms for each 
year, in comparison with connected firms. In addition, in 2009 the level of 
mandatory disclosure in connected firms was 79%. That level of disclosure 
increased over time and in 2013, the level of disclosure was 87%. On the other 
hand, the level of disclosure in non-connected firms remained almost constant 
over the years. 
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Figure 5.16: Level of Mandatory Disclosure in Politically 
Connected and Non-Connected Firms from 2009-2013 
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Figure 5.16 validates the trend observed in Figure 5.15 above. It might be 
observed that, for each year, the level of disclosure in non-connected firms was 
also higher in comparison with connected firms in several sectors group. 
These findings are consistent with the findings of prior research on the 
reporting and disclosure practices of politically connected firms. In the context 
of China, for example, Piotroski et al. (2015), Huang et al. (2014) and Stuart 
and Wang (2014) found that connected firms manipulate and restrict the flow 
of corporate information. These findings also support the initially developed 
propositions of the research that suggested that politically connected members 
of the board have utility maximising preferences. Hence, in order to satisfy 
their self-interests they opt for such actions that are not favourable for 
(minority) shareholders. In order to hide their politically motivated, rent-
seeking activities, they hence constrain dissemination of information to 
shareholders, leading to a poor level of corporate governance disclosure. 
5.1.3 Level of Voluntary Disclosure across Politically Connected and Non-
Connected Firms 
This section answers the third question of this research, 'How does political 
connectedness influence the disclosure of voluntary corporate governance 
information in the annual reports oflisted companies in Pakistan?' 
Table 5.8 shows the voluntary disclosure scores obtained by all the firms from 
2009 to 2013 in the textile and sugar sectors. The maximum obtainable score is 
the maximum score that a firm can obtain if it provides disclosure on all 
disclosure items over all five years. It is calculated by multiplying the number 
of items in the voluntary disclosure index (39) by the number of years (5), 
which equals 195. The grand total is the total for the actual scores obtained by 
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individual firms. The average percentage disclosure is calculated by dividing 
the actual score obtained by each finn by the maximum obtainable score. For 
example, T1 obtained a voluntary disclosure score of 67. Its average 
percentage disclosure is calculated as 67/195 x 100 = 34% 
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Table 5.8: Voluntary Disclosure across Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms - Textile and Sugar 
Status of Maximum Obtainable Actual Score Obtained by the Firms Average %age 
Political Firm Name Score = No. ofitems in Grand Disclosure = Actual 
Connectedness (Anonymised) the Voluntary Disclosure 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total ScorelMaximum Index x No of Years Obtainable Score 
Tl 195 12 12 12 15 16 67 34% 
T2 195 13 13 13 17 18 74 38% 
T3 195 11 12 13 16 20 72 37% 
T4 195 14 14 14 16 21 79 41% 
Politically T5 195 13 13 13 18 18 75 38% 
Connected Sl 195 15 16 14 16 15 76 39% i 
S2 195 16 17 18 17 18 86 44% 
S3 195 9 9 9 9 19 55 28% 
S4 195 16 13 12 14 8 63 32% 
S5 195 17 19 19 17 20 92 47% 
T6 195 19 19 20 25 29 112 57% 
T7 195 17 17 16 22 25 97 50% 
T8 195 16 16 17 22 22 93 48% 
T9 195 15 19 18 23 20 95 49% 
Non- TI0 195 16 16 16 21 24 93 48% 
Connected S6 195 18 19 19 23 25 104 53% 
S7 195 19 21 21 18 18 97 50% 
S8 195 15 17 16 18 22 88 45% 
S9 195 24 24 23 25 26 122 63% 
S10 195 21 21 25 26 25 118 61% 
_._._--
• Average disclosure in connected firms = 38%. Average disclosure in non-connected firms = 52% 
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Table 5.8 shows that the average level of voluntary disclosure in politically 
connected firms is 38%, while that in non-connected firms is 52 %. Therefore, 
politically-connected firms disclose 14% less information than non-connected firms 
in the textile and sugar sectors. 
Table 5.9 presents the voluntary disclosure scores obtained by all the firms in the 
several sectors group. Scores in the table are calculated in the same way as they were 
calculated in Table 5.8. The maximum obtainable score is the maximum score that a 
firm can obtain if it provides disclosure on all disclosure items over all five years. It 
is calculated by multiplying the number of items in the voluntary disclosure index 
(39) by the number of years (5) to produce a total of 195. The grand total is therefore 
the total for the actual scores obtained by individual firms. The average percentage 
disclosure is calculated by dividing the actual score obtained by each firm by the 
maximum obtainable score. For example, SS 1 obtained a voluntary disclosure score 
of77. Its average percentage disclosure is calculated as 77/195 x 100 = 39%. 
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Table 5.9: Voluntary Disclosure across Politically Connected and Non-Connected Firms - Several Sectors 
Maximum Obtainable Actual Score Obtained by the Firms Average %age 
Status of Score = No. of Items in Grand Disclosure= Actual 
Political Firm the Voluntary Disclosure Total ScorelMaximum 
Connectedness Name Index x No of Years 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Obtainable Score 
SSl 195 15 15 14 14 19 77 39% 
SS2 195 13 13 13 12 15 66 34% 
SS3 195 11 8 11 10 17 57 29% 
SS4 195 15 15 16 16 19 81 42% 
Politically SS5 195 16 16 16 18 19 85 44% 
Connected SS6 195 15 17 19 18 21 90 46% 
SS7 195 14 14 14 18 18 78 40% 
SS8 195 18 20 15 14 25 92 47% 
SS9 195 l2 13 10 17 16 68 35% 
SS10 195 15 20 15 15 20 85 44% 
SSll 195 18 18 18 21 22 97 50% 
SS12 195 15 15 15 17 21 83 43% 
SS13 195 17 17 21 21 22 98 50% 
SS14 195 17 19 21 25 25 107 55% 
Non- SS15 195 13 13 15 16 18 75 38% 
Connected SS16 195 24 25 27 32 32 140 72% 
SS17 195 19 19 27 30 31 126 65% 
SS18 195 20 20 20 23 23 106 54% 
SS19 195 23 23 23 27 27 123 63% 
SS20 195 33 33 33 33 33 165 85% 
* Average disclosure in connected firms = 40%. Average disclosure in non-connected firms = 57% 
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Table 5.9 shows that the average level of voluntary disclosure in politically 
connected firms is 40%, while for non-connected firms it is 57%. Therefore, 
politically-connected firms disclose 17% less information than non-connected firms. 
These findings validate the results obtained in Table 5.8 from the firms in the textile 
and sugar sectors. 
In order to analyse the voluntary disclosure practices of politically connected and 
non-connected firms in greater depth, the level of disclosure across various corporate 
governance constructs was also calculated. The following section provides a 
comparison of voluntary disclosure practices of politically connected and non-
connected firms across various corporate governance constructs. 
aJ Voluntary Disclosure across Corporate Governance Constructs 
• Sugar and Textile Sectors 
Figure 5.17 presents a comparison between the percentage disclosure for various 
Corporate governance constructs across politically connected and non-connected 
firms in the sugar and textile sectors. The figure highlights that the disclosure of all 
constructs is visibly higher for non-connected firms. The margin of disclosure on the 
construct of accountability between connected and non-connected firms is 25% (that 
is, 88%-63% = 25%). This margin is 12% in the case of executive/director 
remuneration, 14% for the construct of independence, 11 % for profile, and 13% for 
roles, responsibility and inter-relationships. 
230 
Chapter 5 - Interpreting the Annual Report Data 
Figure 5.17: Level of Voluntary Disclosure on Various Corporate 
Governance Constructs Across Politically Connected and Non-
connected Firms - Textile and Sugar 
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Table 5.10 provides information on the calculation of the level of disclosure 
across politically connected and non-connected firms in the sugar and textile 
sectors. 
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Table 5.10: Voluntary Disclosure on Various Corporate Governance Constructs across Politically Connected and 
Non-Connected Firms - Textile and Sugar 
Maximum Actual score No. of Obtainable Score 
obtained by Percentage of Actual score Percentage of Items in = No. of Items in 
Each Each Construct x a\l disclosure in obtained by a\l non- disclosure in non-
Construct No. of Years x No. connected connected firms connected firms connected firms 
of Firms firms 
Accountability 4 200 125 63% 175 88% 
Independence 7 350 113 32% 161 46% 
Roles, Responsibility 13 650 272 42% 359 55% 
and Inter-relationships 
Profile 8 400 51 13% 97 24% 
Executive/ Director 7 350 178 51% 221 63% Remuneration 
-
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The second column of the table provides the number of items in each construct. 
The third column provides the maximum obtainable score across all connected 
firms. It is obtained by multiplying the number of items in each construct by 
the number of years (5) and then by further multiplying it by the number of 
politically connected firms (5) in each sector. For example, in the construct of 
accountability the number of items is four. Thus, the maximum obtainable 
score is calculated as 4 x 5 x 10=200. 
Column four provides the actual score obtained by politically connected firms 
on each corporate governance construct. The level of disclosure in column five 
of the table is calculated by dividing the actual score obtained by connected 
firms by the maximum obtainable score. Thus, the level of disclosure on 
accountability in politically connected firms is calculated as 125/200 x 100, 
which is equal to 63%. The disclosure in non-connected firms has been 
calculated in a similar way to the last column of the table. 
• Several Sectors 
Figure 5.18 presents a comparison between the percentage disclosure for 
various corporate governance constructs across politically connected and non-
connected firms in the several sectors group. This figure also shows that the 
disclosure of all constructs is visibly higher for non-connected firms in 
comparison with connected firms. The margin of disclosure on the construct of 
accountability between connected and non-connected firms is 30%; that is, 
57% - 87% = 30%. This margin is 19% in the case of executive/director 
remuneration, 9% for the construct of independence, 16% for profile and 18% 
for roles, responsibility and inter-relationships. These results validate the 
results obtained from the analysis of firms in the sugar and textile sectors. It 
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might be observed that politically connected firms disclose a lower level of 
voluntary information on each construct of corporate governance, regardless of 
their sector/industry affi liation. 
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Based on the results obtained from the analysis of voluntary disclosure in the 
textile, sugar and several sectors groups, it might be observed that the construct 
of profile includes the provision of information regarding directors' 
qualifications, experience, skills and competence, and the corporate 
governance training attended. It may be argued that the provision of such 
information in annual reports does not have any economic impact. Thus, 
politically connected firms should not restrain the flow of such information. 
However, Figures 5.1 7 and 5.18 show that the level of disclosure in politically 
connected firms on this construct is only 13% in the texti le and sugar sectors 
and 15% in the several sectors group. 
The analysis could further be linked to the political environment in Pakistan 
because, according to the provisions of Conduct of General Elections Order 
(2002) , every candidate for parliamentary elections must be a graduate 
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possessing a bachelor degree. Therefore, the qualifications disclosed by a 
politically connected member of the board might also have an impact on 
her/his political career, which may be a reason for non-disclosure of such 
information. Another explanation for this poor disclosure on profile may be 
found in the argument that politically connected members of the board are not 
qualified enough and thus do not disclose such information. Similarly, a lower 
level of disclosure on accountability might reflect that politically connected 
firms do not consider themselves accountable for shareholder value creation, 
strategic decision making and disclosure of information. These findings 
support the theoretical propositions drawn earlier in Chapter 3 that the board 
members of politically connected firms might be opportunistic and focus on 
maximising their political interests and in order to hide their activities, they 
restrain the flow of corporate governance information. 
b) Trend of IncreaseIDecrease in the Level of Voluntary Disclosure from 
2009-2013 
• Textile and Sugar Sectors 
Figure 5.19 below shows an increasing trend in the level of disclosure by both 
politically connected and non-connected firms. However, the level of 
disclosure in non-connected firms has remained noticeably higher at each point 
in time during the years under analysis. 
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Disclosure from 2009-2013 
Sugar and Textile Sectors 
57% 
d h°ln dR% 4~ 
<10 0 / _ 
I "U/ h 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
Years 
61 % 
- 44% 
2013 
- Connected 
Firms 
- Non-
connected 
Firms 
• Several Sectors 
Figure 5.20 also demonstrates a rising trend in the level of disclosure by both 
politically connected and non-connected finns. These figures also show that 
the level of disclosure in non-connected finns remained higher compared with 
politically connected firms at every point in time. 
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Figure 5.20: Level of Voluntary Disclosure in Politically Connected 
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The evidence found in this section endorses the results obtained in section 5.1.2 
and the findings are in accordance with the following theoretical propositions 
of agency theory and rational choice institutionalism. 
- Politically connected firms face a double agency problem. Members of the 
board have utility maximising preferences; hence, for meeting their self-
interests they opt for such actions that are not favourable for (minority) 
shareholders. 
- In order to hide their politically motivated, rent-seeking activities, they 
constrain the dissemination of information to shareholders, leading to a 
poor quality of corporate governance disclosure. 
However, a deeper analysis of the data in this section indicates a problem in the 
way in which agency theory has been interpreted and analysed by quantitative 
researchers. As argued by Wiseman et al. (2012), most of the existing 
quantitative researchers have relied on the simplistic interpretation that agents 
want to maximise their economic wealth, while minimising their own efforts 
(through behaving negligently). This overly simplistic interpretation of self-
interested human nature has resulted in an over-emphasis being placed on 
calculating utility through econometric analysis. However, as indicated by the 
results of this study, politically connected companies face the monetary risk of 
being penalised; yet they still do not attend corporate governance trainings or 
improve their qualifications. It may then be interpreted that they are not 
interested in being educated. Although this form of self-interest is not 
monetary, it has a potential to affect adversely the rights of minority 
shareholders whose funds are handled by incompetent directors. 
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As has been discussed in Chapter 3, prior research on the impact of political 
connectedness on corporate disclosure presents contradictory results. Many of 
the existing researchers argue that politically connected firms provide poor 
quality financial disclosure owing to difficulties in the valuation of 
network/relationship based assets27 (Fan et aI., 2014), lack of incentives to 
compete for external resources (Huang et aI., 2014), less fear of scrutiny from 
regulator (Stuart and Wang, 2014), difficulties in accurate forecasting (Chen et 
aI., 2010) shirking and rent seeking (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Bushman et aI., 
2004) and the lack of market pressure (Chaney et aI., 2011). The findings of 
the content analysis in this study support the results of existing empirical 
research in the field as politically connected firms were found to provide poor 
corporate governance disclosure. However, the analysis of data does not 
support the findings of Batta et al. (2014), who argued that politically 
connected firms provide a better quality of accounting disclosure because they 
do not face the risk of expropriation from the state. The results of this research 
support the findings of those other studies that found a lower level of 
disclosure in politically connected firms. 
The above results have been obtained through an analysis of the level of 
disclosure in the annual reports of the firms, calculated through the 
development of ordinal measures. For the purpose of triangulating the findings 
of content analysis, interviews were conducted with the representatives of 
listed companies in the sugar and textile sectors, statutory audit firms and 
regulatory bodies. Interview data so collected not only validated the results of 
content analysis, but also provided a deeper understanding of the reasons for 
27 According to Fan et al. (2014) political networks bring benefits to the firms and therefore they carry 
value. The value of these assets is separate from the value of standard assets of the firm. 
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the disclosure practices of politically connected companies. The analysis and 
findings of interview data are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Furthermore. in order to develop an in-depth awareness of how politically 
connected firms disclose information in their annual reports. an analysis of 
silence in these reports was undertaken. The analysis of silence has provided a 
deeper understanding of the level and depth of corporate governance 
information in the annual reports. In addition, it highlighted the differences in 
the disclosure practices of politically connected and non-connected firms as it 
was found that the annual reports of politically connected firms become silent 
on the disclosure of voluntary corporate governance information when 
compared with the annual reports of non-connected firms. The following 
section provides the analysis of silence in the annual report narratives. 
5.2 Analysis of Silence in Annual Reports - Results 
In order to gain deeper insights into the disclosure practices of politically 
connected and non-connected companies, the technique of analysis of silence 
was utilised. The content analysis above provided an account of the level of 
overall disclosure across industries along with an explanation of variation in 
the level of disclosure in politically connected and non-connected firms. 
The analysis of silence enabled a further in-depth investigation. According to 
the initially developed theoretical propositions of this research. politically 
connected firms were expected to hide information, or to refrain from provision 
of information regarding their corporate governance practices. The analysis of 
silence therefore investigates how the flow of corporate governance 
information is avoided through the use of silence as a tool. 
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The analysis of silence provides further insights into the second and third 
questions of this research. All the annual reports were in the English language 
and no translation was thus required. Drawing on the technique for analysis of 
silence used in previous research (Chwastiak and Young, 2003; Morison and 
Macleod, 2013), as explained in detail in Chapter 4, the disclosure of corporate 
governance practices was analysed to identify the absence of information. 
The findings of this section are based on the analysis of silence in the narrative 
sections of the 200 annual reports. The annual reports of 40 listed companies 
were read over the period of five years (excluding financial statements) and 
information on the constructs of corporate governance was analysed. Initially, 
the annual reports of the firms from sugar and textile sectors were analysed. 
Later on, the analysis was extended to the annual reports of the firms in the 
several sectors group. Section 5.2.1 provides a discussion of the results 
obtained from the analysis of silence on voluntary corporate governance 
information in the annual reports of politically connected and non-connected 
firms in sugar, textile and several sectors groups. 
5.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure 
As explained in Chapter 4 Section 4.3, five constructs of corporate governance 
disclosure were developed after the review of relevant literature. These 
constructs serve as the basic dimensions of corporate governance information 
for this research. This section provides a comparison of corporate governance 
information in the annual reports of politically connected and non-connected 
companies. Such a comparison allows for the identification of various 
instances where the information on various corporate governance constructs 
was totally absent, limited or constituted empty speech in these annual reports. 
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The following discussion reveals how politically connected companies use 
silence as a tool for controlling the flow of information in annual reports. 
Accountability 
As explained earlier in chapter 4, the construct of accountability contains 
information on the firms' accountability regarding shareholder value creation, 
strategic decision making, compliance and disclosure of information to 
shareholders. The board of directors is chosen by shareholders to protect their 
interests and is responsible for shareholder value creation (Green and Graham, 
2005). Therefore, the construct of accountability includes information 
regarding shareholder value creation through an increase in earnings, 
profitability, dividends and share price. 
The analysis of narrative sections in the annual reports of non-connected firms 
in all sectors revealed that the information provided on board's accountability 
regarding shareholder value creation is detailed, and covers a wide range of 
related issues. The annual reports of all non-connected firms state that 
profitability and shareholder value creation formed the main objectives of these 
firms. For example the Annual Report ofT7 for 2009 stated 
We are committed to becoming the premier manufacturing 
organisation in the textile industry ... with the object of maximizing 
returns for all the stakeholders 
Annual Report of T6, a non-connected firm from textile sector for 2013 also 
stated 
The Company is primarily focused on the following areas,' 
• To achieve sustainable growth in revenue of the Company 
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• To diversify the product portfolio to yield high margins 
In addition to the statements elaborating board responsibility, the annual 
reports of non-connected firms also stated the strategy devised for 
enhancement of shareholders value. For example the annual report of a sugar 
sector firm S 10 for 2012 stated that 
The Company has decided to further enhance the production 
capacity of the plant and is confident that (our new distillery unit) 
will bring further financial benefits to the Company and its 
shareholders in the years to come. 
T6, a firm from the textile sector stated in its annual report for 2012 
A responsible value creation can make a way to profitable long 
term growth which is our aim. 
Most of the non-connected firms expressed their concern about and 
responsibility for growth, profitability and value creation at multiple instances 
in each annual report. For example, the annual reports of SS14 (a chemical 
sector firm), SS16 (a food sector firm) and SS20 (a paper sector firm) provided 
statements expressing their concern for shareholder value creation; that is 
recurrently, in different sections and at different pages throughout the annual 
reports in all the years under analysis. Furthermore, non-connected firms 
explicitly set out the difficulties and challenges faced by the management in 
increasing profitability. 
The management is continually striving towards cost controls and 
efficiencies both in terms of production, financial and energy management. 
(T8, Annual Report 2013). 
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However, in addition to the recognition of hurdles, these reports also explained 
the strategic decisions taken by the management to overcome the problems 
identified. Non-connected firms explained the strengths and weaknesses of the 
company and also elaborated how management is working to convert the 
company's weaknesses into strengths, ultimately leading to profitable 
operations. 
In spite of the difficulties being faced we are determined to grow. 
We are looking for ways to convert weaknesses and threats into 
strengths and opportunities ... this value can be increased only 
through marked improvement in quality, market tie-ups, image 
building and change in business philosophy. 
(S6, Annual Report 2009) 
The company will be able to achieve satisfactory levels of 
profitability in the future based on plan drawn up by the 
management for this· purpose and bringing its liabilities to 
serviceable levels and availability of the adequate working capital 
from its lenders and sponsors. 
(T9, Annual Report 2013) 
These examples show that the non-connected firms have a strong commitment 
towards the growth and profitability of the company. Most of the annual 
reports of the non-connected firms also provided a statement of value addition. 
The emphasis placed on better profitability and the information on strategies 
for achieving better returns reflects how the directors of these firms render 
themselves accountable to shareholders in this regard. 
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Strong evidence of silence was found in the annual reports of politically 
connected firms, when compared to non-connected firms, regarding 
assumption of responsibility on shareholder value creation. The analysis of 
data in annual reports of the politically connected firms revealed that politically 
connected firms stated that the aim of these firms is to provide 'competitive 
return' to the shareholders (Tl, Annual Report 2013) and to 'benefit the 
customers, employees and shareholders' (T3, Annual Report 2013). These 
annual reports also referred to their 'endeavour to enhance the value of 
shareholders' (Sl, Annual Report 2010) and to maintain the 'tradition of high 
yield and handsome returns to shareholders' (S3, Annual Report 2013). 
However, these accounts appeared as a part of the standard vision and mission 
statements in most of these reports; which remained unchanged during the 
period of analysis. There was a lack of detailed and obvious disclosure beyond 
these standard statements. 
Among all the politically connected firms, the annual report of only one firm -
that is T5 - explicitly communicated the responsibility of management towards 
shareholder value creation. Going a step further the annual report of T5 
expressed the willingness and commitment of the management to make an 
effort for to achieve better financial results. 
Our mission is to be a dynamic, profitable and growth oriented 
company by providing good return on investment to its 
shareholders and investors 
(T5, Annual Report 2013) 
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Standing out as an exception among the annual reports of politically connected 
firms, the annual report of T5 not only assumed the responsibility for good 
returns on investment but also expressed the concerns of management and the 
steps taken to attract customers and maximise the utilisation of organisational 
resources that might lead to the attainment of better financial results. 
The management is making stern efforts to attract more customers 
for optimal utilisation of available facilities to make further 
improvements in financial results. 
(T5, Annual Report 2011) 
All other politically connected firms remained silent regarding the board 
strategy for enhancement in shareholder value, the challenges faced by 
management for improving shareholder profitability, and, expression of an 
intention to grow despite difficulties through effective future strategy. Thus 
these annual reports provided limited and standard disclosure and covered 
minimal range of information related to board accountability in regard to 
shareholder value creation. 
The second element in the construct of accountability is responsibility towards 
strategic decision making. The in-depth analysis revealed that all the non-
connected firms disclosed information on strategic decision-making of the 
firms during all the years from 2009 to 2013. Most of these reports outlined 
company strategy under a separate head; for example, future strategy and 
prospects (T9, Annual Report 2009), our strategy (T7, Annual Report 2011), 
strategic objectives (S6, Annual report 2013), planning and coordination (TlO, 
Annual Report 2013) and Statement of Strategic Goals (SS20, Annual Report 
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2009). The provision of firms' strategic objectives under a separate heading in 
the annual reports of these firms highlights the importance placed by the board 
on this aspect of disclosure. 
Furthermore, the annual reports of non-connected firms also allocated separate 
sections to information about various committees of the board along with the 
provision of the CEO and the Chairman's message. SSl2 contained both 
CEO's massage and Chairman's message outlining the company's strategic 
objectives and direction in detail, in all the annual reports from 2009 to 2013. 
SS20 provided Chairman's message and also provided details regarding the 
names and composition, the number of meetings and the role and 
responsibilities of various board committees under a separate section entitled 
Information on Board Committees for all of the five years. SS 11 also contained 
CEO message in all of its annual reports, while SS16 contained CEO's 
message under the head Chief Executive's Review. Among politically 
connected firms, only one firm provided Chief Executive's Review, while 
another has provided information about its Management Committee. All the 
other firms remained silent. 
All the reports of the non-connected firms outlined a generic company strategy 
and provided strategic outlines, followed by the techniques used by the 
management for the achievement of corporate objectives. In addition to these 
generic strategy statements, non-connected firms presented their future plans 
with regard to the actual happenings and events taking place in the firm's outer 
environment, so outlining the company's strategy to overcome the challenges 
and achieve the desired outcomes. For example, the 2009 annual report ofTlO, 
a non-connected textile sector firm provided information on the strategic 
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decisions regarding cash flow and reputation management. The report also 
stated that all the strategic decisions and subsequent actions were taken after 
making an allowance for a challenging industry environment. 
The challenging business climate has provided an opportunity to 
pursue a business transformation and streamline our journey to 
position your company strongly for the future ... on the business 
front, your company has experienced marked improvements on 
overall cash flow with tighter cost control and better credit 
management. In overall stakeholder and reputation management, 
we managed to advocate our views on all issues confronting the 
industry, ensuring that we are all abreast with industry change and 
are able to meet the challenges. 
In another example, the 2012 annual report of S7, a non-connected firm from 
the sugar sector provided information on the strategic decision of the company 
to raise funds for expansion of its operations in the following manner: 
The Company is actively engaged in conSidering to broaden its 
operations. For its future plans, the management is weighing 
various options to raise finances. These options include enhancing 
its paid up share capital, which currently is inadequate as 
compared to other comparable entities. Decision in this regard 
shall be taken after complete deliberation from all major 
stakeholders. 
Similarly, under the heading of 'future strategy and threats', the 2010 annual 
report of T9, a textile sector firm also elaborated the challenges faced by the 
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company in the external climate of the company and then outlined the strategic 
steps taken by the directors to deal with those challenges. 
Our long overdue gas connection application is now under serious 
consideration by SNGPV8 and we are hopeful of a positive outcome 
shortly. Once we have the formal approval, the directors are 
committed to invest in a cogeneration power plant, which while 
providing cheaper and continuous power will also generate steam, 
thus resulting in huge saving offurnace oil cost. In addition to the 
Rs. 40 Million interest free loan from the Directors, the directors 
also intend to convert a portion of other interest bearing sponsors' 
loans into equity. Therefore, it has been decided to further enhance 
the authorized share capital by Rs 60 million from Rs 160 million 
to Rs 220 million. 
Annual report 2012 of SS 16, a food sector firm, provided information about the 
formation of its Business Strategy and Planning Committee along with an 
elaboration of that committee's objectives and responsibilities. Some of the 
non-connected firms (for example, SSI7, Annual Report 2012) stated that the 
formulation of company's strategy was the responsibility of the Management 
Committee. 
In addition to outlining the future strategy of the company, these companies 
also provided reference to their previous strategic decisions, how they have 
implemented them and how successful those strategic decisions have proved. 
For example, the annual report ofT7 for 2013, a textile sector company stated 
28 Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited 
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The Company's strategy, which was unchanged from last year, was 
to maintain optimal capital structure in order to minimize cost of 
capital. 
The annual reports of politically connected firms stayed silent on all these 
details. This tendency also highlights that the non-connected firms provide 
detailed, in-depth information regarding management's responsibility for 
strategy formulation, implementation and results. 
The analysis of disclosure of information on accountability regarding strategic 
decision making in politically connected firms' annual reports demonstrated an 
absence of information in the various dimensions and areas covered, when 
compared to the non-connected firms. Only two of the politically connected 
firms provided information on their strategic goals and decision making, while 
this information was absent in the annual reports of all other politically 
connected firms'. Both of these firms provided this information in the form of a 
standard statement that remained unchanged during the years considered. For 
example, one of these firms - that is, T5 - provided a statement regarding its 
management's marketing strategy. 
The management adopted aggressive marketing strategies to boost 
exports in most competitive international markets. 
(T5, Annual Report 2011) 
T5 continued to disclose the same information on its strategic decisions for all 
the subsequent years. In 2012, one more connected firm - namely T2 - also 
started disclosing information on its strategic decisions. 
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Your Company's management has maintained its focus on 
Research and Development activities. Various projects are 
underway to increase efficiencies through machinery up-grading 
and replacements. Efforts are also made to broaden the customer 
base by emphasizing market development as well as product 
development 
(T2, Annual Report 2012) 
As it was observed in the content analysis (Section 5.3), there was a positive 
trend in the level of voluntary disclosure across the years from 2009 to 2013. 
The analysis of silence in the annual reports supports the findings of the 
content analysis. The level of disclosure in politically connected firms 
gradually increased over time. In 2013, seven out often connected firms started 
to recognise the board's responsibility towards strategic policy making. 
Prompt and timely decision in right direction is the core objective 
of every management, particularly in an industry where the input 
costs are more volatile and subject to frequent change. 
(T3, Annual Report, 2013) 
The analysis of silence revealed that politically connected firms did not provide 
any information about company's strategic objectives, as opposed to non-
connected firms which had provided detailed information under separate heads. 
Furthermore, politically connected firms stayed silent on the past, present and 
future strategy of the company's management for handling challenges and 
difficulties. Furthermore, politically connected firms did not discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of the companies in the context of firm's 
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environment. Lack of information on these aspects, when compared to non-
connected firms highlights that these companies use silence as a tool for 
limiting corporate governance disclosure. 
The third element in the construct of accountability is responsibility towards 
compliance. All the firms provided an explicit declaration that they assume the 
responsibility for complying with all the laws and regulations of the country, 
with a specific emphasis on corporate governance regulations. There were no 
observable differences in the narratives of the annual reports across politically 
connected and non-connected firms. It might also be linked back to the 
findings from content analysis, whereby the level of mandatory disclosure was 
adequate in both politically connected and non-connected firms. Thus 
politically connected as well as non-connected firms comply with corporate 
governance and also assume responsibility regarding compliance in annual 
report narratives. 
Provision of information and disclosure was the fourth element in the construct 
of accountability. Among non-connected firms, 17 of the firms disclosed 
information on the disclosure policy of the company over all five years. Non-
connected firms not only stated that they aim to disseminate all material 
information in a timely fashion, but that they also moved a step ahead, 
highlighting that the information provided should be transparent, reliable and 
timely. 
The Company acknowledges the trust and confidence that our 
investors and bankers repose in us. The Company maintains good 
relationship with investors and communicates with them through 
meetings. It disseminates information in timely manner. 
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(T6, Annual Report 2013) 
The management of your company believes in good corporate 
governance, implemented through a well-defined and efficiently 
applied system of check and balance and the provision of 
transparent, accurate and timely information. 
(SSI9, Annual Report 2011) 
Of the politically connected firms, five of the firms provided information 
about their approach towards disclosure over all five years, while two 
politically connected firms started providing information about their 
approach towards disclosure in the annual reports from 2012 onwards. For 
example, the annual report 2013 of S3 stated 
The Board aims to ensure that the Company's shareholders are 
timely informed about the major developments affecting the 
Company's state of affairs. To achieve this objective, information is 
communicated to the shareholders through quarterly, half-yearly 
and annual reports, now being promptly placed on Company's 
website. 
It might therefore be inferred that only a limited number of politically 
connected firms assumed responsibility for the provision of information and 
disclosure, while the rest remained silent. Furthermore, these firms remained 
silent on such issues as the materiality, timeliness and transparency of the 
disclosure provided. Even in the annual reports of those politically connected 
firms that showed a commitment towards disclosure, the provision of 
information was noticeably less compared to non-connected firms. 
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The analysis of silence highlights that the non-connected firms provide a 
detailed account of all the aspects relating to accountability. These firms not 
only provide information on the various aspects of accountability, but they also 
move beyond the provision of traditional statements and provide actual 
examples of the strategic decisions, value addition and profitability. They also 
provide references to firms' policies and practices during the past and outline 
the company's future plans. Moreover, with regard to disclosure, they not only 
take the responsibility of disclosure of information, but also recognise 
reliability and transparency to be important features of the disseminated 
information. While politically connected firms also provide information on 
these aspects, they stay silent regarding their commitment for value addition to 
the shareholders, their actual strategic plans, and timeliness and integrity of the 
information provided by the firm. 
These findings support the results obtained from content analysis (explained in 
Section 5.1.3), which revealed that the level of disclosure on the construct of 
accountability in politically connected firms was considerably lower than non-
connected firms. The content analysis showed that the level of disclosure on 
the construct of accountability in the sugar and textile sectors was 63%, while 
the level of disclosure in non-connected firms was 88%. On the other hand, the 
level of disclosure in politically connected firms in the several sectors group 
was 57% in politically connected and 87% in non-connected firms. 
Independence 
The construct of independence contains items relating to the separate role of 
CEO and chairman, number of independent directors, the independence of the 
audit committee and the independence of HR and remuneration committee. 
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The annual reports of almost all of the politically connected firms provided 
information on the separation of the CEO and the chairman over all five years. 
These reports were, however, silent on the disclosure regarding the number of 
independent directors from the years 2009 to 2011. An incidence of empty 
speech was observed in these reports as most of these reports narrated: 
The Company encourages representation of independent non-executive 
directors representing minority interest on its board of directors. 
(T5, Annual Report 2011) 
However, no information was provided in these reports about the actual 
number of independent directors on the board. Another interesting observation 
in this regard was the confusion in the use of the words 'independent' and 
'non-executive', with these words being used interchangeably. Subsequent to 
the expression of their commitment towards representation of independent 
directors, politically connected firms actually provided information on the 
number of non-executive directors, instead of independent directors. 
The company encourages representation of independent non-
executive directors. At present, the Board includes four non-
executive directors. 
(T 4, Annual Report 2011) 
With regard to the independence of audit committee, the politically connected 
firms stayed silent until 2013 while, with regard to the independence of the HR 
and remuneration committee, information was provided by most of the 
connected firms in 2012 and 2013. 
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In contrast to the politically connected firms, most non-connected firms 
disclosed the status of separation in the role of CEO and chairman during all 
the years under consideration. The number of independent directors was also 
disclosed by most of the firms from 2009 to 2012, while in 2013 all non-
connected firms disclosed this information. Moreover, these firms also 
explicitly stated the criteria used for determining the independence of the 
directors: 
The independent directors meet the criteria of independence under 
clause i (b) of the CCG 
(T6, Annual Report 2013) 
The information regarding the independence of audit committee was also 
provided by most of the non-connected firms during 2009. These firms 
disclosed this information in 2012 and 2013. Information regarding the 
independence of HR and Remuneration committee was provided by one of the 
firms before 2011. However, from 2011 onwards, all the non-connected firms 
provided this information. The overall depth and detail of disclosure in the 
reports of non-connected firms was much better than connected firms. These 
results support the findings of content analysis in Section 5.1.3 where the level 
of disclosure on the construct of independence in the annual reports of 
politically connected firms was considerably less than for non-connected firms. 
The level of voluntary disclosure in the construct of independence in the sugar 
and textile sectors was 32% for politically connected firms and 46% for non-
connected firms respectively. On the other hand, the level of disclosure in 
several sectors group was 61 % for politically connected firm and 70% for non-
connected firms. 
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Roles Responsibility and Inter-relationships 
The annual reports of non-connected firms provided information on all the 
items in this construct. However, the detail and depth of disclosure was better 
for some of these items, when compared to politically connected firms. For 
example, the annual reports of all the non-connected firms disclosed 
information on the duties of the board. Some of these reports stated that the 
directors were well aware of their duties. 
The directors of the Board are well aware of their duties and 
responsibilities as outlined by corporate laws and listing 
regulations. 
(T6, Annual Report 2013) 
However, some of the non-connected firms also stated the expectations 
regarding the role that the board members were expected to perform in the 
company. For example, the 2010 annual report for T7 provided the following 
list of responsibilities towards various stakeholders. 
Shareholders: Protection of shareholders' investment, and 
providing acceptable return on investment. 
Customers: Winning and retaining customers by developing and 
supplying products and services which offer value in terms of price, 
quality, safety and environmental impact, which are supported by 
the requisites technological, environmental and commercial 
expertise. 
Employees Respecting the rights and obligations for the employees: 
• Good and safe conditions at work 
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• Competitive terms and conditions of services 
• Development and best use of human resource 
• Equal opportunity employment regardless of cast, creed, 
colour or sex 
Business associates: Seeking mutually beneficial relationships with 
customers and suppliers 
Society: Conducting business as a responsible corporate citizen. 
State: Complying with all requirements of laws and regulations. 
The annual report of T8, a textile sector non-connected company also outlined 
what practices were expected of the members of the boards. 
All Directors and employees are expected to practice the following 
core values: 
Honesty: Honesty in dealings with persons within the organisation 
and outside 
Integrity: Conduct of affairs in an upright manner at all times 
including avoidance of any type of conflict of interest. 
Loyalty: Demonstrate loyalty towards the Company, the customers 
and all stakeholders. 
Non-connected firms also provided detailed information about various 
committees of the board and elaborated the roles and responsibilities of each of 
those committees. In a similar fashion, all the non-connected firms also 
provided information about buying/selling or other transactions in company 
shares. These firms provided detailed information on the opening balance, the 
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shares purchased/sold and the closing balance for all the directors, CEO and 
their spouses/minor children. Disclosure of the rest of the items within this 
construct was similar to that of politically connected firms. 
The analysis of silence revealed that all the politically connected firms 
provided information on the number of directors, board meetings, attendance 
details, boards' approval for company's risk management policies and 
responsibility towards internal controls. However, on disclosure regarding the 
duties of the board, a complete silence was observed in the annual reports of 
politically connected firms. The annual reports of politically connected firms 
stayed silent regarding expectations from the members of the board. Only six 
of the firms disclosed information on their directors' transactions in 
buying/selling in company shares, while only one politically connected firm 
provided information about the opening and closing balance of shares held by 
the directors. 
It might be inferred from these examples that, while non-connected firms 
provided detailed information on all the above governance items, the politically 
connected firms either stayed silent or provided superficial information, which 
indicates an incidence of empty speech. 
Profile 
In alignment with the results of content analysis above, the overall level of 
voluntary disclosure on the construct of profile was also very poor and there 
was not much difference in the level of disclosure between politically 
connected and non-connected firms for this construct. However, the analysis of 
silence revealed that the difference in the percentage of score obtained on this 
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construct mainly arose due to the provision of detailed information on this 
construct in eight of the non-connected firms' annual reports in 2013. 
The annual reports ofT6, T7, SlO, S9, SSI6, SSI7, SS19 and SS20 provided 
detailed information about the qualifications and experience of the directors. 
The annual report of T7, SS16, SS17, SS19 and SS20 provided coloured 
pictures of the board members, their age, experience and the names of other 
firms in which they held directorships. Similarly, the annual report of T6 SS 16, 
SS 17, SS 19 and SS20 provided detailed information about the profile of the 
board members, including their qualifications, experience and directorships 
held in other companies. The annual report of S 10 and SS20 also provided 
brief biographies of the directors. All of the politically connected firms remain 
completely silent on these matters. 
ExecutiveIDirector Remuneration 
The analysis of silence revealed that the remuneration package in the annual 
reports of non-connected firms, provided greater details of various incentives 
provided to the executives and directors. For example, these firms supplied 
information on the company's provident fund contribution, leave encashment, 
the sum paid in lieu of CEO's residential and telephone expenses, the fees paid 
to directors for attending audit committee meetings, the companies' health and 
insurance plan for directors and their dependents. 
Amongst the politically connected firms, the annual reports of four firms 
stayed completely silent about CEO remuneration until 2013. The remainder of 
the firms also provided limited information about director/executive 
remuneration. These firms provided information on their remuneration package 
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under sub-headings such as, managerial remuneration, utilities, house rent 
allowance, other allowances and conveyance. However, a complete silence was 
observed regarding such information as provident fund contribution, residential 
expenses, phone expenses, and health and insurance plans. 
It might be inferred from the analysis of silence that politically connected firms 
stayed silent in regard to the majority of voluntary disclosure items. The 
information provided was superficial, inadequate, covered a limited range of 
issues and lacked depth. Furthermore, these companies have not provided any 
information regarding management's actual corporate governance practices in 
relation to the companies' environment or past, present or future 
circumstances. Moreover, most of the information was added as a part of 
standard statements that remained unchanged in the annual reports during all 
the years under consideration. These findings support the results obtained from 
qualitative content analysis, whereby the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of politically connected firms was observed to be considerably 
low in comparison to non-connected firms. 
These findings are consistent with the findings of various cross-country studies 
which argue that politically connected firms do not disclose good quality 
corporate information (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Bushman et aI., 2004; Chaney et 
aI., 2011). These findings also support the initial theoretical propositions, 
whereby it was proposed that politically connected members of the board are 
self-interested and opportunist, maximising their political interest at the cost of 
minority shareholders rights. In order to hide their political rent seeking, these 
politically connected members of the board might then restrain the flow of 
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corporate governance information in annual reports, resulting In limited 
disclosure about corporate governance practices of the firm. 
5.2.2 Mandatory Disclosures 
The analysis of silence on mandatory disclosure items did not provide good 
insight into the phenomena under study. The reason for it not being very 
meaningful was because, as it might be expected, companies followed the 
standard format for the statement of compliance with corporate governance 
regulations as issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. 
Most of the firms included the same format as a part of their annual report. 
There was hence no variation in the language, amount, depth, style or structure 
of the information. 
However, an interesting observation in this regard was that, for the items where 
mandatory information was not disclosed, the companies became 'silent' and 
omitted the information from the standard format of the statement. Neither 
compliance nor non-compliance with the regulation was thus stated. For 
example, most of the annual reports before 2013 stated that they encourage the 
representation of independent directors on the board. However, they did not 
disclose the number or names of independent directors. 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined corporate governance disclosure practices of 
politically connected and non-connected listed companies from various 
industries in Pakistan. The findings of the analysis of disclosure in annual 
reports support the initially developed research propositions, whereby, owing 
to the presence of agency conflict, the level of voluntary information was 
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found to be poor in all the firms. However, corporate governance regulations 
have worked towards reduction of this conflict and firms have disclosed a 
better level of mandatory corporate governance information in the annual 
reports. 
The research findings also support the initially developed research proposition 
regarding the influence of political connectedness. It was anticipated that 
politically connected members of the board might have utility maximising 
preferences and, to satisfy their self-interest, they opt for such actions that are 
not favourable for (minority) shareholders. In order to hide their politically 
motivated, rent-seeking activities, they might thus constrain dissemination of 
information to shareholders, leading towards a poor quality of corporate 
governance disclosure. The results of the content analysis have shown that the 
level of mandatory (Section 5.1.2) as well as voluntary (Section 5.1.3) 
disclosure in the annual reports of politically connected firms is poor in 
comparison with non-connected firms. 
It was also found that the level of disclosure vanes on various corporate 
governance constructs. For example, the level of disclosure in regard to the 
construct of accountability was higher, while the level of disclosure on the 
constructs of profile was lower in all the industries and among politically as 
well as non-connected firms. The findings from the analysis of silence (Section 
5.2.1) support the findings of the content analysis; that is, the amount, and 
depth of voluntary disclosure by non-connected firms was much better, and 
they provided more in-depth and detailed disclosure compared to connected 
firms. 
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The analysis of annual report data also revealed that there was no difference in 
the disclosure practices of the companies across industries, being that there was 
a similarity in the level as well as the trend of disclosure on various corporate 
governance constructs in both industries. The findings from the content 
analysis and the analysis of silence were further triangulated with the findings 
from the interview data analysis. The interviews were conducted with key 
personnel from the listed companies, regulators and audit firms in Pakistan. 
The results of interview data are provided in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Interpreting Interview Data 
6.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis outlined the institutional background in which the 
research was carried out. Chapter 3 provided an account of the prior literature 
and explained the theoretical foundations of this research. Chapter 4 outlined 
the research methodology along with an explanation regarding the choice of 
the research methods. Chapter 5 outlined the results obtained from the content 
analysis of the annual reports along with an in-depth analysis of silence on 
corporate governance practices in the annual report narratives of the listed 
companies. 
As explained earlier in Chapter 4, for the purpose of gaining a deeper insight 
into the corporate governance disclosure practices of the listed companies, 
semi-structured interviews were also conducted during the process of research 
data collection. Template analysis was carried out for the purpose of 
interpreting interview data. This chapter outlines the analysis and findings from 
the interview data. The results obtained from the analysis of interview data 
have enabled triangulation and thus strengthened confidence in regard to the 
findings of this research. 
Figure 6.1 below shows how Chapter 6 is positioned in the thesis. 
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Figure 6.1: Chapter 6 - Positioning in the Thesis 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 will explain the corporate 
governance disclosure practices of companies in Pakistan. Section 6.2 explains 
the disclosure practices of politically connected firms, while Section 6.3 offers 
some conclusions. 
The following section will address the first sub question of the research; that is, 
'How do listed companies in Pakistan disclose corporate governance related 
information in annual reports?' 
6.1 How do Companies in Pakistan Disclose Information in Annual Reports? 
This research has investigated how corporate annual reports are prepared in the 
actual settings of the listed companies in Pakistan. Interviews were started by 
asking participants to describe the process of preparation of annual reports in 
listed companies and who were the preparers of the annual report. There was a 
high level of agreement among respondents from the listed companies, as they 
all stated that annual reports are prepared by the accounts and finance 
department of the companies. Table 6.1 summarises the evidence regarding the 
preparers the corporate annual reports. 
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Table 6.1: Preparers of Annual Reports 
Nature of 
the Firm Examples Prepared by: 
Organisation 
Textile - A (Company secretary) 'Annual reports are obviously prepared by accountants. ' Accounts Department 
PoJiticaJJy 
Textile B - (Company secretary) 'One is the CEO. And the other one is CFo. ' CEO and CFO Connected , 
Companies 
Sugar - J (Chief Financial Officer) 'CFO does this as it is afinancial report. ' CFO 
Accounts and Finance 
Textile C - (GM Finance) 'That is generally prepared by the accounts department. ' Department 
Non- 'Annual reports are always prepared by Accounts 
connected Textile - D (Deputy Financial Accounts Department 
Listed Controller) Department, and auditors verify all information. ' 
Companies 
'The one who owns the financial statements, the financial 
Sugar - I (Chief Financial Officer) Finance Department department '. 
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Table 6.1: Preparers of Annual Reports 
Nature of 
the Firm Examples Prepared by: 
Or2anisation 
'The CFO of the company normally submits financial 
CFOandCEO Statutory Audit Firm - L (Partner) 
statements first to CEO and then to board of directors. ' 
'All the core information will be coming from the accounts Accounts and Finance 
Statutory Statutory Audit Firm - N (Partner) 
and finance department. ' Department Audit Firms 
For all practical purposes, in Pakistan around 99% accounts 
Statutory Audit Firm - 0 (Partner) Statutory Audit Firms 
are being prepared by the chartered accountant firms. ' 
'Actually these are prepared by finance department or 
accounts department, well this is theoretically but practically 
Regulator - S Statutory Audit Firms Regulator 
chartered accountants (external auditors) prepare all 
accounts. ' 
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6.1.1 Preparation of Annual Reports - The Process 
This information provided by the interview participants (Table 6.1) suggests 
that the accounting and finance department is mainly responsible for the 
preparation of annual reports. It is the ultimate responsibility of the Chief 
Financial Officer to prepare annual accounts, compile them in the form of a 
report and present them to the board of directors. These findings support the 
previous literature. For example, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) showed that annual 
reports are prepared by the chief accounting officer of the company. 
The response from respondents Sand 0 was, however, unexpected. Although 
respondent S was working in a key position in a regulatory department, the 
respondent explained that the statutory audit firms prepare annual reports for 
listed companies. Participation of statutory auditors in the preparation of 
annual accounts is a violation of International Financial Reporting Standards 
and raises questions about the independence of external audit function. 
6.1.2 Role of Directors in Preparation of Annual Reports 
As stated earlier, the Companies Ordinance (1984) makes the directors 
responsible for the preparation of annual reports. According to the theoretical 
underpinnings of agency theory, the board performs the function of controlling 
and monitoring management's activities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It is argued 
in the prior literature that the board oversees the preparation of corporate 
annual reports (Matoussi and Chakroun, 2008). Many researchers have also 
studied the impact of board characteristics such as board duality, proportion of 
independent directors and board size on disclosure through quantitative 
analysis (Bujaki and McConomy, 2002; Andersson and Daoud, 2005; Ben-
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Amar and Boujenoui, 2006; Hossain, 2008; Samaha et aI., 2012; AI-Najjar and 
Ding, 2014), and found contradictory results. 
However, the prior literature remains silent on the real life process of 
preparation of the annual reports in listed companies and the role of the board 
of directors in this regard. This research has investigated these matters to gain 
deep insights into the conduct and role of the board of directors in the context 
of Pakistani companies. Table 6.2 summarises the responses regarding the 
influence of the board of directors on the preparation of corporate annual 
reports. 
I 
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Table 6.2: Preparation of Annual Reports - Role of the Board 
Nature of 
Nature of the 
Firm Examples Directors 
Organisation 
Involvement 
Textile - A (Company 'Reports are prepared by CFOs, but they show them to 
Monitoring 
secretary) directors. ' 
Politically Sugar H - (Company 
'During the preparation of annual report, we keep consulting Active guidance 
Connected secretary) with the working directors ... and keep getting their feedback. ' and monitoring 
Companies 
The CEO ... reads the entire report. Not all the directors. The 
Sugar - J (Chief Financial 
concerned director which is our CEO ... he gives us guidelines Active guidance 
Officer) and monitoring 
that how we could, improve the information. ' 
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Table 6.2: Preparation of Annual Reports - Role ofthe Board 
Nature of 
Nature of the 
Firm Examples Directors 
Organisation 
Involvement 
'Board of directors read it word by word. Then they suggest Active guidance 
Textile C - (GM29 Finance) 
corrections too. ' and monitoring 
Non-
connected Textile - E (CEO and 'Before he (the auditor) finalises the report he comes to me for Active guidance 
Listed Chairman) clarifications. ' and monitoring 
Companies 
'The things (in annual reports) are being decided by the Active guidance 
Textile F - (CFO) 
management, management means board of directors. ' and monitoring 
Statutory Audit Firm - L 'The ultimate decision ... that how information is to be used and Active guidance 
Statutory (Partner) reflected will be decided by the board of directors. ' and monitoring 
Audit Firms 
Statutory Audit Firm - N 'If there is something in the report that they (the board) don't Monitoring 
----- ----
---_._ .. _-
--- - -
29 General Manager 
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Table 6.2: Preparation of Annual Reports - Role ofthe Board 
Nature of I 
Nature of the 
Firm Examples Directors 
Organisation 
Involvement 
(Partner) think right, they will not allow it, delete it. ' 
Statutory Audit Firm - 0 There are 2-3 active directors who study and finalize these 
Monitoring 
(Partner) accounts. ' 
Regulator S - Regulator 'Basically this is the responsibility of directors. ' Monitoring 
- ------ -
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The examples in Table 6.2 show that directors have a profound impact on the 
preparation of annual reports in all the listed companies, irrespective of the 
status of their political connectedness. In most of the companies, the board 
members take an active part in guiding the accounting and finance department 
about the preparation of annual reports. Once the accounting and finance 
department prepares a first draft of the report, the members of the board read it 
and suggest changes/improvements. 
Respondent H, a company secretary, explained that he collects all financial 
data from the accounting and finance department one month before the due 
date for submission of the report. He then prepares the draft of the report and 
submits it to the directors seven days before the board meeting. The members 
of the board raise questions and provide suggestions on the submitted draft 
during this board meeting. Therefore, it can be implied from this evidence that, 
in alignment with the agency theory perspective, the directors are performing 
an active monitoring role in the preparation of annual reports in the context of 
Pakistan. 
Lau (2010) argues that in family controIled listed companies, decision making 
and management roles are held by the same individuals; that is, the controlling 
family members. The responses of some of the participants support this view 
being that the company secretaries and the CFOs explained that the board 
provides them with strategic guidelines on operations, financial matters and 
preparation of annual reports and closely monitors the everyday affairs of these 
companies. For example, Respondent H, a company secretary stated: 
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'During the preparation of the annual report, we keep consulting 
with the working directors; we share information with them from 
time to time and keep getting their feedback. ' 
Therefore, the annual reports are prepared under the strong influence and 
advice of the board of directors. The management of the companies is given 
strict guidelines regarding preparation of annual reports from the directors. The 
directors not only read the annual report before presenting it in the annual 
general meeting, but they also advise amendments and improvements in the 
draft report. These findings also support the view that family owned companies 
are typically managed by the family members themselves. Therefore, the gap 
between owners and managers is minimal (Javid and Iqbal, 2010). 
6.1.3 What to Disclose in Annual Reports? - Financial Information 
One of the key aims of the implementation of corporate governance regulations 
in Pakistan has been to boost investor confidence through an improved flow of 
financial as well as non-financial information (The World Bank, 2005). The 
existing literature emphasises the importance of narratives in annual reports 
and generally argues that narrative sections in the annual reports are to be used 
as a device for presenting a controlled impression regarding company affairs. 
Thus, corporate narratives are not merely expressions of accounting 
performance; rather they are drafted carefully for meeting firms' strategic 
objectives (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012). 
This research, however, found otherwise. During the process of analysis, it was 
observed that most of the respondents stated that annual reports comprised of 
financial/production data. The respondents considered that annual reports 
consisted of financial statements and were prepared to inform the readers about 
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the financial affairs of the company, while they totally ignored the disclosure 
on corporate governance and other non-financial/strategic aspects. Table 6.3 
summarises the responses of various interviewees. 
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Table 6.3: Annual Reports are Financial Data 
Nature of the 
Firm Examples Annual reports are: 
Organisation 
'The pattern of the report is pre-determined in the law ... the 
Textile B - (Company 
balance sheet, the profit and loss, cash flows. Statement of Financial statements 
secretary) 
changes in equities, notes. ' 
Politically 'In the annual report we can see results of a complete full 
Connected Sugar - H (Company year, all production data, sales data, complete yearly expenses Companies Financial data I 
secretary) even which were planned but not yet done, so this report states 
the actual (financial) position of the company. ' 
Sugar - J (CFO) 'It is a financial report. ' Financial report 
'In the annual report there are various segments; one segment Financial data + 
Non-connected Textile C - (GM 
Listed contains financial information ... and the other segment that corporate governance 
Companies Finance) 
relates to certain requirements of the corporate governance.' disclosure 
--
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Table 6.3: Annual Reports are Financial Data 
Nature of the , 
Firm Examples Annual reports are: 
I Organisation I 
Textile - I (Chief 
'Annual reports are actually annual accounts. ' Financial statements 
Financial Officer) 
Textile - E (CEO and 'It is between the finance and the external auditor to finalise 
Financial statements 
Chairman) the balance sheet. ' 
There are six elements of financial statements balance sheet, 
Statutory Audit L- Partner profit & loss, cashjlow statement, statement of comprehensive Financial statements 
Firms 
income ... equity, notes to the accounts. ' 
'Chartered accountants prepare all accounts ... they prepare 
Regulatory S - Regulator Financial data 
Body annual reports. ' 
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Table 6.3 shows that all the respondents from politically connected as well as 
non-connected finns stated that the annual reports comprise of financial 
infonnation. No respondent, with the exception of respondent C considered 
that corporate governance and other non-financial infonnation are also 
included in the annual reports. Respondent C, the OM finance from a textile 
company, talked about the provision of non-financial infonnation in the annual 
reports. Respondent C talked in detail about various sections of the annual 
report, including non-financial infonnation related to corporate governance. 
However, he later explained that his company had recently launched an 
investment project in a foreign country and the company was following 
international best practices. Several respondents also stated that, in Pakistan, 
multinational finns are providing good, voluntary disclosure in their annual 
reports. 
There are ... some people who only fulfil the minimum requirement and 
there are some people who ... are ... multinational...who have foreign 
investments, who have to develop international relations or have to 
attract response from market ... they are providing a lot of information. 
(I, Chief Financial Officer, Sugar Sector Firm) 
Another participant said: 
If the company is a multinational company and it is a listed 
company on the stock exchange of Pakistan. In addition to the local 
requirements, they will make sure that the reporting is in line with 
their holding company's requirement, sitting back in any country, 
any part of the world. 
(B, Company Secretary, Textile Sector Company) 
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The evidence above highlights that while preparing annual reports, the 
companies in Pakistan pay considerably less attention to non-financial 
disclosures such as corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, 
company history and environmental disclosures. These findings do not support 
the existing literature on the value of narrative disclosures, whereby it is argued 
that companies use narrative sections in the annual reports for various 
purposes, such as impression management and the provision of addition useful 
information to the users (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007; Cho et aI., 2010). 
The results of this research indicate that there is a difference between the 
disclosure practices of domestic and multiple listed/multinational companies, 
whereby multiple listed companies will disclose more non-financial 
information. These findings are not surprising as the companies listed on stock 
exchanges are required to follow the regulation of the respective country and 
the results are in alignment with the existing literature (Collett and Hrasky, 
2005; Andersson and Daoud, 2005) 
It might be inferred from the above analysis that most of the participants 
considered that annual reports only constitute financial statements and 
corporate governance disclosures were totally omitted from their responses. 
Based on these findings, the researcher could have expected that the disclosure 
of corporate governance matters in the annual reports might be poor. However, 
the content analysis of the annual report data (Chapter 5) indicates that 
although the level of voluntary disclosure is poor in the annual reports, most of 
the firms disclose a high level of information regarding mandatory corporate 
governance requirements. Therefore, in order to explore the matter more 
deeply, a subsequent question was asked. The opinion of interview participants 
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was sought on how they would define 'good disclosure' in an annual report. 
The discussion of the response to this question is outlined in the following 
section. 
6.1.4 Good Disclosure Means Mandatory Disclosure 
The respondents were further questioned about corporate governance 
disclosure in annual reports. The respondents from politically connected finns 
explained that the minimum regulatory requirements relating to corporate 
governance disclosure are provided in the Code of Corporate Governance 
(2002) and complying with those requirements fulfils the infonnation needs of 
the users of the annual reports. However, the respondents from non-connected 
finns asserted that good disclosure includes the provision of mandatory as well 
as voluntary infonnation. Table 6.4 summarises quotes from some of the 
respondents from the listed companies in this regard. The third column of the 
table provides the evidence while the last column provides the researcher's 
interpretation of the evidence provided. 
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Table 6.4: Good Disclosure means Mandatory Disclosure 
Nature of the 
Firm Examples Good disclosure is: 
Firm 
Textile - H (Company 'Disclosures mentioned in an annual report should be to 
Mandatory 
Secretary) the point. You should not mention anything beyond that. ' 
'The pattern of the report is pre-determined in the law. 
Politically Textile B - (Company 
I There is a minimum requirement in the law and this must Mandatory 
Connected Secretary) 
be reported ' 
Companies 
'The good annual report can be explained as the report in 
Sugar J - (CFO) which information on all the mandatory requirements is Mandatory 
provided. ' 
'Good disclosure is ... it would be that annual report which 
Non-Connected Mandatory + 
Textile C - (OM - Finance) clearly discloses all aspect of information (voluntary and 
Companies Voluntary 
mandatory. ' 
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Table 6.4: Good Disclosure means Mandatory Disclosure 
Nature of the 
Firm 
Firm 
Sugar - D (Deputy 
Financial Controller) 
Textile - G (Director-
Finance) 
Examples 
'Good quality disclosure is very compact disclosure in the 
shape of points ... you should use small heading, small 
paragraphs and... you must specify a target. The more 
Good disclosure is: 
Mandatory 
+ 
Voluntary 
information you add on ... industry analysis that what is the + 
overall progress of the industry... most relevant Presentation and 
information for an investor ... that his investment is not in Layout of Annual 
loss. ' Report 
'There are certain requirements of corporate governance 
and disclosures but they go beyond that. ' 
Mandatory + 
Voluntary 
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As Table 6.4 indicates, there is a noticeable difference in the opinions of the 
respondents from politically connected and non-connected firms. The data 
suggest that politically connected firms consider that good disclosure involves 
the provision of mandatory information in the annual reports. However, 
representatives from non-connected firms stressed that good disclosure goes 
beyond the provision of mandatory information in annual reports. 
The reasons for this difference in the responses of politically connected and 
non-connected firms might be traced back to the earlier analysis carried out in 
Section 5.1.2. It was found in Section 5.1.2 that politically connected firms 
neither provided information regarding corporate governance training attended 
by the members of the boards nor did they explain the reasons for non-
compliance with this requirement. It might thus be inferred that as politically 
connected members of the board do not attend corporate governance training, 
they are unaware about the benefits of better disclosure and provision of 
corporate information. Therefore, they consider compliance with minimum 
mandatory requirements to be a benchmark for' good' disclosure. Furthermore, 
as explained in Section 6.2.4 below, politically connected members of the 
board make rational calculations about the benefits of disclosing information 
and do not consider voluntary disclosure to be a useful practice because it 
doesn't provide them any direct benefit. Rather, disclosure of additional 
information may become problematic being that it may draw the undesirable 
attention of regulatory and tax authorities. 
The results support the findings from the content analysis of the annual reports 
(Chapter 5), whereby a high level of mandatory disclosure was observed in the 
annual reports of all the companies. In contrast the level of voluntary 
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disclosure, although not good in all of the firms, was higher in non-connected 
when compared with politically connected firms. Mandatory disclosure, 
however, does not represent a deliberate flow of information from the listed 
companies. 
The prior literature argues that strict monitoring improves the level of 
compliance with the mandatory disclosure regulation in listed companies 
(Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). Therefore, the high level of mandatory 
disclosure in politically connected firms might not be an indicator of their 
inclination towards disclosure of that information. Instead, it might be the 
result of strict monitoring by regulatory bodies. The following section analyses 
participants' responses regarding the level of monitoring by regulatory bodies. 
6.1.5 Mandatory Disclosure - Monitoring and Compliance 
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) is the regulator 
of the corporate sector in Pakistan. The SECP prescribes reporting and 
disclosure regulations in the country. These regulations are built upon the 
recommendations of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP). 
The corporate governance regulations have been made a part of the listing 
regulations of all the stock exchanges in Pakistan. Stock exchanges in Pakistan 
have play the role of front line regulator (Karachi Stock Exchange, 2013). 
All of the participants insisted that companies in Pakistan comply with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. The respondents were of the view that 
regulatory bodies, particularly the SECP, strictly monitor the level of 
compliance with the mandatory disclosure requirements. 
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Furthermore, in order to ensure strict compliance with corporate governance 
disclosure regulations, the SECP requires that the directors of all the listed 
companies provide a statement of compliance with corporate governance as a 
part of their annual reports. In addition to this statement, the external auditors 
of the listed companies are also required to issue a review report on the 
statement of compliance with corporate governance. Thus listed companies 
operate in a strictly monitored environment regarding corporate governance 
disclosures. They are left with no choice but to disclose. There follow some of 
the responses from the participants. 
In Pakistan, we have a good regulatory environment ... we have a 
strict reporting requirement that is been monitored by Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and certain professional 
bodies (auditfirms). 
(C, OM Finance, Textile Sector Company) 
Mandatory disclosures are mandatory, if they don't give that then 
auditors qualify the report ... then auditors don't even give you the 
report and say that you are not complying. 
(D, Deputy Financial Controller, Textile Sector Company) 
These arguments support the findings of the existing literature whereby it is 
argued that strict enforcement by regulatory bodies results in better mandatory 
disclosure (Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). Therefore, the companies provide 
high mandatory disclosure in their annual reports. 
The findings from the interview data supported the results of the content 
analysis (Chapter 5), being that the level of mandatory disclosure in the annual 
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reports of the listed companies is significantly higher when compared with 
voluntary disclosure. Agency theory implies that firms increase disclosure to 
avoid potential pressures from regulatory authorities; therefore, these findings 
support an agency theory perspective. Corporate governance disclosure 
mechanisms have been introduced to minimise the information asymmetry 
between firm management and the shareholders (Healy and Palepu, 200 I). 
The research undertaken hence provides evidence that, in the absence of a 
monitoring mechanism (voluntary corporate governance disclosure), the 
management (agent) does not disclose information voluntarily to the 
shareholders (principal). In addition to agency theory, these findings also 
support the propositions drawn from rational choice institutionalism. It can be 
inferred that the management of the listed companies makes strategic 
calculations about the strict regulatory environment and they make the rational 
decision of providing 'good' mandatory disclosure. The discussion about the 
prevailing level of voluntary and mandatory information during the interviews 
gave evidence to indicate that the companies were disclosing information only 
to meet minimum regulatory requirements. The respondents were questioned 
about the reasons underlying this reluctance towards disclosure. They were 
further enquired about their unwillingness to disclose over and above the 
minimum benchmark. The following section discusses their responses. 
6.1.6 Drivers Underlying Reluctance to Corporate Governance Disclosure 
The International Finance Corporation conducted a survey on corporate 
governance practices in Pakistan in 2007. The findings of the survey indicate 
that business enterprises in Pakistan are reluctant to disclose information 
regarding corporate governance, ownership structures and operating results 
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(International Finance Corporation, 2007). The analysis of data in this research 
(Table 6.5) supports the findings of this survey. 
All of the interview participants expressed their unwillingness to disclose 
corporate information. They openly expressed the opinion that companies did 
not want to disclose more information and explained various reasons for this 
reluctance. They stated that they were complying with regulation as was legally 
required, but they were not keen to disclose information. Table 6.5 provides the 
summary of the respondents' replies. 
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Nature of the 
Firm 
Politically 
Connected 
Companies 
Firm 
Sugar - J (Chief 
Financial Officer) 
Table 6.5: Reluctance to Disclose 
Examples 
'There is a small hurdle in it ... and that is that some businessmen are not 
willing to provide information as they have some problems with other 
Reasons for 
Reluctance 
laws .. .In Pakistan the greatest fear of the businessman is from tax I Tax authorities 
authorities. It's not so in Pakistan only, it's the same all around the 
world ... there are so many heavy taxes.' 
Textile - A I 'These (disclosure) requirements are a little bit impractical, because these Cost of 
compliance (Company secretary) I are not cost effective. ' 
Sugar - H (Company 
Secretary) 
'This increases paper work .. for example, if ten employees were working 
previously, you have to add one more to complete the financial statements; 
this will increase your expenses. So this is little bit more costly. ' 
Cost of 
compliance 
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Table 6.5: Reluctance to Disclose 
Nature of the Reasons for 
Firm Examples 
Firm Reluctance 
Textile -K 'In reality if you check the data in FBR30 more than one thousand MNA31s 
(Manager Finance, and MP A32s do not disclose their income and wealth tax. They hide their 
Taxation 
Accounts and information. In personal capacity they are not showing the actual tax picture. 
Non-
Taxation) And if they are director of a company they will do the same. ' 
Connected 
Companies 'Look, if the company is not politically connected, companies do like 
Textile - G (Director I disclosing information. But in controlled ... as ... some of the unit that has Family 
Finance) I been 75% to 80% controlled by the families, and 2 % publically contro!' So Ownership 
they are not interested to properly disclose their information. ' 
30FBR stands for the Federal Board of Revenue. The Federal Board of Revenue is responsible for formation and enforcement of fiscal laws and collection of revenue for the government 
of Pakistan. 
31MNA stands for Member of National Assembly in Pakistan. 
32MP A stands for Member of Provincial Assembly in Pakistan. 
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Table 6.5: Reluctance to Disclose 
Nature of the Reasons for 
Firm Examples 
Firm Reluctance 
'1 have told you here the majority of the businesses are family owned and the 
Textile - F (Chief Family 
reports being made in respect of these regulations are just to meet the legal 
Financial Officer) Business 
requirement. ' 
I 
'Actual culture is the same ... that most of the businesses are family oriented 
Sugar- I 
businesses ... and due to thatfactor ... it is family oriented business so they ... 
(Chief 
people think that listing is of no use and when they think that it is a family 
Family 
owned business, then they don't want to disclose the information as well ... the 
Financial Ownership I 
only thing that makes difference ... if the companies are closely held, then they 
Officer) I 
I 
will definitely not provide additional information because they do not want to 
provide. ' 
---_._--
- -
I 
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Table 6.5: Reluctance to Disclose 
Nature of the Reasons for 
Firm Examples 
Firm Reluctance 
C0033 - Stock 
Regulator 
'The corporate community as a whole has not accepted ... it has been imposed Family 
Exchange upon them, they have to implement it ... they are resisting over it ... 
, 
ownership 
'People normally hes itate .... they think that if give I we 
Statutory 
I 
Audit Firm 
Q-Partner information ... something undesirable will happen ... tax authorities will start Tax authorities 
following us. ' 
--- -- .. -
-- --- -- - -- ---
33 Chief Operating Officer 
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The examples in Table 6.S clearly indicate that the companies are reluctant to 
disclose information. The respondent from the statutory audit firm also 
suggested that most companies disclose the bare minimum of information and 
hardly comply with mandatory requirements. However, it might also be 
observed that the reasons for this reluctance vary amongst the various groups 
of respondents. 
The respondents from the politically connected firms explained that 
information disclosure is avoided because it leads to difficulties in subsequent 
dealing with various government departments. Respondent J explained that 
disclosure of financial information is especially problematic, as tax authorities 
raise queries about the profitability position of the company. Non-financial 
disclosures are also avoided, being that the information can be cross-matched 
against other data and it becomes difficult for the management to defend any 
contradictions. The most unexpected response came from respondent J, a CFO 
in a politically connected firm who asserted: 
If you would pay the tax with 100% honesty, then you cannot do 
business. It's my personal view, that you cannot do business in that 
case. 
However, the following response was one of the most unexpected statements 
from one of the respondents from the politically connected firms: 
Companies do not declare the profit. First thing is if the company 
will show the profit then the company would have to declare 
dividend. Secondly, if the company will show the profit then it 
would have to pay the tax. 
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The respondents from non-connected firms argued that politically connected 
companies do not provide fair financial disclosures as they evade taxes. They 
insisted that while politically connected firms are not making actual losses, 
they most often declare losses in their annual reports. When the annual reports 
of politically connected firms from the sugar and textile sectors used in this 
research were assessed, it was found that most of these companies showed 
losses from 2009-2013. Furthermore, most of the politically connected 
companies did not declare any dividend during the period under study. 
However, a considerably higher number of non-connected firms declared both 
profits and dividends. The analysis of annual reports in other sectors groups 
also provided similar results (please refer to Appendix D). These results 
support the existing literature, whereby it is argued that politically connected 
firms disclose poor accounting information and do not provide good quality 
information in regard to firms' unobservable economic performance (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004; Chaney et aI., 2011) 
The members of politically connected companies named increased cost as a 
second major reason for avoiding disclosure in annual reports. Respondent A, 
stated: 
There is a cost offinancial statements. To publish. print and design 
them. I mean, it also includes the cost of time, you have to allocate 
human resources and when you want to publish, it also adds to the 
cost. ' 
In addition to the printing cost, the respondents also showed their concern for 
the cost of forming various board committees, comprised of qualified 
professionals. This implies that the increased cost is also a barrier to disclosure. 
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Moreover, it shows that politically connected firms do not consider the 
disclosures to be useful in terms of the flow of information to minority 
shareholders. Instead, the increase in costs is perceived to be negative for the 
firm. These findings support the earlier findings of the survey conducted by 
International Finance Corporation (2007), whereby research participants had 
expressed their unease about the costs of corporate governance regulations. 
The respondents from non-politically connected firms considered that 
companies do not want to disclose information being that most of the 
companies are family owned and controlled. The stock market in Pakistan is 
highly concentrated, while family ownership and control is an important 
feature of the stock market (Hamid and Kozhich, 2007; Iqbal, 2008). Prior 
literature suggests that the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
is negatively related to the firms being owned or controlled by founding 
families (Chau and Gray, 2002; Ali et aI., 2007). The analysis of the interview 
data thus provides evidence for these arguments. The most prominent reason 
for the unwillingness to disclose turned out to be the family control of the listed 
companies. 
It is generally a single family that holds a significant 
shareholding ... that is why even if maximum information is 
disclosed; still it is not going to make a significant difference. As in 
our country the true corporate culture which is practised in some 
developed nations, where the basic concept of corporations 
is ... disbursed ownership ... that is not practised in our country. 
(C, GM Finance, Textile Sector Company) 
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Some of the respondents stated that, since the establishment of Pakistan, most 
of the businesses in the country had been family owned. In order to promote 
corporate culture in the country and to strengthen its stock exchanges, the 
government offered tax rebates to listed companies. Therefore, in order to take 
advantage of this tax benefit, family businesses listed themselves on stock 
exchanges. However, with the passage of time, the government has eliminated 
that tax relief. Therefore, listed companies have been left with very small tax 
incentives, while they have to comply with corporate governance regulations 
(Israr, 2012). As they do not receive any benefits, listed companies are 
therefore becoming delisted from stock exchange. One respondent from a listed 
company explained: 
The government announced a benefit that was tax rebate ... most of 
the businesses were actually family oriented businesses ... they 
wanted to maintain their family structure in the same way ... but 
they wanted to take benefit out if it. However, over the period of 
time that benefit is also eliminated. Jfyou see in the previous five to 
six years, how many companies have been listed in the stock 
exchange? Their perspective is that there is no tax benefit 
anymore ... people think that listing is of no use and when they think 
that it is a family owned business, then they don't want to disclose 
the information as well. 
(I, Chief Financial Officer, Sugar Sector Company) 
Another respondent said: 
One prime reason is ... the compliance with the statutory 
requirement because they are family owned companies, and they 
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will definitely not wish to hire the non-executive director on their 
board. So, they will prefer to go for delisting. So, they offload 25% 
shares from their own pockets or from banks and just get rid of the 
minority shareholders. They will ... request SEep to determine the 
market price based on their book value ... so, may be getting back 
their shares at below par value ... . and it ensures that the legal 
requirements are not in fact practical. 
(B, Chief financial officer, Textile Sector Company) 
Overall, the results of the analysis suggest that a severe agency conflict exists 
between the controlling family members on the boards of listed companies and 
the minority shareholders. The controlling families do not want to disclose 
information to the minority shareholders. This situation indicates a 
misalignment between the existing institutional environment in Pakistan and 
the regulations introduced. 
The following sections focus on acquiring information regarding the influence 
of political connectedness on the mandatory and the voluntary disclosures of 
the companies. 
6.2 The Influence of Political Connectedness on Corporate Governance 
Disclosures 
6.2.1 Political Connectedness and Mandatory Disclosure 
This section focuses on gaining insight into the second sub-question of this 
research project: 'How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of 
mandatory corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Pakistan?' 
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The interview data was collected from politically connected as well as non-
connected firms in the sugar and textile sectors. At the beginning of the 
interview process, it was expected that, owing to the sensitivity of such issues, 
respondents from politically connected firms might resist openly expressing 
their opinions, in comparison with the non-connected firms. However, as the 
interviews were conducted, the respondents from connected firms openly 
provided opinions on how politicians influence business. The respondents from 
the politically connected firms also explained various ways in which these 
firms perform such corruption-oriented activities, such as window dressing, tax 
evasion, underlover invoicing, etc. Political corruption is pervasIve III 
Pakistan. In 2012, Pakistan was ranked as the twenty-eighth most corrupt 
country on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2014). 
Although there is a lack of literature on the influence of political connectedness 
on corporate governance disclosures, the prior literature has found that political 
influence is negatively related to corporate disclosure and transparency34, 
accountability and quality of accounting information and positively related to 
earnings opacity35 in annual reports (Bushman et aI., 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004; Chaney et aI., 2011). In contrast, the analysis of the interview data 
suggests that political influence does not affect mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures. Table 6.6 below summarises responses from the 
interview participants in this regard. 
~4Bushman et al. (2004, p. 208) defined corporate transparency as the availability of firm specific 
Information to company outsiders. 
35R"ah" " I I-Belkaoui (2004) defined earnings' opacity as a measure reflecting the insufficiency of disclosed 
Information regarding a firm's true but unobservable economic performance" 
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Table 6.6: Political Connected Firms and Mandatory Disclosure 
Nature of the Will they Reason/or 
Firm Examples 
Firm Disclose? Disclosure 
'Reporting requirements, he (politician) can't influence 
Textile-A Strict 
them ... because they (SECP) are tough guys and ... they like law Yes 
(Company secretary) enforcement 
Politically enforcement. Yes, because they hardly get influenced. ' 
I 
Connected Sugar - J (Chief 'They will disclose ... if they would not then legal authorities will Strict 
Yes 
Companies Financial Officer) make them comply with the law. ' enforcement 
Textile B -
'They will have to disclose mandatory information. Otherwise Strict 
Yes 
(Company secretary) they will get notices from the SECP and the stock exchange. ' enforcement 
Textile C - (OM 
'Politicians cannot injluence ... because that is directly monitored 
Strict 
Non-connected by the regulatory bodies, and there is a strict enforcement for Yes 
Finance) enforcement 
Companies this area. ' 
Textile - E (CEO 
'They will disclose what is required by law ... whatever is the Yes Strict 
-- ----
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Table 6.6: Political Connected Firms and Mandatory Disclosure 
Nature of the Will they Reason/or 
Firm Examples 
Firm Disclose? Disclosure 
and Chairman) requirement, they disclose. ' enforcement I 
I 
Sugar - H (Company Strict 
'They only share information which needs to be shared' Yes 
secretary) enforcement 
'Obviously the powerful people in Pakistan ... make their laws, 
R - Regulator 
they can twist the regulation, and they can give the regulation 
No No Influence Regulator 
their own meaning and they can implement according to their 
own standings. The things are not very simple in Pakistan. ' 
Statutory Audit Audit Firm - L 'As far as disclosure requirements are concerned, these Strict , 
Yes 
Firm (Partner) politicians may not have any influence. ' enforcement 
---
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Table 6.6 indicates a strong agreement in the views of all participants, except 
for regulator R. All respondents asserted that politically connected firms have 
to abide by the mandatory corporate governance disclosure regulation because 
the SECP strictly monitors compliance. It can be inferred from this evidence 
that political connectedness does not influence regulation implementation. The 
respondents were of the view that politicians exercise a profound influence 
over policy making. Therefore, policy making in those industries with 
substantial participation from politicians is heavily influenced. 
In addition to policy making, politically connected firms obtain administrative 
benefits from various government departments. They can easily obtain access 
to utilities and support from government bureaucracy, always ready to resolve 
their administrative problems. However, when it comes to the enforcement of 
corporate governance regulation, politically connected firms comply. For 
example, a respondent from a non-connected firm said: 
Reporting is being done as per the minimum requirement of the 
Code of Corporate Governance no matter if the firm is political or 
non-political. 
(I, Chief Financial Officer, Sugar Sector Company) 
However, the respondents also explained the reasons for the disclosure of 
mandatory information. First of all, the respondents said that regulation 
enforcement in the country is quite strict. Most of the respondents were of the 
view that, in case of non-compliance, the SECP sends notices to everyone, 
irrespective of their political affiliation. While it may not take any further legal 
action immediately, as soon as the politician loses power then the regulatory 
authorities take action against him. Therefore, most of the people prefer to 
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comply with regulations. The Chief Financial Officer of a politically connected 
firm claimed that 
If you are politically strong today and you are not fulfilling the 
paperwork and legal requirements, and the legal authority is not 
asking you anything because of political influence at the moment, 
but after five years you will be answerable. Your record is 
maintained by the regulatory authority, your history is being 
made ... iI means you will be accountable at later stage. 
(1, Chief financial officer, Sugar Sector Company) 
The respondent from a non-connected firm also shared similar views: 
In the implementation of rules and regulation, during the time that 
person holds a political position, he may not follow the rules and 
regulations. However, later on ... subsequently ... when their tenure 
ends ... government and bureaucracy now documents 
every thing ... they have become very active now ... then they use it 
against such politician. 
(I, Chief Financial Officer, Sugar Sector Company) 
The above evidence indicates that political connectedness does not influence 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports. These 
results support the earlier findings of content analysis in Chapter 5, 
demonstrating the level of mandatory disclosure in both connected and non-
connected firms was high. However, on the whole, the level of disclosure in 
non-connected firms was higher than in connected firms. 
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These results provide support for the perspectives of agency theory as well as 
rational choice institutionalism, whereby disclosure regulations serve as a 
monitoring corporate governance mechanism to resolve agency conflict 
between the principal (management) and the agent (minority shareholders). 
Furthermore, based on their calculations about the strict regulatory 
environment prevailing in the country, the directors of politically connected 
firms decide strategically to comply with corporate governance and disclosure 
regulation, which results in provision of high mandatory disclosure. 
These findings support the findings of Khemakhem and Dicko (2013) who 
argue that politically connected listed companies comply with mandatory 
provisions because non-compliance results in penalties being applied. 
However, the response from the respondent R (representative of regulatory 
body), suggests that politically connected people could use their power to 
influence the regulation formation and its implementation. The following 
section provides a detailed account of the in-depth analysis that was carried out 
in consideration of respondent R's opinion. 
6.2.2 Political Connectedness and Truth and Fairness of Mandatory 
Disclosures 
The assessment of the transparency of corporate governance disclosure does 
not come under the scope of this research. However, in Table 6.6 above, it can 
be seen that the response from respondent R, who was working at a key 
position in a regulatory organisation, was quite surprising. Respondent R stated 
that politicians always find ways of influencing policy making and its 
implementation. His response was an indication of the potential problems in 
the existing disclosure practices of politically connected companies. 
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As interview transcripts from all the participants were read iteratively, an 
unsettling theme emerged in regard to the truth and fairness of the disclosures 
provided by politically connected firms. It was found that, although these firms 
provide most of the mandatory disclosures in annual reports, their reliability 
might not be certain. Several respondents explained that corporate governance 
disclosure regulation is followed only in documents, while corporate 
governance is not practiced in reality - meaning in true practice. The partner of 
a statutory audit firm made this claim about the disclosure practices of 
politically connected firms: 
Practically, it (corporate governance regulation) remains just a 
piece of document ... only for the purposes of attestation, practically 
it was not implemented 
(0, Partner, Statutory Audit Firm) 
The partner of another audit firm stated: 
In Pakistan there are many things which are written in the books 
but nothing is done in practice. 
(L, Partner, Statutory Audit Firm) 
Another statement emerged from the representative of another regulatory body: 
They disclose but don '/ implement. 
(S, Regulator) 
Several representatives from the listed companies also agreed upon this in the 
context of politically connected firms; for example: 
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In annual reports they show and in practice they do not comply. 
(K, Manager Accounts, Finance and Taxation, Textile Sector Company) 
In order to look deeper into this matter, the review report on compliance with 
the best practices of corporate governance was analysed in each of the 200 
annual reports of the listed companies used for this research. In the 100 annual 
reports of non-connected firms, it was found that statutory auditors had only 
reported only one instance of non-compliance in the review report. However, 
in the 100 annual reports of politically connected companies, 16 such instances 
were found where the statutory auditors were of an opinion that they could not 
objectively verify the statement of compliance provided. Thus, they may not 
appropriately reflect the company's compliance with the Code. Thi,s evidence 
leads to the conclusion that politically connected firms provide corporate 
governance disclosures in the annual reports to meet minimum regulatory 
requirements. However, the information provided may not be transparent. 
Earlier literature on financial transparency has found that political influence is 
negatively related to corporate disclosure and transparency, earnings opacity, 
accountability and quality of accounting information in annual reports 
(Bushman et aI., 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Chaney et aI., 2011). However, 
there is a dearth of literature on the influence of political connectedness on the 
transparency of corporate governance disclosure, indicating the need to carry 
out future research whereby the transparency of corporate governance 
information in politically connected firms may be analysed. 
The following section will discuss the findings of the interview data analysis 
regarding the impact of political connectedness on voluntary disclosures. 
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6.2.3 Political Connectedness and Voluntary Disclosure 
This section focuses on acquiring information and insights into the third sub-
question of this research: 'How does political connectedness influence the 
disclosure of voluntary corporate governance information in the annual reports 
of listed companies in Pakistan?' 
There is a scarcity of literature addressing the impact of political connectedness 
on voluntary disclosure practices of the firms. However, as has been mentioned 
earlier, the literature suggests that political connectedness has a negative 
impact on the disclosure of financial and accounting information in annual 
reports (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Chaney et aI., 2011). The results from the 
content analysis in this research suggest that voluntary disclosure is poor in the 
annual reports of politically connected firms. The following table provides the 
responses of some of the research participants regarding voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of politically connected firms. 
306 
Chapter 6 - Interpreting Interview Data 
Table 6.7: Political Connectedness and Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Do politically 
Nature ofthe Firm Examples connected firms Firm disclose 
voluntarily? 
'Whether it is a politician who is doing business, you can consider him to be 
Textile-A a businessman only, instead of a politician. Every businessman conceals 
(Company secretary) many things ... if they are doing any good social work, they can disclose it a No 
Politically little bit. ' 
Connected 
Companies Textile B- 'The politically connected people will not prefer this (voluntary disclosure). 
(Company secretary) They will simply print a booklet to comply with the requirements. ' No 
Textile - J (CFO) 
'Not only the political people but everyone - political or non-political; no-
one likes to disclose any information. ' No 
Textile - D (Deputy 'For political people, the most important concern is to save their political 
Financial Controller) career, so if you share more information, more questions will be raised. ' No 
Non-connected Textile - G (Director 'If the company is not politically connected, companies do like disclosing 
Companies Finance) information. ' No 
Sugar - I (Chief 'As far as information of politically connected firm is concerned, they only 
Financial Officer) fulfil minimum requirements. ' No 
--
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The responses in Table 6.7 indicate that the interviewees from connected as 
well as non-connected firms both agreed that politically connected firms do not 
provide voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports. The 
respondents from politically connected firms insisted that no company wants to 
disclose voluntary information, regardless of its political connections. 
However, respondents from non-connected firms stressed that provision of 
excessive information was avoided by politically connected firms because 
politically connected firms find it difficult to handle the disclosure of 
additional information. This implies that politically connected firms are 
hesitant to disclose openly information on their governance related activities as 
they feel afraid of subsequent questions or objections. This finding supports the 
initial propositions of this research. 
6.2.4 Voluntary Disclosure is Not Useful 
One interesting theme that emerged in the analysis of interview data was that 
the respondents insisted that disclosure of voluntary information was not 
useful. The most striking response emerged from respondent H, a company 
secretary in a politically connected sugar sector company, who asserted that the 
disclosure requirements set out by regulations are the maximum standards for 
compliance, and that no information should be provided over and above those 
requirements. When he was asked about the provision of information over and 
above mandatory requirements, he replied: 
We cannot cross the limits ... disclosures mentioned in an annual 
report should be to the point' 
(H, Company Secretary, Sugar Sector Company) 
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The following two statements from the representatives of politically connected 
firms also emphasise the fact that the respondents consider that information 
regarding corporate affairs is owned by the company management and its 
disclosure is not useful, unless required by regulation. 
Neither I nor anyone else would like to disclose the (voluntary) 
information. It is my right, why should I tell everything to the 
public about anything? Until or unless it is the requirement, I 
would not disclose anything. 
(1, Chief Financial Officer, Sugar Sector Company) 
As per the traditional agency theory perspective, company management tends 
to be self-interested and opportunist and will tend to hold information for their 
own personal benefits (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The responses by 
interviewees in this study strongly support the assumption of self-interest. The 
usefulness of disclosures is also directly related to the self-interest of 
management and directors, and not to the interest of shareholders. The 
interviews revealed that there was no sense of fiduciary duties towards the 
information requirements of minority shareholders. Therefore, a severe agency 
problem existed between the board members of these family-controlled 
politically connected companies and the minority shareholders. For example, 
participant J stressed: 
I do not want to disclose because it doesn't benefit me in any way. 
There is no benefit to me for disclosing more information. 
(J, Chief Financial Officer, Sugar Sector Company) 
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The respondents from politically connected, as well as non-connected 
companies, openly expressed how the members of the board in politically 
connected companies expropriate money and take other undue benefits from 
the business. Respondent B, a company secretary from a politically connected 
company stated: 
I know so many people in the business ... they are taking money 
from business ... there are a number of ways ... they get money from 
sales. They have decided underlying side contracts with the buyers, 
they under-invoice on procurements. At the end of the day the 
company is not making money, they will not get benefit, they will 
not get dividend. The money goes into their pocket, and it is not 
disclosed. Their private accounts maybe in Switzerland, maybe in 
any other country, maybe in Dubai. Even statutory and regulatory 
authorities don't know about it. They will not ... they can't track it. 
Respondent Q, a partner of an audit firm, also shared his experience with a 
politically connected firm: 
They (politically connected members of the board) take some of the 
things for their personal use. They don't do that for 
company ... there are many such things ... that are not allowed to 
them ... I have seen it personally ... they will say, "It's ok, because 
it's authorised by a board member who is a minister, so it's ok. " I 
said "It is not allowed by law, you can use company assets for 
business purposes only, and you cannot use them for personal." 
But sometimes it happens so ... I had seen it in a company. 
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The analysis of these research data supports the argument that politicians' 
involvement in company affairs (such as being members of the board) results 
in their bargaining with managers, whereby they offer bribes to the managers 
in pursuit of their political interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Thus, despite 
being the agents of the shareholders, politically connected members of the 
board work to meet their personal political interests. Thus the presence of 
politically connected members on boards ultimately leads to a lower level of 
disclosures and transparency. 
In the institutional context of Pakistan, with high levels of political corruption 
and an under-developed capital market, it was expected that politically 
connected firms would provide minimum voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports. These findings support the initial research propositions and the results 
of the content analysis (Chapter 5). 
6.3 Findings and Conclusion 
The analysis of the interview data revealed that an accounting and finance 
department is mainly responsible for preparation of annual reports. It is the 
ultimate responsibility of the Chief Financial Officer to prepare annual 
accounts, compile them in the form of a report and present them to the board of 
directors. However, the members of the board actively guide and monitor the 
process of annual report preparation. The members of the board read the 
contents of annual reports and provide instructions for the addition or deletion 
of information. It was also found that politically connected firms consider 
annual reports as a tool for dissemination of mandatory information only. 
However, non-connected firms asserted that annual reports are aimed at 
311 
Chapter 6 - Interpreting Interview Data 
providing mandatory as well as voluntary and corporate governance 
information. 
The analysis of data suggests that annual reports are mainly prepared to meet 
regulatory requirements. Although the level of mandatory disclosure in all of 
the listed companies is high, the reason for this good level of disclosure is that 
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan is a strict regulator and 
ensures compliance with regulation. However, it was found from the 
interviews, that politically connected firms do not provide true and fair 
disclosures; instead, they comply with minimum regulatory disclosure 
requirements regarding their corporate governance obligations. 
It was found that all the listed companies in the sample avoid disclosing 
voluntary information in their annual reports. The pervasiveness of family 
ownership structure is the main reason for this reluctance to disclose in non-
connected firms. The family-controlled companies explicitly expressed their 
unease with certain corporate governance provisions, such as, board 
independence and board qualifications. However, the level of unwillingness 
towards voluntary disclosure increases manifold in the case of politically 
connected firms. 
It was found that the nature of agency conflict was more severe in politically 
connected firms because these firms avoid providing voluntary information in 
the annual reports. It might be inferred that a more severe form of agency 
conflict exists in these firms compared to non-connected firms. A lower level 
of disclosure might indicate that politically connected members of the board 
influence decisions pertaining to corporate governance disclosure, owing to the 
fear of cross matching the information and subsequent queries being raised. In 
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addition, the decisions regarding corporate governance disclosure are taken on 
the basis of perceived benefits and interest. However, the form of interest 
varies among politically connected and non-connected firms. A strong notion 
of self-interest was observed when the members of the board have political 
connections. It was also found that the decisions relating to disclosure are not 
driven by self-interest only. Instead, rationality plays an important role and 
considering strict regulatory enforcement, firms disclose mandatory 
information on corporate governance, while voluntary disclosures are avoided. 
The analysis of interview data has provided validation of the earlier findings 
obtained through the analysis of annual report data. The purpose of conducting 
interviews was to add to the richness of the earlier analysis and to make it more 
robust. The results obtained from the analysis of the annual report data have 
been further elaborated and enhanced by the results of the analysis of the 
interview data. It has therefore been found that the findings from the interview 
data not only support the results obtained from the content analysis, but they 
also support the initial theoretical foundations of the research. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this thesis elaborated the institutional background for this research. 
Chapter 3 provided a detailed review of prior literature in the field of corporate 
governance and disclosures and explained the theoretical foundations of this 
research. The critical review of the prior literature identified the gaps and developed 
foundation for the conduct of this research. Chapter 4 outlined the philosophy 
informing this research project. Explanations were provided regarding the design of 
this research project and the methods used for data collection and analysis were 
elaborated. 
Chapter 5 outlined the results obtained from the content analysis of the annual 
reports along with an in-depth analysis of silence on corporate governance practices 
in the annual report narratives of the listed companies. Chapter 6 provided results 
obtained from template analysis of the interview data. The results obtained from the 
analysis of interview data enabled triangulation and thus strengthened confidence in 
regard to the findings of this research. 
This chapter provides the conclusions to this research project. The contributions of 
this research are outlined. Limitations of this study are also recognized and directions 
are provided for future research. 
Figure 7. 1 shows how Chapter 7 is positioned in the thesis. 
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Figure 7.1: Chapter 7 - Positioning in the Thesis 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 of this chapter summarises the 
main findings of this research along with an explanation of how the results 
obtained answered research questions. Section 7.2 explains how this research 
has contributed to knowledge in the field of corporate governance. Section 7.3 
explains that the research was carried out ensuring the best quality standards in 
regard to the various criteria outlined by researchers. Section 7.4 outlines 
various limitations associated with this research along with an elaboration of 
potential directions for future research. 
7.1 Findings of the Research 
The main findings from the research carried out in this study attest to and 
validate that politically connected members of the board are self-interested and 
opportunistic, and make rational decisions regarding corporate governance 
disclosure. Politically connected companies take into consideration the 
institutional factors, such as the regulatory environment, while making 
decisions. However, this research has also found that the self-interest and 
benefits are not always monetary in nature. For example, the members of the 
board demonstrate the shirking of their fiduciary duties by not increasing the 
level of their qualifications to perform their roles more effectively. Instead, 
they comply for the sake of complying in terms of corporate governance 
practices, thus paying 'lip service' to the requirements. These findings are 
consistent with the argument that not all forms of corruption are monetary in 
nature (Andersson and Heywood, 2009). Owing to a strict regulatory 
environment, politically connected firms provide good mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures. However, the transparency of the disclosure provided 
may be doubtful. 
316 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This research used two different sources of data; namely, audited annual 
reports and semi-structured interviews. Three different methods were used for 
analysis of data: qualitative content analysis, analysis of silence and template 
analysis. The use of multiple data sources and data analysis methods enabled 
the researcher to validate the findings of the research through triangulation. A 
summary of the results of this research so follows, in reference to each research 
question. 
Question 1: How do listed companies in Pakistan disclose corporate 
governance related information in annual reports? 
This research question focused on exploring the process of preparation of 
annual reports to enable understanding of the role of the board in the process of 
decision-making regarding corporate governance disclosure. The research 
question also helped in examining the voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
practices of listed companies across the sugar, textile and the several sectors 
group. Template analysis (Chapter 6) showed that that board of directors are 
actively involved in the preparation of annual reports in the listed companies of 
Pakistan. Although, the annual reports are primarily prepared by the accounting 
and finance department, the members of the board actively guide and monitor 
the process. However, the purpose of preparation of annual reports is to meet 
regulatory requirement regarding preparation and dissemination of financial 
statements. No significant meaning or importance is attributed to non-financial 
data and corporate governance disclosures. 
The results of the qualitative content analysis of audited annual reports 
(Chapter 5) revealed that there are noteworthy differences between the levels 
of voluntary and mandatory disclosures in the annual reports. In both the sugar 
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and textile sectors, companies provide an adequate level of mandatory 
disclosure. However, the level of voluntary disclosure is poor in both 
industries. The use of triangulation strengthened the results obtained because 
the analysis of interview data supported the findings of qualitative content 
analysis. The respondents further asserted that it is not useful to provide 
information which is not required by the regulator (voluntary information). 
It was found that, in the context of Pakistan, 'good' disclosure is mandatory 
disclosure. It was also found that most of the companies studied in this research 
comply with mandatory corporate governance disclosure requirements. The 
analysis of interview data revealed that there was a clear resistance towards 
provision of information in annual reports. The companies provided this 
information only because it was required by law and they did not have any 
choice about non-disclosure. Furthermore, it was found that family ownership 
and the fear of tax authorities were the main factors responsible for this 
reluctance towards disclosure. 
No significant variation was observed in the level of disclosure across the 
different sectors. Instead, there was a similarity in trends of disclosure in 
various corporate governance constructs in the industries studied. It was found 
that the firms in all the sectors provided minimum disclosure regarding the 
profile of the board, while maximum disclosure was provided regarding board 
accountability. 
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Question 2: How does political connectedness influence tire disclosure of 
mandatory corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Pakistan? 
This research question focused on exploring the differences in the mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure practices of politically connected and non-
connected firms. It also aimed to explore in depth the underlying motivations 
and processes through which political influence is transmitted to affect 
mandatory disclosure. The use of qualitative content analysis revealed that the 
level of disclosure was adequate in both politically connected and non-
connected firms, with politically non-connected firms achieving slightly better 
levels of disclosure. However, the level of disclosure on the construct of profile 
was noticeably poor in politically connected firms. 
The analysis of interview data revealed that politically connected firms disclose 
mandatory corporate governance information, owing to strict regulatory 
enforcement. Template analysis indicated that even if the authorities do not 
take legal action for non-compliance against a politician immediately after the 
incidence of non-compliance is observed, they certainly take action as soon as 
the politician loses power. 
Another important finding indicated that despite the threat of penalisation from 
regulatory bodies, politically connected firms did not disclose information on 
the corporate governance trainings and qualifications of the members of the 
board. Thus, these firms faced the threat of monetary penalties, but did not 
provide information on board profile. One of the reasons for this non-
disclosure might be found in the argument that qualifications held by 
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politicians are an important issue in the Pakistan's political context and their 
disclosure can have political consequences for the politicians. 
These findings support the theoretical propositions of agency theory and 
rational choice institutionalism. It might be concluded that politically 
connected members of the board demonstrate self-interested and opportunistic 
behaviour. As evidenced by the interview data, they make strategic calculations 
about the strict regulatory environment and make the rational decision of 
disclosing mandatory information. However, as these members of board are not 
well qualified and competent, they do not provide information about their 
profile in the annual reports. The companies face the risk of penalty and 
monetary loss by non-disclosure of this information. However, politically 
connected members of the board neither improve their qualifications, nor do 
they provide disclosure. This may indicate the prevalence of a form of political 
corruption which is not monetary in nature. 
These findings challenge the notion that self-interest and utility can always be 
calculated in monetary terms. Instead, self-interest and opportunism of the 
members of politically connected firms motivates them to stay unqualified and 
thus expropriate minority shareholder interests through shirking. The chances 
of being penalised and thus facing a financial loss also fail to convince them 
for improving their knowledge and skills, as required. 
Template analysis also indicated that although the level of mandatory 
disclosure in the annual reports was high; however, the reliability of 
disclosures was not certain. The analysis of interview data indicated that 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports of politically 
connected firms might not be transparent as they are often provided for 
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meeting regulatory criteria only. The analysis of annual report data supported 
this finding as, in several instances, the statutory auditors of politically 
connected firms had refrained from objective verification of corporate 
governance disclosures provided in those annual reports. 
Question 3: How does political connectedness influence the disclosure of 
voluntary corporate governance information in the annual reports of listed 
companies in Pakistan? 
The qualitative content analysis of data (Chapter 5) in the annual reports of 
listed companies revealed that politically connected companies disclose a 
visibly lower level of voluntary corporate governance information in 
comparison to non-connected firms. Meanwhile, non-connected firms provide 
better disclosure on all the constructs of corporate governance. The analysis of 
silence in the annual reports (Chapter 5) also attests to this finding of the 
qualitative content analysis, as a strong evidence of silence and empty speech 
on corporate governance matters was found in the annual reports of politically 
connected firms. 
The analysis of silence indicated that the annual reports of non-connected firms 
provided detailed disclosure and covered a broad range of corporate 
governance aspects. It was found that non connected firms provided detailed 
information about their accountability regarding shareholder value creation, 
strategic decision making and disclosure. These companies outlined their past, 
present and future strategies for dealing with challenges in corporate 
environment. These companies also provided details about the outcomes of 
past company strategy. 
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In addition, non-connected companies also expressed their strong commitment 
towards the provision of timely, reliable and transparent corporate disclosure. 
Furthermore, non-connected firms provided detailed information about the 
roles and responsibilities of the directors. However, the annual reports of 
politically connected firms stayed silent on all these aspects of disclosure. The 
analysis of silence revealed that disclosure in the annual reports of politically 
connected firms is mainly superficial, inadequate, covering a limited range of 
issues and lacking depth. Evidence of empty speech was also observed 
regarding disclosure on board independence. 
A template analysis of interview data (Chapter 6) revealed that politically 
connected firms did not consider provision of voluntary disclosure to be useful. 
A complete lack of fiduciary duties was observed as politically connected firms 
insisted on providing minimum information, claiming that the public was not 
supposed to be informed of anything about the company beyond legal 
requirements. Strong evidence was found in support of the research project's 
theoretical propositions as the notion of self-interest and opportunism was 
reinforced. The representatives of politically connected firms claimed that they 
do not disclose corporate governance information as it does not benefit them. 
Some of the respondents explicitly stated that they did not want to disclose 
information as they were involved in rent seeking activities. Evidence obtained 
from representatives of audit firms also confirmed the involvement of 
politically connected members of the board in rent seeking activities, which 
resulted in poor level of disclosure. 
The findings from the analysis of data support the initial theoretical 
propositions of the research based on agency theory and rational choice 
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institutionalism. It might be argued that these theoretical perspectives provide 
useful explanations regarding corporate governance phenomena in the context 
of developing countries like Pakistan. However, the findings of the research 
also indicate a need for further theoretical development and expansion in the 
field. 
7.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
1) The research findings indicate that politically connected members of the 
board are self-interested individuals, although the institutional environment 
plays an important role in shaping their behaviour. For example, fearing 
regulatory actions, they provide a high level of mandatory information. The 
strict regulatory environment forces them to comply. These findings support 
the presence of a strong agency conflict in the context of Pakistan. 
2) This research has reconciled the economic agency perspective with an 
institutional perspective. The evidence supports the use of a socialised version 
of agency theory as it was argued that outcomes cannot always be 
economically calculated. This study also supports the calls for more in-depth 
research, using multiple theoretical lenses and combinations of various 
research methods in corporate governance and disclosure literature. 
3) This research has filled a gap in existing corporate governance literature in 
developing countries being that no prior research has, to the best of the 
researcher's knowledge, investigated the impact of political connectedness on 
corporate governance disclosure. It is to be argued that although several studies 
have investigated the impact of political connectedness on the quality of 
financial reporting, there are currently no studies investigating the impact of 
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political connectedness on non-financial information, such as the corporate 
governance disclosure practices of listed companies. 
4) This research has explored the process of formation of annual reports in the 
real life context of a developing country that is Pakistan. The research indicates 
that members of the board take decisions regarding the nature, level and quality 
of corporate governance disclosure. The research also indicates that statutory 
audit firms participate in the preparation of financial statements, which is a 
violation of the International Financial Reporting Standards. 
5) This research has made an important methodological contribution because it 
has analysed the narrative sections of the annual reports through an 
examination of silence in regard to corporate governance information. 
Although the analysis of silence has been used for the study of political 
communication, it has not been widely used as a tool for analysis of annual 
report data. This research has utilised analysis of silence in conjunction with 
the qualitative content analysis in order to seek deeper insights. The method 
employed here indicates that politically connected firms use silence and empty 
speech as tools for non-disclosure. 
Theoretical Implications 
Existing research in the field of corporate governance and disclosure has 
predominantly utilised the agency theory perspective for conducting 
quantitative investigation. This research project was a response to the calls for 
investigation of agency conflict in rich contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Heracleous, 
2008; Heracleous and Lan, 2012). As many researchers have proposed using 
agency theory in combination with other theoretical perspectives so as to 
capture effectively the complexity of the phenomena researched (Eisenhardt, 
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1989; Cohen et aI., 2008), for the purpose of gaining deep insights, this 
research used the agency theory perspective in conjunction with rational choice 
institutionalism. This research is significant academically being that it has 
combined the theoretical underpinnings of agency theory and institutional 
theory. It is argued that both perspectives, if utilised together, jointly provide a 
better and more robust understanding of complex real life phenomena. 
Initial research propositions were developed for the purpose of directing the 
scope of the future research. It was intended to analyse the so called positivist 
and rigid assumption of self-interest in the institutional context in which social 
actors make disclosure decisions. Various recent debates and suggestions 
regarding an institutionally sensitive version of agency theory were taken into 
consideration while analysing data (Hendry, 2005; Heracleous and Lan, 2012; 
Wiseman et aI., 2012).Through an analysis of voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure practices of politically connected firms in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
the notion of self-interest, opportunism and rational decision making have been 
verified. However, it has also been found that institutional (regulatory and 
political) environment plays an important role in influencing disclosure 
decisions. 
The empirical analysis of annual report data has enabled the researcher to look 
for an explanation beyond the traditional agency theory perspective, whereby 
the notion of self-interest is limited to the maximisation of wealth and 
monetary benefits. The analysis of data indicated that listed companies in 
Pakistan avoided providing mandatory disclosure on the construct of board 
profile, which included information on corporate governance training and the 
qualification of the members of the board. They did not therefore avail 
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themselves of opportunities for professional development and good governance 
practice, both of which could have helped in the improvement of company 
performance. 
This behaviour might have several negative implications. Firstly, it has 
negative consequences for minority shareholders' interests manifesting agency 
problem. Furthermore, non-disclosure of such information can result in 
penalisation by the regulatory bodies and financial penalties. Another 
important implication of a lack of qualification of these members of the board 
might be the negative affect on their own political career, which might 
ultimately lead to a loss of political power. However, despite these negative 
implications for minority shareholders, as well as for their own political 
careers, these members of the board do not attain required qualification. Thus 
their resistance to acquire better qualification (self-interest) overwhelms the 
monetary and political benefits attached with the attainment of qualification. 
Through the evidence stated above, this research strengthens the notion that 
self-interest might not always be measurable in monetary terms, as it has 
always been interpreted by existing quantitative corporate governance 
literature. Thus this research extends the existing agency theory through the 
conduct of this empirical research. 
It was also found that although self-interest and opportunism are central in 
decisions regarding corporate governance disclosure (Chapter 6). However, 
rationality played an important role in guiding these decisions (Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6). Evidence from research data indicated that, although politically 
connected firms did not provide high level of voluntary disclosures, they 
provided high level of mandatory disclosures (Chapter 5). 
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Template analysis has here validated the perspective of rational choice 
institutionalism because it was found that politically connected firms provided 
better mandatory disclosure as regulatory enforcement in the country is quite 
strict. As no benefits are perceived to be associated with the provision of 
voluntary corporate governance information, therefore its level remains low. 
This finding attests that social actors make strategic calculations about the 
institutional environment and attempt to maximise their benefits rationally. 
This research thus supports the argument that the rigid assumptions of self-
interest, as presented in traditional agency theory, should be studied beyond the 
inflexibility of certain economic assumptions. This study also highlights the 
usefulness and importance of studying agency conflict in the real life context. 
The research also supports the arguments presented in the existing corporate 
governance research whereby an institutionally sensitive approach might be 
used for research. 
Practical Implications 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Pakistan, like many other developing countries, 
follows an Anglo-Saxon based model of corporate governance through the 
introduction of a Code of Corporate Governance in 2002. However, as has 
been argued by prior research, the Anglo-Saxon model is a market-based 
model based on a theory of shareholder wealth maximization. It is therefore 
suitable for a market characterised by widely dispersed owners, efficient and 
liquid capital and equity markets (where firms are expected to be less 
dependent on long term bank finance), and well established legal systems 
where company management is relatively free from close monitoring and 
control. 
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However, Siddiqui (2010) argued that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance, as adopted by developing economies is not a suitable model given 
the economic, legal and corporate context of these countries. Siddiqui (20 I 0) 
further argued that stock markets in developing countries are less developed 
and are characterised by high ownership concentration. The Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance is considered more suitable for application in 
developed capital markets with dispersed shareholders. However, despite this 
institutional misalignment, various developing countries, including Pakistan, 
have adopted this model under the influence of international financial agencies. 
The findings of this research indicate that under strict regulatory pressures, 
companies in Pakistan have started to comply with mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure requirements. However they do not consider these 
regulations to be of any use. The deli sting of companies after the introduction 
of corporate governance regulations in Pakistan context demonstrates the 
reluctance of companies towards compliance. Furthermore, while politically 
connected firms also adhere to high levels of compliance (Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6), the incidence of empty speech demonstrates that compliance is 
reduced to a box ticking activity. Moreover, the reliability and transparency of 
disclosure provided by politically connected firms might be questioned. It may 
be implied that the introduction and implementation of corporate governance 
and disclosures have not met their original objectives of enhancing 
transparency and investor protection. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that, in order to ensure effective 
implementation and compliance, international regulatory bodies and local 
governments in the developing countries need to be more sensitive towards the 
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country's institutional environment while new corporate governance and 
disclosure regulations are introduced and implemented. This research provides 
evidence that politicians extract rents from corporate sector and hide such 
information through a lack of disclosure. The clear implication is that there is a 
need to focus on the development of such corporate policies and governance 
regulations that are compatible with the prevailing institutional environment of 
the country. 
It is recommended that regulators should not ignore the fact that most of the 
companies in the stock market in Pakistan are family owned and controlled, so 
governance in such companies might not be improved by implementing an 
Anglo-Saxon based model of corporate governance. Considering the fact that 
one set of regulations might not address the governance needs of all 
companies, the regulators might consider introducing a separate set of 
corporate governance and disclosure regulations for family owned listed 
companies. Since these companies are subject to agency conflict between 
family owners and non-family members/minority shareholders, corporate 
governance guidelines might assist them in resolving those issues on their own. 
Moreover, since every family business deals with unique circumstances on 
account of complexity in family relationships, corporate governance guidelines 
for family businesses might not be mandatory. These guidelines might be 
voluntary, with a focus on assisting family firms in devising tailored solutions 
to their problems. 
Since the findings of this research also indicate that the level of disclosure in 
politically connected firms was lower compared with non-connected firms, this 
might indicate that politicians' involvement in the corporate sector results in a 
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conflict of interest between their political and business interests. Thus, the 
regulatory bodies might consider introducing certain regulations to avoid this 
conflict of interest. For example, a regulation might be introduced imposing 
restrictions on the appointment of a politically influential person as chairman 
of the audit committee. 
7.3 Quality of Research 
The researcher was aware of the issues concerning the quality of this research. 
Hence, an assessment of the quality of this research was carried out on the 
basis of various criteria, as outlined by Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 43). As this 
research was an in-depth context-based case study and that most of the 
evidence was gathered through the qualitative analysis of interview data and 
narrative sections in the annual reports, the assessment criteria for qualitative 
research - that is, credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability -
are appropriate for evaluation of this study. 
Credibility refers to the degree to which the research findings might be taken as 
believable. Multiple methods of data collection have been used for carrying out 
an exploratory and context-based inquiry regarding corporate governance 
disclosure practices. The use of triangulation through multiple sources of 
evidence has ensured that the data were actually demonstrating the trends 
which the researcher believed it to be indicating. Agreement in the results 
obtained from various sources of data and through various methods of data 
analysis validated the findings of the study. This therefore increased the level 
of confidence in the inferences drawn from the data (Saunders et aI., 2012). 
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Transferability refers to the extent to which the research findings might be 
applied to other contexts; that is, how generalisable the research findings prove 
to be. This research was a qualitative context-based study and this feature tends 
to limit its generalisability. However, a good level of transferability was 
ensured through a provision of detailed descriptions of the phenomena studied. 
The research questions and the reasons for the choice of the research sample 
have been explained in detail. Various decisions and choices made during the 
process of research have also been well elaborated. The findings of the study 
might thus be applicable to similar contexts, particularly to the context of other 
developing countries. 
Dependability refers to the extent to which the findings might generate the 
same results, if the research were to be repeated. In order to enhance the future 
replicability of the research, various conceptual terms were clearly explained. 
The process of categorising annual report data and the template analysis of 
interview data have indeed been explained in detail in this thesis (Chapter 4). A 
detailed description regarding the method for analysis of data has been 
provided. These factors enhance the ease of replication for future researchers. 
In addition, a detailed account of existing research, employing similar research 
methodologies, has been provided and an explanation has been provided of 
how this research is placed in the existing literature in the field (Chapter 3). 
Confirmability represents the extent to which the researcher attempts to 
generate objective results (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p. 43). Multiple methods of 
data collection have strengthened the objectivity of the data. No inference has 
been drawn from the data unless the researcher found at least three instances of 
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evidence in support thereof. An adequate amount of evidence has been 
provided in support of the conclusions drawn from the data. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study and Agenda for Future Research 
Although the research provides strong and useful insights on how political 
connectedness influences corporate governance disclosure, there are some 
limitations associated with this study. 
Firstly, considering political connectedness to be a sensitive topic, some bias in 
the interview responses is likely to have crept in as some of the respondents 
might have responded to certain questions cautiously. However, the researcher 
utilised triangulation in order to overcome this limitation and to enhance the 
quality of research findings. The results of template analysis were supported by 
the findings obtained from qualitative content analysis and the analysis of 
silence and thus raised the level of confidence in results. 
Secondly, this is a single country study, aimed at understanding the impact of 
political connectedness on corporate governance disclosures in Pakistan. It 
might be considered that qualitative techniques of data analysis are more time 
consuming, when compared to quantitative analysis. Being that it was an in-
depth qualitative study and also included collection and analysis of interview 
data, the corporate governance disclosure practices of only 40 listed companies 
have been studied across the different industrial sectors. The research has not 
utilised any statistical techniques to establish a correlation between the various 
variables. Thus, research utilising a larger sample of firms utilising the 
technique of quantitative content analysis might be conducted in the future. 
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Thirdly, the study has used a measure for direct observation of political 
connectedness in corporate boards. However, owing to the difficulties in 
getting access to relevant and reliable data, other mechanisms for establishing 
political connectedness, such as lobbying and political donations have not been 
taken into account. This limitation of the research might be addressed in future 
research whereby new and more effective measures for political connectedness 
might be developed in the context of Pakistan and other developing countries. 
Furthennore, this study was an in-depth investigation of the impact of political 
connectedness on the level of corporate governance disclosure. The study of 
transparency and quality of corporate governance disclosure do not then fall 
within the scope of this research. However, as indicated by the findings of this 
research, the disclosures provided by politically connected finns might not be 
reliable and transparent. Therefore, research might be carried out investigating 
transparency of corporate governance disclosure in politically connected finns. 
This research project has successfully fulfilled its objective of providing an 
understanding of the unique context in which it was conducted. Moreover, as 
the ownership structure and nature of the capital market in Pakistan is similar 
to the ownership structure prevailing in many Asian and developing countries, 
the findings of this research might be useful in seeking explanations in similar 
institutional contexts. However, this research calls for similar qualitative 
studies to be carried out in the contexts of developing countries so as to 
facilitate a comparison and understanding of how institutional forces affect the 
implementation, development and effectiveness of corporate governance and 
disclosure regulations in these countries. More context-based research could 
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also provide an explanation of contradictions In the findings of existing 
corporate governance research. 
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Table of Legislation 
Statutes 
The Constitution of Pakistan (1973) 
Civil Servants Act 1973, Pakistan 
Government of India Act 1935 
The Companies Ordinance 1984, Pakistan. 
UK Data Protection Act 1998, United Kingdom 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, United Kingdom 
Statutory Instruments 
KSE 2002 Listing Regulations 
Conduct of General Elections Order 2002 
Codes 
The Code of Corporate Governance 2002, Pakistan 
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Research Project Information and Consent Form 
Project Title 
The Impact of Political Connectedness on the Quality of Corporate Governance 
Disclosures in Pakistan 
Name of the Researcher 
Fatima Yusuf - PhD Student- The Open University, UK. 
Purpose of the Research 
This research project is undertaken purely for academic purposes. The objective 
of the research is to develop an understanding regarding the impact imposed by 
political connectedness on the quality of corporate governance disclosures in 
listed companies of Pakistan. The research process will involve semi-structured 
interviews with the participants along with detailed observational field notes. In 
addition to interview data, the research will also include analysis of corporate 
annual reports. The research responses and data will be used for the purposes of 
academic analysis only. 
Duration of the Interview 
The interview will be conducted at participant's workplace and will last for 
duration of approximately one hour. 
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Benefits to the Participants 
As the participants in the research are either experts in the field of corporate 
governance or senior managers, i.e., representatives of the listed companies, 
regulatory bodies and audit firms, the outcomes of this research might be of 
special interest to them. A copy of the research report shall be provided to them 
after completion of the project. 
Risks to the Participants 
The research process involves a minimal level of risks. The participants will not 
encounter any risks that might exceed the level of risks that the participants 
encounter in everyday life. However, the researcher shall take due care to protect 
participants from all types of psychological distress and physical risks. 
Confidentiality and Data Protection 
Every possible precaution will be taken in protecting the confidentiality of the 
research participants' identities and data. The data collected from the participants 
will be used for research with their due permission. If any participant does not 
permit the use of any of the information provided by himlher for research purpose, 
such data will not be used. 
The interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed by the researcher later on. 
The researcher will take every possible measure to ensure protection of data from 
unauthorised access, accidental disclosure, loss or destruction. The researcher 
shall keep the data under password protected storage. The audio data will be 
stored on the OU secure server which is accessible to the researcher only. The 
data shall not be kept with the researcher longer than required for the project and 
will be destroyed once this research project is finished and the research 
dissertation is completed and formally approved. The data will be accessible to the 
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researcher, the supervisors and the examining team only and all measures will be 
taken to ensure that no third party can access the data. 
The names of the participants shall be kept confidential. The name of the 
organisation shall also be kept confidential unless its disclosure is allowed. 
Pseudonyms shall be used for the purpose of securing anonymity for research 
participants. The provisions of the Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
Act, the Open University's Code Of Practice for Research and Those Conducting 
Research, the Ethics Principles for Research involving Human Participants and, 
the Economic and Social Research Council's Framework for Research Ethics 
regarding confidentiality and data protection shall be followed. The results of the 
data shall be disseminated in the form of a dissertation report and possibly in the 
form of an article for presentation in an academic conference or by publication in 
an academic journal. 
Costs and Compensation 
The research project is funded by The Open University and will be undertaken for 
the purpose of the PhD thesis. The research participant shall not be obliged to bear 
any extraordinary costs during the research process. The researcher shall approach 
the participant at hislher workplace. 
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
The participant has full right to refuse participation in the research process. In 
case of agreement of participation, the respondent has the right to withdraw 
hislher participation before all the research data are analysed and final results are 
concluded. 
Contact Details 
In case of any queries about the matters relating to the research project, please free 
to contact me or my supervisors at The Open University. 
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Fatima Yusuf (Researcher) 
T: UK 01908(6) 54022 Pak 00923214577090 
E: fatima.vusuf@open.ac.uk 
Dr.DevendraKodwani (Lead Supervisor) 
T: UK 01908(6) 55859 E: devendra.kodwani@open.ac.uk 
Professor Jane Frecknall-Hughes (Supervisor) 
T: UK 01908(6) 32565 E: Jane.Frecknall-Hughes@open.ac.uk 
Participation Agreement 
1 ______________________ ___ have had the opportunity to read this 
information and consent form, ask questions about the research project and am 
prepared to participate in this project. I have been informed about the purpose, 
duration, risks, and benefits of the project. Moreover, I have been informed that 
confidentiality of the information shall be protected and the responses shall be 
used for academic purposes and might be published in the form of articles in 
academic journals. I assign the copyright for my contribution to the Open 
University for these purposes. I have also been informed that I have the right to 
withdraw from participation before all the research data are analysed and final 
results are presented to conclusion. 
I understand that if I have any questions or concerns about this project, I can 
contact the researcher and her supervisors as listed above. 
Participant's Signature Date 
Researcher's Signature Date 
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Appendix B 
Interview Schedule 
The following interview questionnaire has been developed for the purpose 
of seeking answers to relevant and important questions. This guideline will 
help in ensuring that the interview does not lose focus. 
From Listed Companies' Managersl Directors 
1. Process for Preparation 
I. How are corporate annual reports prepared? 
ii. In addition to the regulatory requirements by SEep, do organisations 
develop an internal disclosure policy? 
iii. How is it decided whether to disclose information beyond what is required 
bylaw? 
iv. Whose interests do disclosure regulations serve? 
v. How does the level of law enforcement affect the quality of disclosures? 
vi. Do you perceive that good disclosures are beneficial for the companies? 
2. Quality of Disclosures 
i. How will you define good quality corporate governance disclosures in the 
company annual report? 
ii. How do listed companies ensure disclosure of a good quality of 
information? 
iii. What is your view about the quality of corporate governance disclosures in 
a listed company's annual reports in Pakistan? 
IV. What would improve the quality of disclosures? 
354 
Appendices 
v. What do you consider are the undesirable consequences/limitations of 
corporate governance disclosure requirements for listed companies? 
vi. Can compliance with the disclosure regulations provide listed companies 
with a competitive advantage? 
vii. Is it beneficial for the company to disclose information over and above the 
minimum disclosure requirements set by corporate governance and 
reporting regulation? 
3. Political Connectedness 
i. Who are the most important people in listed companies, influencing the 
decisions regarding corporate governance disclosure in annual reports? 
11. What benefits does political connectedness bring to the company? 
Ill. Does political connectedness bring any benefits to the shareholders of the 
company? If yes, kindly elaborate the nature of the benefits. 
IV. Can you elaborate the process through which political connectedness bring 
benefits to the company? 
v. How does political connectedness influence organisational policies and 
practices regarding corporate governance disclosures? 
vi. How does political connectedness play a role in hiring of those human 
resources in the organisation who are involved in preparation of annual 
reports? 
vii. How do the members of the board affect hiring process in the organisation? 
4. Control 
I. Who controls the management of a listed company? 
II. How are the interests of the owners of the business protected? 
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Ill. Are current corporate disclosure practices catering for minority 
shareholders' interest? 
5. Reasons for Poor Quality of Disclosures 
IV. What do you think can be the possible reasons for poor quality of 
disclosures in the annual reports of listed companies in Pakistan? 
From Managers in Audit Firms 
i. What, in your opinion, can be the possible reasons for poor quality of 
disclosures in the annual reports of listed companies of Pakistan? 
ii. Who are the most important and powerful people in listed companies, 
influencing the quality of corporate governance disclosures In listed 
companies? 
iii. How, in your opinion, do politically connected members of the board 
influence company activities? 
iv. How, in your opinion, can the political connectedness of the members of 
board of directors affect companies' quality of corporate governance 
disclosures? 
v. How do politically connected people on company boards influence minority 
shareholder rights? 
vi. How, in your opinion does the quality of disclosures differ in non-connected 
companies if compared with connected ones? 
From Representatives of Regulatory Bodies 
i. What were the objectives for the introduction of corporate governance 
disclosure regulations for listed companies of Pakistan? 
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ll. How would you define good quality disclosures in the annual report of a 
listed company? 
iii. Are you satisfied with the quality of corporate governance disclosures by 
the listed companies in Pakistan? 
iv. Can the imposition of more stringent regulation improve the quality of 
disclosures in annual reports of listed companies? 
v. How, do you think, can companies improve corporate governance related 
disclosures in their annual reports? 
VI. Can you quote any incidents (without name) when the regulatory body 
prosecuted or took action against directors, chief executive or other officers 
for non-disclosure of material corporate governance information? 
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Appendix C 
[Ol 
\.~ 
From 
Email 
Extension 
To 
SubjKt 
Ref 
Redfonn 
Submitted 
Date 
Dr Duncan 8anks 
Chair, The ()pen University Human Research Ethics Committee 
duncan.banks@lopen.ac.,* 
59198 
Fatima Yusuf, Faculty of Business & Law 
-1M Impact 0{ Politicol C~d~ on rh~ Quality 0{ 
Corporr1t~ ~manu Disclosrns In Pakistan .• 
HREC/2013/1462/Yu~/l 
06 June 2013 
24 June 2013 
Memorandum 
This memorandum is to confirm that the !'!Search protocol fof the above-named !'!Search project, as 
submitted for ethics review, has been cMn • favourable opinion by the Open Uniwrsity Human Research 
Ethics Committee. 
Please make sure that any question(s) relatine to your application and approval are sent to Research-REC-
Review@o~n.ac.uk quotinc the HREC reference numb« above. We will endelMll.r to respond as qulCldy as 
possible 50 that your research is no!: delayed in any way. 
A! the conclusion of your JWOjett, by the date that you stated in your application, the Committee would like 
to receive I summary report on the procress c:A this project, any ethical issues that haW lrisen and how they 
haW been dealt with. 
Reprds, 
Dr Duncan Banks 
Chair OU HREC 
The Open University is inoorpoIaIed by Royal 0w1I!r (number RC 00039' ~ an ~ cNrity in England & Wales and II 
--, ~ in ScaIIand (number SC 0383(2) 
~C_20'Ul462-Yusuf-t~ 
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Appendix D 
Profitability and Dividends - A Comparisons Between Politically Connected and Non 
Connected Firms Sugar and Textile 
Total No of Times 
Profit Earned or 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 Dividend 
Announced 
Politicall Connected firms 
No of Profitable 
Firms 6 4 6 7 5 28 
No of Firms 
Disclosing 3 4 4 4 3 18 
Dividends 
Non Connected firms 
No of Profitable 
Firms 9 7 9 8 5 38 
No of Firms 
Disclosing 7 6 6 7 5 31 
Dividends 
Profitability and Dividends - A Comparisons Between Politically Connected and Non 
Connected Firms Several Sectors 
Total No of Times 
2013 2011 2011 2010 2009 Profit Earned or 
Dividend 
Announced 
Po Iitica II Connected firms 
No of Profitable 
Firms 6 4 5 6 3 26 
No of Firms 
Disclosing 4 4 
Dividends 
4 5 3 20 
Non Connected firms 
No of Profitable 
Firms 8 8 10 8 7 41 
No of Firms 
Disclosing 6 6 6 7 6 31 
Dividends 
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